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JPRS L/10670 19 July 1982

Worldwide Report

TERRORISM FOUO 7/82



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WORLDWIDE REPORT

TERRORISM

FOUO 7/82

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YUGOSLAVIA

TERRORISM AS WEAPON FOR SETTLING ACCOUNTS

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 May 82 p 8

[Interview with Dr Vojin Dimitrijevic, professor at the School of Law of Belgrade University and member of the Committee for International Terrorism of the World Association for International Law, by Milivoje Pavlovic: "A Dangerous Weapon in the Hands of a Minority"]

[Text] [Question] Is it an essential characteristic of terror that an armed minority is settling accounts with the majority? (we asked Dr Vojin Dimitrije-vic, author of a study of contemporary terrorism which will soon be published).

Enthusiasm and Repugnance

[Answer] Yes, even today terror is a weapon of a minority which feels that some broader interest of its own is being threatened and out of this fear wants to paralyze this adversary. In so doing the minority is unable, and sometimes even unwilling, to distinguish between those truly to blame and those who are not. The innocent predominate in the total number of victims, either because terror is by definition undiscriminating or because it is taken out of the hands of the initiators. The haste with which acts are committed and the lack of surveillance make abuses possible, especially in the form of settlement of personal accounts inspired by hatred, envy and ambition. Thus in addition to the confusion among enemies, a state of general uncertainty is created which threatens even government authority itself.

[Question] What can be said about the present terminological confusion over the terms "terror" and "terrorism"?

[Answer] The attitude toward terrorism, and indeed toward its study, is charged with emotion. The reaction to individual acts of terrorism may in one and the same case range from extreme enthusiasm to the deepest repugnance. There are few terrorist acts which do not simultaneously encounter both approval and condemnation, even if we set aside the immediate circles around those committing them or their victims. On the other hand there does exist a tendency today to put the terrorist label even where previously it would by no means have applied. At present there is no agreement in the international community of specialists concerning the definition of terrorism, though by and large what is meant by it is well known.

[Question] Can it be said that every act of terror has a political dimension?

[Answer] There are researchers who say that there is such a thing as nonpolitical terrorism. Every act of terror "from above" is political, because ruling people falls in the domain of politics. The dilemmas arise in attempts to define the main dimensions of terror exerted "from below," which may be aimed at overthrowing the government, but may also be a part of a struggle waged between forces which do not desire power. The international conventions which have been adopted on prevention and prosecution of particular manifestations of terrorism such as the hijacking of aircraft or threats to civil air navigation do not require that the offender committing the crimes they describe have political motives.

Our own legislation does take these peculiarities into account. Article 125 of the SFRY Criminal Code describes as acts of terrorism only those acts undertaken "out of hostile motives toward the SFRY."

[Question] Terrorists of all countries are today uniting and collaborating better than certain official international organizations. What unites them, especially when neither their goals nor means are the same?

[Answer] Until recently most acts of terrorism concerned relations within a country in which a majority of others had no interest. The terrorist act brought about international consequences only when the terrorists took refuge abroad. Today, however, the forms of terrorism in international relations cannot be reduced to simple notions. The field of international terrorism is widening to unprecedented proportions. When the West German, Italian and Japanese "Red" terrorists collaborate, the thing is still comprehensible: they are waging war out of a conviction that they have a common enemy. One can also explain the ties between the West German and Palestinian organizations, as well as collaboration between the Northern Ireland and Basque terrorist groups. There are even suppositions about crisscrossed ties of ideologically unrelated groups. However, the terrorist today can operate on an international scale even when his act has no elements of foreignness whatsoever. The West European fighter against imperialism need not, according to this conception, enter into association with the fighter in Latin America to kidnap an Arab minister to make this an international act. He attacks his worldwide enemy right at home by killing, in West Germany, say, the director of a German

I Do Not Believe That There Is a 'Terrorist Internationals'

Governments on the other hand are unwilling to admit that domestic causes of terrorism exist, and they are inclined to proclaim all terrorists agents of foreign forces and services.

[Question] Do you believe in the existence of any sort of secret "terrorist internationale"?

[Answer] I have occasionally read about this in our own and the world press. Supposedly that kind of "internationale" brings together all terrorists solely

because they are terrorists, because terrorism is their trade. Certain semilegendary figures have even been created, and films have been made about the mysterious "Carlos" and certain other "abstract" superterrorists, "masters of the world." So far I have not seen a single convincing piece of evidence concerning the existence of a "terrorist internationale." I do not believe that it exists.

[Question] Terrorism is a dangerous threat to certain general human values. Does agreement exist about the values which should be protected by international law?

[Answer] Terrorism can be described as a pathological phenomenon in international relations. At the same time it is a symptom of deeper unfavorable conditions in societies and in relations between them, and it threatens to disrupt those relations yet further. The lawyers have made this area fairly complicated, so that at the international level it is not easy to agree either about the causes or prevention, nor even about the measures of deterring (repressing) terrorism. In this divided world it is not easy to identify with a sufficient measure of clarity those international values which terrorism is threatening. Many international treaties and conventions have been signed which individual countries interpret and enforce depending on a number of variable circumstances. At present there is no general convention against terrorism that enumerates terrorist acts which are dangerous in an international context. Because of ideological fragmentation, considerations arising out of alliances or the momentary political interest of individual states, the terrorist still has places of refuge: he even knows in advance where he will go and how he will take advantage of double standards.

[Question] Unfortunately, the story about terrorism cannot bypass even our own country. Terrorist activity against the new Yugoslavia has not died out even now after four decades. Can you say what it is that is feeding contemporary terrorism against Yugoslavia and what are all its characteristics?

[Answer] Activity aimed against the new Yugoslavia is being carried on by the same forces which in the years of the war attempted unsuccessfully to subjugate the population of the country by applying the most horrifying forms of violence. We are referring to a reactionary community which has been perpetuated artificially and which has also turned up in other places after a major revolutionary change. The defeat in open combat and the loss of every political point of support cause desperation and usually give rise to the motive for terrorism. Revenge, spite and suicidal motives are mixed with self-delusion; the uproar over the act of terrorism serve the functions of convincing the perpetrators themselves that they still exist.

Parasites of Bloc Policy

If there is no outside support, this kind of terrorism without domestic roots usually dies out with the biological aging of the defeated generation. Unfortunately, the ideological divisions and the Cold War have made it possible for the enemies of Yugoslavia to represent themselves differently in many quarters: in places where their fascist orientation was unacceptable, they declared

themselves to be anticommunists; in places where this was not good, they represented themselves as fighters for freedom and civil rights; when they were able to get rid of the traces of their collaboration with the occupier, they have come forth as fighters for national liberation.... Aside from these methods, which are aimed at support or at least sympathy with the public, another circumstance that has operated reliably is that claims against Yugoslav territory, irredentist and bloc-oriented, have not disappeared; the extremist emigre community has always been able to obtain the material aid of those organizations, governmental and nongovernmental, which have had ready-made tasks for them as a function of the situation.

[Question] You probably have records on the total number of such misdeeds since the war.

[Answer] I have the figures for the period up to the middle of 1981: about 200 serious acts of terrorism were carried out against Yugoslavia; 92 persons died in them, and more than 330 were wounded. Unfortunately, these figures have increased in the meantime; in Belgium alone there have been 13 assassination attempts in the last 8 months in which 3 Yugoslavs have lost their lives and 5 have been wounded.

Since the war not a single act of terrorism has been recorded that was entirely prepared and carried out within the country. The anti-Yugoslav terrorists—usually Yugoslav citizens or foreigners of Yugoslav origin—have prepared all their nefarious acts in the comfortable shelter of foreign countries, where as a rule they do not expect organized preventive activity, vigorous prosecution and severe penalties.

[Question] What is the size of the extremist Yugoslav emigre community?

[Answer] It is calculated that it runs to about 1,000. This historical anachronism is from the material standpoint a parasite in the garbage dump of bloc policy, ideological exclusiveness, ignorance and the calculations of the secret services. Once it has financial support, it renews itself with new "cadres" which arrive from the dark edges of Yugoslav society, where, as indeed in many other countries, there are people who seek a way out of their own failure, a cover for their own criminal inclinations and a remedy for their own personal difficulties.

Terrorism, however, is a weapon of those who are weak in numbers and in character. Its effects do not depend directly on numbers. If not prevented, 1,000 people can inflict great evil. The lack of a response within the country will not discourage them. It is in the nature of the terrorist that he does not cast doubt on his methods, but constantly blames his failure on others, his adversaries—whom he hates still more fiercely, those who are indifferent—whom he only wants to injure, and rivals from within his own ranks—who suffer in the mutual settlement of accounts.

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ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ARMENIAN DOSSIER IN LIGHT OF HISTORY

Istanbul, ERMENI DOSYASI in Turkish 1982 pp 386-425

[Sections 63 through 68 and table of contents from book "Armenian Dossier in the Light of History" by Cemal Anadol, Turan Publishing House, 426 pages]

[Text] Armenian Organizations Today and France

The reason the revolutionaries of the Hnchak [Social Democratic Party] and Dashnak [Armenian Revolutionary Federation] organizations have, from the outset, planned most of their operations out of France is that France leads the nations of the world in inciting the "Armenians."

France thinks it is still fighting World War I. It will be recalled that many years ago Special Services agents captured at the French consulate in Damascus documents in connection with "Arab Revolutionary Committees."

At the time, France was bargaining with Great Britain and Italy, who called themselves the "Entente Powers," as well as Greece, Serbia and Romania, who had entrusted their fates to these powers, over the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. France wanted to have Antep, Urfa and Adana and an "Armenian State in Cilicia" under its own protection.

Today France supports a number of Armenian terrorist organizations including the Beirut-based "Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia-ASALA"; the Los Angeles-based "Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide-JCAG"; the Paris-based "New Armenian Resistance Organization-NAR"; the Paris-based "Armenian Liberation and Freedom-EKO"; the Beirut-based "Youth Action Group-GEGE"; the Beirut-based "Armenian Liberation Front-3 October Commandos"; and the Geneva-based "9 June Armenian Organization." This support stems from France's old "hatred against the Turks." French incitement of the "Armenians" is not any less than Soviet provocations and incitements.

Information gathered by the Interpol in various countries indicates that militants of the ASALA, the most active Armenian organization, are trained in camps operated by the organizations of "Naif Hawathme" and "Dr George Habash" in (Ammuriye) in Syria and Damur and Sidon in Lebanon.

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In these camps, experts from the Soviet intelligence organization, the KGB, provide special training to the militants. In 1981, it was determined, for instance, that a KGB operative of Armenian descent, named Brutens, held a conference in the (Ammuriye) camp in the south of Damascus with the participation of 317 people, of whom 4 were from the West German Red Army, 6 were from the Italian Red Brigades, 4 were from the Japanese Red Army, 3 were from a Basque organization in Spain, 170 were Iranians and 130 were Turks.

Among the 11 Armenian organizations—which are divided into "death" and "propaganda" groups—3 primary groups have identical goals and activities, but use different methods.

ASALA made itself known for the first time on 1 January 1975 with a bomb attack on the offices of the World Council of Churches. This is an organization that considers itself part of the "International Terror Movement" and has announced that its struggle can only be waged by the force of arms.

According to the communiques they have issued, ASALA's goals are:

- 1. To liberate Armenian lands under occupation and to establish a united, democratic and socialist Armenia. (According to ASALA, Soviet Armenia is a "liberated area," and Turkey's Eastern Anatolia provinces are "Armenian lands under occupation.")
- 2. To give the Armenian people the opportunity to exercise their right of self-determination when they return to their homeland.
- 3. To force Turkey to accept the "genocide" as a historical fact.
- 4. To force Turkey to pay reparations on those grounds.

ASALA has been cooperating with divisive organizations in Turkey. ASALA and the Apoists (Kurdistan Workers' Party) announced at a press conference in Sidon, Lebanon, on 8 April 1980 that they have formed an alliance against the Turkish government. At this press conference, 12 men and 2 women, wearing black masks with openings only for the eyes, introduced themselves as "Armenian guerrillas and Kurdish revolutionaries from Turkey" and told the "Palestinian guerrillas" loyal to Dr George Habash surrounding them that they want "to consolidate their ties with Palestinian organizations." 285

The JCAG was established with the goal of avenging the alleged Armenian genocide, which, supposedly, has gone unpunished, and restoring the rights of the Armenians. The JCAG wants:

- 1. To force Turkey to admit the Armenian genocide of 1915 and to pay reparations;
- 2. To recover Armenian lands the borders of which are specified in the Sévres Treaty of 1920.

It is seen that the JCAG has the same goals as the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [ARF]. Their ultimate goal is, naturally, identical to that of ASALA,

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namely the unification of those lands with Soviet Armenia.

The New Armenian Resistance [NAR] made itself known for the first time on 14 May 1977 by a bomb attack on the Turkish Tourism Office in Paris.

It is now evident that these international terror organizations are dyeing the world with blood with the support of Armenians in the United States and the encouragement of Soviet agents. It is a fact that France today endorses the existence of an "Armenian question." Furthermore, fanatic Armenians who pass themselves as academicians, such as Dennis Papazian, Professor of Russian History at the University of Michigan, and A. O. Sarkissian, Chairman of the Armenian Assembly, write books which distort facts and documents and which present the Turks as being "wrongful."

The answer given by Armenian Patriarch Shnork Kalustyan and other Armenian notables [in Turkey] to allegations that the 50,000 to 60,000 Armenians living in Turkey are still subjected to "genocide" and oppressed under a cultural imperialism is undoubtedly very significant. Furthermore, the resolution endorsed by the French Council of State to the effect that "the Armenians in Turkey are not oppressed" can, if well publicized, bring some sense to the Western world and render the continuing Armenian murders as unforgivable.

It is now known that some Armenian clergymen in Turkey have also helped the Armenian terror organizations—which, so far, have taken 19 Turkish lives—and that Armenian and Assyrian orphans have been taken to Jerusalem supposedly for "religious education" only to be turned into "anti-Turkish" militants by "brainwashing" methods. 287

Turkish security forces launched a broad investigation into this matter when certain documents were captured on an Armenian clergyman who was on his way to a foreign country. The investigation revealed that the first such group of children was taken to Jerusalem in 1968 under the supervision of Varujan Hirkaciyan, a priest from the Holy Trinity Church in Beyoglu, Istanbul.

Under this scheme, certain clergymen--though opposed by the Armenian citizens of Turkey--gather Armenian and Assyrian orphans from parts of Anatolia and bring them first to Istanbul supposedly for "religious education." These children are then taken, in groups of 10, to the Armenian Monastic School in Jerusalem. The first group in 1968 was followed by a second and a third group. While the clergymen took these orphans from Turkey to Jerusalem, those sent previously and trained as "anti-Turkish" militants were brought back to Turkey.

Hayko Eldemir, a priest on the teaching staff of the Armenian Monastic School in Jerusalem, said in his testimony after his capture by the Turkish security forces that he was one of those taken to Jerusalem in 1968 by Varujan Hirkaciyan. He said:

"We traveled in groups of ten. Among us there were children who did not know Armenian and spoke Kurdish. Our teachers at the school were members of the Dashnak organization, which has been killing Turkish diplomats. This organization had a building of its own on the campus. In the course of our training, we were

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taught courses which had an anti-Turkish character. We were brainwashed. At the end of our training, we became anti-Turkish Armenian hard-liners. Later on, I taught Armenian history at this school. I told my students that the Turks massacred the Armenians and that this can only be avenged by Armenians like us who hate the Turks."

Hayko Eldemir stated that he was a friend of Arpiyar Demirciyan, a terrorist who has sabotaged Turkish institutions in Europe. Eldemir added:

"Shahe Acemyan, the principal of the Armenian Monastic School in Jerusalem, assigned me to find good children to be trained at the school. I would become one of the administrators of the school after I returned with the children. But I was caught before I could do that."

The security forces also determined that the clergymen involved collected money from Armenian citizens in Turkey supposedly for the "religious education" of these children. Priest Mikail Saglam and Armenian citizens who were asked to testify confirmed that money was collected. However, the contributing citizens said that they thought the money would be used for the education of the children and that they did not know that the Armenian Monastic School in Jerusalem is an anti-Turkish institution operated by the Dashnak organization.

Operations by the security forces revealed that some Armenians who were taken to Jerusalem to be trained as anti-Turkish militants later returned to Turkey, while others joined terrorist organizations. It was also determined that the priests who have returned to Turkey have sung marches associated with the Dashnak terrorist organization at the end of religious ceremonies in the churches. Priest Mikail Saglam, a former student of the Armenian Monastic School in Jerusalem, said in his testimony:

"I was taken to Jerusalem when I was 10 years old. I studied there for 5 years. During my training, I forgot my Turkish identity. We were constantly brainwashed to hate the Turks. I met Hayko Eldemir in 1977. At the time, he was teaching Armenian history; he frequently talked about the Armenian genocide. I returned to Turkey in July, 1980. I went to the Armenian church in Buyukdere to attend Mass. Hayko Eldemir was holding the Mass. After the ceremonies we were invited to a dinner. During the dinner, Eldemir asked the guests to turn their children over to him and inquired whether they felt oppressed by the Turkish government and whether they had any complaints. The Armenian citizens replied that they are not under pressure and that, on the contrary, they have a very comfortable life. Upon that, we left the church and boarded a car. We sang Dashnak marches and Armenian songs in the car."

The children taken from Turkey to the monastic school in Jerusalem go through a two-stage training system. Those children who know Armenian go directly into middle and high school level education. Those who do not speak Armenian, such as the Assyrian children, are first taught the language. Those who complete their high school education then go on to receive professional religious training. During this training period, priest candidates, who attend Mass at the Saint Jacobs church, are brought up as "enemies of Turkey" through general history and Armenian history courses.

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The captured priest, Hayko Eldemir, who served as the assistant principal of the monastic school, said that he studied for 7 years at the school and subsequently became a teacher. He said:

"Ten of us were taken to the Armenian Monastic School in 1968 by Priest Varujan Hirkaciyan. I spoke Armenian then, because I had attended an Armenian school in Istanbul. Ohannes Pakrat and Ohannes Savas, who both read and spoke Armenian like me, and myself were placed in the same class. The Yeznik, Aram and Ohannes Balyan brothers who were Assyrian and did not speak Armenian were placed in a different class.

"We were under very strict discipline at the school. Students who broke the rules would be severely punished. First, we were taught extensive courses on modern spoken Armenian. Hatred against the Turks was instilled at Armenian history classes. Armenian history is taught from the first grade until graduation. In the first year, the emergence of the Armenian nation is taught. In the second year, the development of the Armenian nation is taught. In the third year, the Roman conquest of Armenia and Armenian relations with Arabs and Turks are discussed. Hatred against Turks is injected into the students' brains most pointedly during the final year. The students are told that on 24 April 1915 Armenian leaders in Istanbul were murdered and the genocide was launched with the collaboration of the Germans. The students are taught that those Armenians who escaped the killings were then forced into exile and sent to Syria, the United States and European countries.

"When I started teaching at the school, I instilled and fanned the flames of hatred against Turks among the students. I told them that the Turks massacred the Armenians, that several provinces in eastern Anatolia belong to the Armenians and that the Armenians must take their revenge from the Turks. When I was teaching at the school, every classroom had a map showing the borders of Greater Armenia. Classwork was conducted on those maps."

Hayko Eldemir said that the Armenian organizations in Jerusalem receive large sums of money from the United States and that most of the money comes from the "Armenian Relief Committee" which was established by Aleks Manukyan, a rich Armenian from New York. Shahe Acemyan, the principal of the monastic school, told us during our conversation with him that a new building for the school was completed at the cost of \$1 million in 1975 and that all the expenses were paid by Manukyan's Armenian Relief Committee. He added that this organization will continue to provide financial assistance. Hayko Eldemir, who is currently under arrest and whose trial will begin soon, said that this committee provides monetary assistance to all Armenian organizations and churches around the world. Eldemir said the following about the form of this assistance and the activities of Armenians in Turkey:

"I do not think that the Dashnak and Hnchak organizations have any branches in Turkey. Because they do not like the Turks. Their activities and operations are based mainly abroad. However, the Armenian Relief Committee in the United States keeps contact with Shnork Kalustyan, the Armenian Patriarch in Turkey. As far as I know, current efforts involve educating Armenian orphans at schools abroad and turning them into professionals, gathering Armenian children who have

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lost their Armenian identity from various parts of Anatolia, bringing them into Istanbul and improving their social and economic lives. These activities are organized by the Patriarchate. As far as I know, Bedros Gregor Tokatliyan has been appointed by the Patriarchate to coordinate these activities. This person regularly goes to Anatolia to find Armenians who have lost their national identity, brings whole families of them with him, helps them settle in Istanbul and then arranges passports for them so that they can leave for countries where there are a lot of Armenians. He also brings the children of such families to Istanbul and places them in Armenian schools or orphanages. In order to ensure that these 8 to 10-year-olds are brought up as proper Armenians, they are sent to the Armenian Monastic School in Jerusalem.

"Varujan Hirkaciyan, the Head Priest of the Holy Trinity Church in Beyoglu, is also involved in similar activities. The Armenian children who are sent to the monastic school are then trained to hate the Turks by teachers who are members of the Dashnak and Hnchak organizations. Some of these students return to Turkey; others receive asssignments in churches in the United States and Europe and Armenian societies around the world. Very rarely do students dislike the school and return to their homes."

While innocent brains are injected with "hatred against Turks" under the pretext of "religious training" at the monastic school in Jerusalem, the Saint Jacobs Monastery across from the school doubles up as a training center for the terrorist organizations.

Two Armenian terrorist organizations are at the heart of the monastery's structure, which is considered part of the monastic school. Of these, "Hay Yeridasartagan Miutyun," that is the "Armenian Young Men's Association," is a branch of the Hnchak organization, and "Hay Marzagan Unthanur Miutyun," that is the "Armenian General Athletic Association," is part of the Dashnak organization.

The Armenian General Athletic Association building stands right behind the church on the school campus.

The leader of the Armenian General Athletic Association branch at the Saint Jacobs Monastery is Abraham Papazian who also teaches general history and Armenian language at the school.

Takvor Ohannesian and Hagop Sandruni are also members of this organization. Both these persons have their living quarters at the monastery. Meanwhile, the Armenian Assistance League, set up by women who are affiliated with the Armenian General Athletic Association, provides financial assistance to needy Armenian women.

The Armenian Young Men's Association of the Hnchak organization has a club in the basement floor of the monastery. The club consists of a reception room, a cafeteria and a conference room. This organization is led by Varujan Diredurian, a Jerusalem watch dealer who was born in Lebanon. Other members of the organization include Liberit Bedrosian, a touristic goods shop owner who is a close friend of Varujan's and Vartan Der Vartanian, a jeweler who also teaches at the monastic school. Other members of this organization are Agop Meneshian, a baker who used

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to be a physical education teacher at the monastic school; Agop Kalaydjian, a jeweler; and Alex Kalaydjian, a photolithographer.

In the east wing of the Saint Jacobs Monastery is housed a third organization called the "Armenian Well-Wishers' Association." The members of this organization are mostly Armenians born in Jerusalem. These Armenians, who speak with an Arabic accent, work closely with other Armenian organizations. Moslem Arabs in Jerusalem say that this organization is mostly involved in aiding elder Armenians and active young men and women rather than in terrorist activities. This organization is led by Garabed Garabedian, an employee of the UN Military Command in Jerusalem.

Moslem Arabs say that the Armenian organizations housed in the Saint Jacobs Monastery are an inseparable part of the Armenian Monastic School and its church.

In June, Armenians bombed the two floors of the Turkish Tourism Office in Paris and blew up a large part of the building. They thus caused a damage of 4 million Turkish liras to the Turkish government.

Meanwhile, reports to the effect that the Armenians are going to cruelly murder a number of our diplomats in Europe around August are causing anxiety among our citizens abroad.

The time has come to bring an end to the treacheries and the attacks of these rabid Armenians against Turkey. If the authorities cannot stop these inimical attacks, we will consider them responsible for and guilty of the consequences.

We read in MILLET the following important article entitled "Armenian Organizations Working Against Turkey in France": 289

There is a powerful Armenian movement in Paris and in France in general. We learned in 1975 that the "Front de Liberation Armenienne," that is the "Armenian Liberation Front," gained powerful new members. These new members are mostly engineers, technicians, lawyers and other professionals who have reinforced the organization financially and morally. Among these, Gregorian, a 34-year-old nuclear-electronics engineer is one of the most active. His family are immigrants from the Kayseri-Sivas region. Gregorian's spouse, Elie, heads an extremely important chemical research laboratory. Both husband and wife are active and influential in the said Armenian organization. We wrote to the Press Counselor of the Turkish Embassy in Paris, Necla Erbakir, that the Armenian nationalists are holding most of their meetings in the Paris mosque. As is known, this mosque is headed by Si Hamza Aboubakr, a former Algerian deputy at the French National Assembly during the colonial period and currently a professor of Islamic civilization and theology at the Institut d'Etudes Musulman which is housed in a building on the mosque grounds. Hamza Aboubakr is also a well-known enemy of the Turks. This person is not too deeply involved with Armenian activities, but he has been disseminating Kurdish propaganda and he is known to be supporter of the Kurds.

Among the Armenian militants is a woman named Houry Ipekian who has a degree in the history of law and social sciences at the French universities. She has also done

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extensive research in Armenian history. Ipekian's family is also originally from Anatolia. Before the most recent Armenian wars, her father served in an important position in the Ottoman government during the Union and Progress Party period. He represented the Armenian community in the Ottoman government. In conferences she holds in France and Europe, Houry Ipekian talks about Armenian civilization and focuses on the Armenian genocide. She also explains the Armenian cause at French schools and institutions of higher learning. Ipekian is officially a member of the cultural arm of the Dashnak party. In the last few years, Ms Kalustyan, the headmistress of the Esayan Lycée in Istanbul, has also been working for the cultural arm of that party. Another member of that cultural arm is Dr Marie Louise Chaymont who wrote "Recherche sur l'Histoire de l'Armenie de l'Avenement des Sassanides a la Conversion du Royaume" published in Paris in 1969. Although her name sounds French, Chaymont is an Armenian. All these three women work for the Dashnak party which has the most inimical attitude against Turkey among the Armenian organizations in Paris. The names of these women will not be found in membership roster of the Dashnak party which the Turkish Embassy in Paris has obtained from the French police. That is because these women, being university faculty members, are forbidden to join political organizations. These three women, together with other members of the Dashnak party, meet at an Armenian library, only 150 meters away from our embassy in Paris. This library is called "Fondation Nubar" and is located at 11 Square Alboni, Paris/6. The library has a thickly wooded garden around it and is 50 meters away from the Passy subway station. Turkish Ambassador Ismail Erez was martyred [in 1975] only 60 meters away from this library. This library is headed by a Turkish Armenian named Karindashian who speaks very fluent Turkish and who says he is from Egypt. It is in this library that all the anti-Turkish communiques and plots are prepared by Armenians from Paris as well as other places around the world. Kurdish leaders living in France also meet and work in this library. It is known that Alishan Maktubi, who directs the Kurdish movement in Europe and who spends most of his time in Britain, has come to this library several times and that his assistants work here. The Kurdish language professor of the Ecole Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivandes is also one of the visitors of this library. We have learned from Houry lpekian that members of the illegal Turkish Communist Party [TCP] also visit this library and that there is close collaboration between the TCP and Armenian organizations in Paris. Every effort is made in this library to recruit Turkish students in Paris to be sent as agents to Turkey. Most of the targeted students are from Eastern Anatolia.

In a book entitled "Manifesto," published in very limited quantities in July 1976, the plotting of anti-Turkish incidents in France and around the world was set as a primary goal. To that end, the book proposed a media drive, the organization of rallies and church ceremonies and the recruitment of persons working in Turkish representative offices around the world. A large number of Armenians live in France, and since they hold French passports they can freely enter Turkey. Armenians in France closely follow domestic political developments in Turkey and are able to gather all the information they need. The said book proposes that anybody who stands against the Turks must be cooperated with. The publisher of the book is not specified. The book only says that it was printed by the Fondation Nubar.

The anti-Turkish activities in Paris are primarily directed by the Dashnak party, but they are also joined by the Hnchak and Ramgavar [Democratic Liberal Party] parties. The Hnchak party follows a communist ideology, but is not linked to the

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Soviet communists. The Ramgavar party, on the other hand, is directly affiliated with Soviet Armenia and is governed from there. All three parties have offices in Paris. The most anti-Turkish group among the three is the Dashnak party. Lately, the Ramgavar party has also gained strength in France and has become influential within the Armenian community. These three parties are in rivalry among themselves in matters of methods and goals. The Dashnak party is directed by rich Armenians who have been in France for a long time. Members of the Hnchak party, despite their communist affiliations, are forbidden from entering the Soviet Union.

In 1976, the Hnchak and the Ramgavar parties jointly formed a new organization to counteract the Dashnak party. This new organization is called "Front de Liberation de l'Armenie Turque" [Front for the Liberation of Turkish Armenia]. The organization is headquartered at and directed from the Fondation Nubar. According to the 1962 census, 200,000 Armenians live in France. Many of them occupy important positions in that country. Most of these Armenians are engineers. Armenians usually have an affinity toward well-paid professions and profitable businesses. M. Daen, the special secretary of French President Giscard d'Estaing is an Armenian and comes from a Turkish-Armenian family. M. Median, the Chairman of the Department of Comparative Literature at the Sorbonnes University, is also an Armenian and comes from a large family. Dedean, the foreign minister under General De Gaulle, was also an Armenian.

Eva de Vitary-Mayeravisch, who was invited by our tourism office in Paris in 1967 to give a lecture about the "whirling dervishes" and who has visited Turkey several times, and her live-in Iranian companion Muhammad Madri say in the No 1-2, 1973 issue of the "Revue des Etudes Armeniennes" that Mevlana [the mystic leader of the whirling dervishes] was not a Turk, that he was Iranian and that he could even be an Armenian.

Arthur Beylerian has published a very important research work. 290 The 50-page paper talks about the reasons the Armenians sought the protection of big powers [in the years preceding World War I]. It also talks about the harassment of the Armenians in Turkey and their oppressed living conditions.

In our opinion, to bring an end to this anti-Turkish movement in France, publications of this type must be closely monitored; all available literature on Turkish history, literature and culture must be immediately sent to all libraries in Paris; Turkish academicians must give frequent lectures—at least once every 2 years—at our tourism office in Paris about new Turkish publications, Turkish history, language, literature and culture; and more emphasis must be placed on academic exchange programs with foreign universities. First of all, when someone is sent to France, care must be taken that he is a genuine academician. There are very few books on Turkish culture and civilization in France and French institutions acutely feel this deficiency. The chief reason behind the French anti-Turkish stand is the fact that they do not know us very well. We have not been taking serious measures to correct that situation, while our enemies are using it to their maximum advantage. We believe it is our conscientious duty to report all these incidents we have witnessed to the proper authorities.

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France, Turks and a Page From History

The Princess of Savoi, Louise, the mother of French King Francois I who was enslaved by Charles Quint, said in a letter addressed to the Ottoman Sultan, Suleyman the Magnificent:

"If you, the King of Kings, will have the grace to give us the assistance we have asked for, we will be enslaved by your favors."

The great Turk replied in a manner that justified his title of "Magnificent":

"The imprisonment of kings is not right. You have nothing to worry about. Our horses are saddled and our swords are ready. We will do whatever is necessary to drive your enemies out of your country and to rescue you from your captors." 291

When Henry II succeeded Francois I, he wrote to the Serailles in Istanbul through the French envoy, d'Aromont: "I ask the Turkish King, who helped my father Francois I and who adopted him as his son, to give we all the help he can to rescue my country from the oppression of the German King."

History records all the favors that the great Turkish ruler has done for France.

Today, we see France biting that valuable and helping Turkish hand.

Armenian Terrorism and Turkish Diplomats

In March 1982, the famous Rockefeller Foundation held a secret meeting on "international terrorism and the protection of diplomats from terrorist attacks." The meeting was held in Villa Serbelloni, a small—population 3,000—Italian village on Lake Como, near the Swiss border. Turkey was not invited to this meeting.

According to the conclusions of this meeting, "Turkish diplomats do not know where to keep their guns; a pistol should be kept above the right thigh or behind the right arm so that its handle faces outwards."

According to international terrorism experts, diplomats must not live in the top and bottom floors of buildings. Because it is easier to enter these floors compared to the middle floors.

A diplomat must not park his car in the same place every day. If he does not have round-the-clock police protection, the diplomat must always look under his car before he enters it in the mornings.

A diplomat must keep the doors of his home locked 24 hours a day. He must never open the door without knowing who the visitor is. He must be aware of letter bombs. He must not carry the gun as an ornament. Having in mind that a single bullet can save his life, he must continually practice shooting with a pistol.

 Λ diplomat must report the slightest suspicious thing to the security forces, even if it is just an unidentified car parked in front of his home.

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All visitors to embassies and consulates must have their identities checked and searched for weapons in a bullet-proof glass compartment before they are admitted into the offices they are supposed to visit.

The experts also stress two important points:

The appointment of bodyguards by the local authorities and the establishment of checkpoints at specified locations.

Falsifications by Armenian Terrorists

The British Foreign Ministry has announced that telegrams allegedly sent by the Ottoman Interior Minister Talat Pasha and published in the London DAILY TELEGRAPH in 1922 do not exist and that, consequently, such allegations have no basis of truth? These telegrams are cited every 24 April [Armenian Martyrs' Day] by Armenian organizations as proof that the Turks planned and executed an "Armenian genocide."

Studies have revealed that General Allenby, who was reported to have captured these telegrams, has not even heard about them and that these documents were forged by Armenian rebels at the time.

As is known, members of the Ottoman government and the Union and Progress Party were tried in Istanbul for their responsibility in the alleged genocide after the occupation of Istanbul by British and French forces. A number of those tried were later sent into exile in Malta.

Later, the British began looking for documents to prove those exiled to Malta guilty. They could not find any documents to confirm their allegations in the Ottoman State Archives.

The British Embassy in Washington wrote: 294

"I am sorry to report that there is nothing that can be used as evidence against the Turks exiled to Malta. Not a single incident exists that can constitute sufficient evidence. The reports in question do not seem to contain any evidence that could reinforce the information already at the disposal of His Majesty's government."

Subsequently, the British Foreign Ministry turned to the Royal Prosecutor for directions as to what action to take next. The Royal Prosecutor replied that no evidence has been found to suggest that the Turks exiled to Malta ordered the Armenian genocide. 295

The British noted that the German court that tried Talat Pasha accepted only five of the telegrams brought forth by writer Aram Andonian as being authentic and rejected the rest as forgeries and, consequently, decided that falsifications were involved in the case.

Talat Pasha, on his part, showed a great deal of sensitivity in his orders and demanded the severe punishment of those who break the rules. He said: 296

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"It has been learned that certain officials and individuals have committed unruly and illegal acts during the relocation of the Armenians which was undertaken for military and security reasons. Three investigation panels will be set up to observe the situation on location and to send guilty parties to a court-martial. Committees will begin their investigations as soon as possible. The Treasury will allocate funds for their daily expenses."

Those found guilty were severely punished. In fact, a number of innocent people were also punished simply as a result of pressure applied by the Armenians on foreign powers. It is now clear that most of those found guilty and punished were wretched people who were permanently and irreparably hurt by the Armenians.

Ottoman Intellectuals Against Armenian Propaganda

Armenian dreams to set up a "Greater Armenia" on Ottoman territory go back to 1830.

Ottoman intellectuals have often responded to Armenian propaganda.

The following document 297 consists of two sections and was written for the Sultan for publication by the Deputy Inspector and Secretary of the Non-Moslem and Foreign Schools.

Document (1st Section):

"Western public opinion has turned against us as a result of the lies, erroneous reports and libels published by the Armenians in the European press. As a loyal subject of the Sultanate, I consider it my duty to reject these lies and libels on historical, geographical, statistical and political grounds, to correct existing mistaken perceptions and to remind the European public of the special privileges accorded to the Armenians from the very outset by the Ottoman government. Our Sultan is already aware that the Armenian question has gained importance through the press. Therefore, he can publish this defense in either a pamphlet or newspapers. Its publication in the press will be more effective. However, the Sultan can, naturally, make the most correct decision."

[Signed] Mehmet Sukru, Deputy Inspector and Secretary of Non-Moslem and Foreign Schools.

(2d Section):

"A variety and a a large number of thoughts and ideas have lately appeared about the Armenians in the European press. Since some of these publications seem very serious about their intentions, we must scrutinize their writings before we express our own thoughts and ideas.

"When these publications are closely scrutinized, they are found to be the summary of the lies and libels propagated by Armenian propaganda experts and historians. Of all the books and articles on this issue, only three have geographical and historical sections that could be used as references. Even those have mistakes that need to be corrected. One of these is the 'Geographical Atlas,'

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a work prepared by Chradaire and his colleagues for an academic institution and published in 1889 in Paris. The second one is the 'La Grande Encyclopédie,' again published by a prestigious academic institution, and the third work is Geography. The authors of all three works are well known in Europe and their works are considered to be authoritative. For example, on page 38 in the Geographical Atlas, the Ararat mountain and the Arax valley are shown as part of the Armenian homeland. 'La Grande Encyclopédie' says that the Armenians are least mixed with foreign elements around them in an area bordered by the Kura and Arax rivers on the one side and the Euphrates river and Lake Van on the other side. The cities of Echmiadzin and Armavir (both in Russia) are shown as centers of this area. In reality, if we travel 100 kilometers in any direction from these two centers, we have to pass through regions where Turks, Armenians, Kurds and Georgians have alternating majorities. The same article notes that this piece of territory was captured by the Persians in 428, by the Arabs in the 7th century, by the Byzantines in the 11th century, by the Seldjuk Turks a short time later, by the Mongols in the 13th century and finally by the Ottomans in 1514. Without noting that some of these lands have later been occupied by other powers, the 'Atlas' shows Kars, Yerevan, Elisabethpol, Tbilisi and Kutais as part of Russia. Part of Azerbaidjan is shown as part of Iran. In addition to these areas mentioned in the 'Atlas,' the 'Encyclopédie' considers Van, Bitlis and Erzurum, that is all of Southeastern Anatolia, as part of Armenia, thus making the errors even more visible. The demands made are only on Ottoman territory. Therefore, we will not discuss the situation of the Armenians in Russia and Iran. We will base our conclusions on figures gathered by the Europeans themselves in the course of their investigations in the area. Although these figures are biased and disfavor the Turks, they can still clarify the issue to a certain extent."

Mehmet Sukru provides in this section of his document a listing taken from a work called "Ottoman Asia." Sukru continues:

"Even in exaggerated accounts prepared by the Europeans, 340,000 Armenians are shown in the region in question against a Moslem population of around 1 million. In reality, at least 100,000 can be deducted from the Armenian total and 500,000 can be added to the Moslem figure. Thus, in reality, there are 240,000 Armenians and 1.5 million Moslems living in the said region. Even if we accept the European figures, which deliberately disfavor us, the Armenians constitute only 23 percent of the population of the said region, thus falling far short of being the majority.

"Now that we have discussed the geographical and ethnographic situation of the Armenians in the said region, let us look at the historical aspects of the issue as given by the 'Encyclopédie.' It is generally accepted that neither the Ottomans nor the Seldjuk Turks before them nor the Abbasi Arabs even before them found an independent Armenia when they came to this region. Although an adventurer named Tigranes did establish an independent kingdom around 2,000 years ago, he was soon defeated by Roman commander Lucullus and taken as a slave to Rome. Since that time the areas inhabited by Armenians have been ruled by the Romans, the Byzantines, the Abbasi Arabs, the Seldjuk Turks, the Ottomans, the Russians and the Iranians. The provinces of Erzurum, Van and Bitlis which remained in Ottoman hands were, until recently, collectively called Arzi Rum, meaning the

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'land of the Rum [Byzantine Greeks].' This name was also used by the Abbasi Arabs and the Seldjuk Turks.

"Victorious nations always try to annihilate the culture, the customs and the legality of the vanquished. Even in these civilized times, advanced nations like Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia are trying similar tactics. The Ottoman government, on the other hand, has never acted against the Armenians that way. Gertain privileges were granted to them in the past few years, but never has any action been taken to hurt their dignity.

"On the political field, the latest reforms insure that none of subject ethnic groups of the Ottoman Empire are oppressed or enslaved. The Armenian minority has benefited most from this state of affairs. Depending on their work and competence, Armenians have been appointed to government ministries, counselorships, embassies, the Assembly and the courts. They also serve as governors, mayors, village chiefs and as public servants in criminal and trade courts, municipal councils, public works and national education commissions. That is, apart from all the special privileges they have, the Armenians enjoy all the rights accorded to Moslems. In other words, they have privileges that even the Moslem population does not have."

Epilogue and Professor Shaw

Dr Stanford J. Shaw, a professor at the University of California at Los Angeles, and his spouse, Ezel Kural Shaw, have prepared, after years of research, a work called "History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey" which establishes the facts related to the Armenian question. When this book was published by the university and distributed to all the libraries around the world, Armenian terrorist groups in the United States launched a campaign against Professor Shaw. His class was repeatedly dispersed by force, his papers were stolen and his home was bombed.

But Professor Shaw did not give in; he did not distort the facts. As a result, he won the admiration and support of the university community. But, still, he was forced to leave the United States with his family.

We have reserved the epilogue section of this book—which in effect is a summary of the whole book—to Professor Shaw. We are asking the world to put aside its "crusader mentality" and to look and listen to the unfortunate fates of thousands of innocent Turks who have lost their lives to "Armenian massacres." We are asking the world to lend an ear to the haunting cries of bayoneted children, burned old men, raped women and people who lost their lives after having their cyes gouged out and ears cut off and after being subjected to tortures that make a man forget about humanity. We are asking the nations of the world to put an end to their "hatred against the Turks."

Professor Shaw says:

"When the Russians realized that they will not be able to establish control over southeastern Europe through Bulgaria, they sought another alternative to bring about the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. They directed their efforts toward the

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Armenian minority, which, at the time, had no intention of rebelling against the Sultan. The Armenians had integrated themselves with the traditional Ottoman society. They had cultural and religious autonomy within their Gregorian community as well as the administration of the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul. As among the other non-Moslem communities of the Ottoman Empire, any discontent among the Armenians about their administration was a product of their religious hierarchy.

"This is evident from the fact that the few Armenians who did express discontent did so in religious terms and that some of them converted to Catholicism and Protestanism.

"The official Ottoman recognition of Catholicism and Protestanism during the reform period gave the Orthodox Armenians the opportunity to challenge the traditional structure of authority. The Armenian community felt uneasy under the domination of an alliance of the rich, the religious leaders and usurers. The rivalry that emerged with the reform movement opened the way to democratization in the Armenian as well as other communities. Although the rich maintained their dominance in various ways, less rich members of the community also began to make their voices heard.

"In the Middle East, the Armenians dominated the fields of money and gold trade, jewelry, foreign trade, construction, pharmacy and theater. They always played an important role in Ottoman trade and industry.

"Here, it must be mentioned that after the Greek revolution, Greeks in schools and bureaucracy around the Empire were replaced by Armenians. Their fluency in foreign languages and experience in financial and trade matters helped them rise in every branch of the reform bureaucracy, including foreign affairs, finance, education, justice, the mail service, railroads and the census service.

"Some European travelers and missionaries have claimed that there were around 2 million Armenians living under the Sultan's rule. According to the records of the Ottoman Census Bureau, which regularly took population counts on the basis of identity cards, the number of Armenians living in the Empire was 988,887. If we assume that two-thirds of the 160,166 Catholics and the 36,339 Protestants were Armenian, this figure rises to 1,125,000. This number constituted 5.5 percent of a total population of 20,475,225 (excluding the provinces of Yemen, Tripoli, Benghazi, Egypt and Tunisia where no census was taken).

"Even in Istanbul, where the largest group of Armenians lived, according to the 1878 census, there were 97,782 Orthodox Armenians, 407 Catholic Armenians and 340 Protestant Armenians constituting 18 percent of a total city population of 542,437.

"The Armenians began to disperse to the four corners of the world under Byzantine rule and during the conquest of Anatolia by the Turks.

"As of 1882, the Armenians were the minority in all provinces and counties which they claimed to be their homeland. Very rarely would they be the majority at the district level in rural areas. There were only two such districts.

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"In rural areas, the economic condition of the Armenians dispersed among Moslem peasants was better than that of other settled villagers or nomads. The nomads occasionally raided the cultivated farmlands as a consequence of bad administrative methods employed by the large landowners and the bureaucrats. These raids hurt both the Moslem and the Christians. All problems among the Armenians themselves stemmed from infighting among their religious leaders.

"The Armenians, like the other subjects of the Sultan, were free to live as they liked. They could operate the schools, churches and hospitals the way they wanted to.

"Influenced by Western missionaries, Catholic and Protestant Armenians began, around the beginning of the 19th century, to revive Armenian national culture.

"Thus, classical Armenian studies were developed. The Bible was translated from classical Armenian into the spoken language. A new literary school was born. The Orthodox Armenian community began to assume a more democratic structure, partly as a result of pressures from the government. Meanwhile, grassroots pressure forced them to adopt a more secular system of education which produced a cultural renaissance.

"Many wealthy Armenians sent their young to Europe, France in particular, for their education. These people were, naturally, influenced by French culture, and, when they returned to their homeland, they became the vanguard of a radical reform movement. Their demands included secularism and independence. As a result of these views, they took part and worked prominently in the 'Young Turks' movement.

"The Orthodox Armenian community prospered at the time under the Ottoman administration. Consequently, Armenian merchants and civil servants opposed and checked demands by a small minority for independence.

"The independence of Bulgaria and Serbia following the Berlin Congress provided inspiration for the Armenians.

"In 1877, Armenian officers and administrators working in the Russian army led Russia's conquest of Caucasia and Eastern Anatolia. When they called upon the Armenians in Turkey to unite against the Sultan, some Armenians obliged, and the rebellion movement began to escalate.

"In San Stefan and Berlin, Patriarch Nerses attempted to win the support of the Europeans for the establishment of an Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia. Meanwhile, some Armenians resorted to terrorism—with encouragement from the Russians—to achieve their ends.

"Thus, a number of Armenian revolutionary organizations emerged. These organizations began printing magazines in big cities in Europe and distributing them in the Ottoman Empire using foreign mail services.

"A group from Tbilisi began shipping weapons and ammunition from Batum to Rize. Armenians in Tabriz began planting agents in Moslem villages. However, the

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Armenian movement did not succeed like similar movements in Bulgaria and Serbia because their efforts did not concentrate on a specified region. Moreover, Tsar Alexander cut his support for the Armenians for fear that undermining the Sultan could encourage radical doctrines among his own people.

"The Armenians formed terrorist gangs and carried out massacres and acts of terror in the East to force the British and the Russians to intervene. These acts made it increasingly difficult for the Moslem and Christian communities to live together, although the security forces of Sultan Abdulhamit II occasionally prevented the Moslems from retaliating against the Armenians.

"The Hnchak party was established by Armenia's students in France and Switzerland. In 1890, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, also known as the Dashnak party, was established in Russia in an effort to unite the Armenians who were dispersed by the Tsar in a drive to eradicate radical movements in that country. These two organizations assumed responsibility for the acts of terror committed in the Ottoman Empire. They planned and executed raids and massacres against the people and officials of the Empire. They even attacked other Armenians. Their ultimate aim was the establishment of an independent and socialist Armenian state in the six provinces of Eastern Anatolia after the expulsion and annihilation of the Moslem population of that region.

"The Dashnak party formed cells in Istanbul, Trabzon and Van, but could not do anything significant until 1895. The Hnchak party, on the other hand, established a broad network covering Erzurum, Harput, Izmir, Aleppo and Geneva and enjoyed success within and outside the Empire. This party also cooperated with groups fighting against the Ottoman Empire in Macedonia, Crete and Albania.

"The Hnchak party also distributed revolutionary literature within the Empire, bombed several public places and murdered officials.

"Meanwhile, Moslem tribes and villagers began retaliating against the Armenians. At the time, there were millions of refugees who had suffered massacres in Russia, Bulgaria and Bosnia. It was not difficult to mobilize the Moslems against the Armenians with the leadership of these refugees.

"Initially, Sultan Abdulhamit II maintained close ties with the Armenians. However, he changed this stand later on. He accused the Armenians of being disobedient. He ordered the government to take measures to reduce the indisputable economic power of the Armenian merchants in the marketplace. He used the Hamidiye brigades to suppress the rebellions in the East.

"Faced with the bloody Armenian terror movement of 1890-1893, the government was forced to use harsh measures occasionally. However, this harshness was not at a level to make the voice of the Hnchak party heard in Europe.

"The Hnchak party organized a rebellion in Sasoon, which had a large Armenian population, and provoked the villagers to attack the government tax collectors. When the army was sent in to restore order, the rebels burned Moslem villages and fled to the mountains. By the time the army and the Hamidiye brigades reached Sasoon, all the villages were destroyed and their inhabitants massacred.

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"At the time, the Europeans accused the Ottoman government of burning 25 Armenian villages and massacring 20,000 Armenians. Commissions were set up, ready to believe the worst allegations. However, Sultan Abdulhamit II succeeded in staving off the foreigners by promising that he would implement reforms in the East.

"The stance of the Europeans disappointed the Hnchak party. This time they chose Istanbul as their target. They organized a march on 30 September 1895 in the embassy district and Babiali on the pretext of protesting a commission report. But the masses in the capital, including unemployed and homeless refugees, were angry. Rumors that a security officer was killed triggered large-scale rioting. The government brought the situation under control by declaring martial law. Similar incidents occurred in Trabzon and other cities. Subsequently, Europe began clamoring about a massacre of the Christians by the Moslems with the support of the government. But there was no intervention, and the terrorists were even more disappointed.

"Security deteriorated even further between 1895 and 1896; painful incidents took place. On 26 August 1896, a group of Armenians occupied the Ottoman Bank in Beyoglu to attract attention to their cause. They placed bombs around the building and held the employees as hostages. On another occasion, the Armenians marched to Babiali, killed a few soldiers and threatened to kill the Grand Vizier. Various parts of Istanbul were bombed and innocent people were killed. A bomb placed under the Sultan's car killed 20 of his bodyguards. The Sultan rejected the Armenian demands in order to maintain his authority. The bank incident ended after a day of occupation; the hos ages were freed and the rebels dispersed.

"The Sultan declared a general amnesty to reduce tension and to prevent further incidents. Christian administrators were appointed to regions where Christians formed a sizeable minority.

"At the time, Lord Salisbury wanted to have the support of Tsar Nicholas II. He proposed sending the British fleet to Istanbul as a means of support for the Armenian demands. But Russia and France rejected this proposal out of fear that British influence over the Ottoman Empire could increase.

"Thus deprived of foreign support, Armenian terrorist groups began to divide up from inside. When their provocative influence was removed, intercommunal relations in many areas returned to normal. The Ottoman government did not hesitate to return Armenians to high positions in the civil service. Armenian merchants and farmers returned to their work. Some rich Armenian merchants and a number of revolutionary intellectuals migrated to Iran, Egypt, Europe and the United States. The Armenian question was forgotten until 1897. But when the Empire lost the Balkans too, the relative proportion of the Armenians in the total population rose.

"Enver Pasha first wanted to realize his objectives in the East. As soon as he took over as Minister of War, he began strengthening the Erzurum-based Third Army whose area of defense included all of northeastern Anatolia extending from Lake Van to the Black Sea. So that when World War I started, he was ready to attack. He made one last attempt to secure the support of the Armenian population in the area. But his meeting with Armenian leaders ended in failure. The Russian promise for the establishment of an autonomous Armenian state in the Caucasus and

parts of Eastern Anatolia played an important role in the outcome of that meeting. The Armenians hoped they could complete the expulsion and annihilation of the majority Moslem population of the area with Russian help. So, the Armenians told Enver Pasha that they would stay neutral. However, it was impossible to hide their sympathy for the Russians. Right after the meeting, an Armenian delegation, including a member of the Ottoman assembly, went to the Caucasus to discuss cooperation with Russian military authorities. It was clear that the Armenians wanted to scuttle the Ottoman war effort.

"Even so, Enver Pasha maintained that Ottoman security forces were strong enough to prevent Armenian sabotage acts.

"While the Ottomans were preparing for a winter assault, Tsar Nicholas II went to the Caucasus to review the latest Russian plan of cooperation with the Armenians. Nicholas II told the leaders of the Armenian National Bureau in Tbilisi:

"'Armenians from all over the world are rushing to join the Russian army in order to contribute with their blood to the victory of the Russian forces. The Russian flag will fly over the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. The nations living under the Turkish yoke will win their freedom. The Armenians of Turkey, who were made to suffer because of their faith in Christ, will have a new and free life under Russian protection.'

"Thus, the Armenians began to join the Russian army. Confident that the days of occupying Istanbul were near, the Tsar returned to St. Petersburg.

"The Russians attacked on 1 November 1914, but were repulsed within a few days. On 21 December, the Ottoman Third Army launched a counteroffensive. This force was led by Enver Pasha. The purpose of the operation was to cut off the Russians from their main bases in Kars and to retake Kars, Ardahan and Batum. The first Ottoman objective was Sarikamis. On 26 December, the Ottoman army captured Sarikamis, but soon lost it back to the Russians. The deteriorating morale of the army paved the way for a Russian offensive in Anatolia and an Armenian rebellion against the government.

"The Russians had already evacuated the Armenians from their sector of the border and turned the area into a battle zone. The Armenians went along with this Russian action without hesitation because they were certain of a Russian victory.

"Around the middle of March 1915, while the war was going on against the Russians as well as the British in Egypt, it was decided to evacuate the Armenians from Van, Bitlis and Erzurum for security reasons. These evacuees would be resettled in villages and camps in the Musul region in northern Iraq. Armenians living in Syrian flatlands would also be sent to the interior. The army was given special instructions to protect the Armenians from attacks by nomads during their migration and in the areas of resettlement. Special provisions were made to meet all the needs of the evacuees. Military leaders were instructed to prevent those who had suffered from Armenian terrorism for years from exploiting the the situation. The Armenians would be protected and taken care of until they returned to their homes after the war.

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"A special commission set up by special legislation recorded the properties the Armenians left behind and kept the revenues obtained from the sale of any property so that they could be returned to their owners when they came back. Moslems could only stay as tenants in evacuated buildings and on condition that they leave when the owners returned.

"Armenians as well as the West have always claimed that more than 1 million Armenians were massacred during World War I. This allegation is based on the assumption that there were 2.5 million Armenians living in Turkey before the war. However, according to Ottoman census records, the pre-war Armenian population of Turkey was only 1.3 million. Only half this number of people lived in the areas where the said incidents occurred. Thus, around 400,000 Armenians were resettled in Iraq. Around 500,000 Armenians left for the Caucasus during the war. After the war, around 150,000 to 200,000 Armenians migrated to Western Europe and the United States leaving only 100,000 Armenians living within the borders of the Empire. Around 200,000 Armenians perished as a result of starvation, disease and war conditions and not just as a result of the evacuation. It must not be forgotten that more than 2 million Moslems died from the same causes. None of the secret archives of the Ottoman government contain any genocide orders from any Union and Progress Party leader or central government official. In fact, we can find specific orders to local leaders demanding measures to prevent any clashes or disorderliness that could cause loss of life.

"As the evacuation of the Armenians got under way in April 1915, Dashnak party operatives from Russian Armenia organized a rebellion in Van. where 33,789 Armenians--constituting 42.3 percent of the total Armenian population--lived. Although local Armenian leaders opposed this idea for fear that they would be hurt, they were finally convinced that the Russians would provide military assistance once the Moslem population of the area was expelled. Thus, the Russian army in the Caucasus launched an offensive against Van. On 14 May 1915, Russian forces supported by the Armenians entered Van. These forces massacred the Moslem population in two days. The small Ottoman garrison was forced to retreat to the south of Lake Van. Thus, an Armenian state was established under the protection of the Russians. An Armenian army was set up to drive the Turks out of the southern shores of Lake Van and to prepare the ground for the Russian assault into Bingol. Thousands of Armenians living in Mus and other major population centers began to migrate to the new Armenian state. By July, there were 250,000 Armenians in Van, which could support only 50,000 Moslem and non-Moslem residents before the war. Ottoman reinforcements sent to the area forced the Armenians to retreat. A large number of Armenians who were afraid to account for the massacres they had perpetrated helped the Ottoman forces. After a resistance that lasted for one month, Van was retaken by Cevdet Bey. Around 200,000 Armenians migrated to the Caucasus on the trail of the retreating Russian army. Most of these refugees were Armenians who lived in provinces not covered by the evacuation order. Many of these Armenians died when Ottoman soldiers chased the fleeing Russians."

FOOTNOTES

- 285. Secretariat General of the National Security Council, "Before and After 12 September", pp 215-217.
- 286. Istanbul HURRIYET, 19 Jan 82.
- 287. Istanbul TERCUMAN, 15 Jan 82.
- 288. Tokay Gozutok, "In Armenian Cultural Centers", Istanbul TERCUMAN, 15-19 Mar 82.
- 288. Istanbul MILLET, 18 Feb 77.
- 290. Arthur Beylerian, "Les Origines de la Question Armenienne, du Traite de San Stefano et Congres de Berlin (1878)", Revue d'Histoire Diplomatiqe, June 1973, A. Delon, Paris.
- 291. "Correspondances, Traites du Grand Seigneur", Paris, 1886, p 49.
- 292. "Memoires des Ambasadeurs de France au prês des Sultans Ottomans", Paris, 1891.
- 293. Istanbul MILLIYET, 27 Apr 82.
- 294. "From British Ambassador in Washington R. C. Craige to Lord Curzon", British Foreign Ministry Archives, 13 July 1921, 371/6504/8745.
- 295. Ibid., 29 July 1921, 371/6504/8745.
- 296. Prime Ministry Archives, Istanbul Assembly Cabinet Minutes, No 149.
- 297. Prime Ministry Archives, Yildiz Documents, Section 19, Document No 123, File No 143, Carton No 56.
- 298. J. Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Ibid., Cambridge University Press.

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

WHY OPEC TERRORIST KLEIN RENOUNCES TERRORISM

Rundown of Events

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 7 Aug 78 pp 68-70

[Preface to interview with OPEC terrorist Klein by DER SPIEGEL: "'I Believed in It with a Blind Rage'"]

[Text] What was supposed to move the world was "crazy." What was supposed to be conveyed to those in power through violence was "a crappy way." With such comments OPEC terrorist Hans-Joachim Klein has turned away from terrorism. He has told DER SPIEGEL about his extremely dangerous defection and the fantastic plans of his comrades.

Main Post Office, Milan, 26 April 1977.

Hans-Joachim Klein, 30, one of the terrorists wanted worldwide after attacking the OPEC conference in Vienna in 1975 and kidnaping 11 oil ministers as hostages, stands at the counter for mailing packages.

He wants to get rid of a package in a plastic box containing, wrapped and tied, his revolver, a "ZBR Zbroyovka 38," not loaded complete with leather case and a case with 12 pieces of ammunition. A letter is enclosed. The addressee: DER SPIEGEL, Rome.

The postal employee does not want to take the package from him, drawing attention to the regulation, in effect following numerous bombing attacks, that packages first have to be opened and then provided with a control stamp. Klein takes the package back, flings it on the floor and calls out with feigned indignation, "There is no bomb in there!" The man behind the window falls for this and accepts the package unopened.

The scene is the crucial point of a biography and at the same time describes the man: the same sangfroid he displayed at the OPEC raid in Vienna, he now shows at the post office window as he leaves the internationalist terrorist scene. In the letter he has enclosed in the package with the revolver, he dissociates himself from his guerrilla comrades, saying "I have done enough mischief" (DER SPIEGEL No 20, 1977).

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"Ready to throw up" in light of the "crazy actions" of the international terrorists, he is seeking to make contact with the public in order to issue warnings about murder attempts, planned at the time, against the heads of the Jewish communities in Berlin and Frankfurt. Since that time he has been wanted not only by the police.

Klein: "I realize that the guerrillas will think of it; they'll be after me." What this means is that the defector must fear the revenge of his former comrades, such as caught up with Ulrich Schmuecker of the "2 June Movement" terrorist organization. Schmuecker was murdered.

Nevertheless Klein wants to speak out again. In a SPIEGEL interview managed with the camouflage of a borrowed identity, he now spills the beans, talking about previously unknown details of the OPEC raid, not previously described background information and the fantastic-sounding plans of the international guerrilla movement.

He reports about Wadie Haddad, the wirepuller, about the ties between German and Arab terrorist groups, about his "leader" in Vienna, legendary Ilich Ramirez Sanches alias Cenon Clarke alias Glenn H. Gebhard alias Carlos—a truly revealing document.

For to this day no one who has dissociated himself from terrorism has had the kind of insider's view that Hans-Joachim Klein has about the international entangelement of money, violence and political interests. A deserter, in other words, another star witness like former BM [Baader-Meinhof] people Karl-Heinz Ruhland, Gerhard Mueller or Dierk Hoff? A provident man who while in hiding wants to secure a kind of penalty discount in case the police nab him after all?

Former terrorist Klein—and that makes his case unique—does not do the obvious. The man who first took part himself in the shooting during the OPEC raid and then dispatched his "piece" takes a quite specific stand. Though he does not want to make common cause with the police, he pursues in his own way their aim of putting an end to terrorism. He himself, as he puts it, had "believed in it with a blind rage," but now that he has abandoned his erroneous views, he sees the anarchists of violence "bombing themselves deeper and deeper into the morass. Surely that is no leftist policy."

Thus he personally tries to draw a clear line between "treason" (against former fellow culprits) and "prevention" (of further terror). If he went straight over to the police, Klein says, he would forfeit credibility among the very comrades whom he would like to address.

As a "leftist" (and that is what he continues to regard himself as), "I would lose my political identity, and thereby also the opportunity to get others away from terrorism." As a traitor he could not set an example, and to surrender to the police—their declared enemy—he says, is asking too much, and, therefore, ineffective. But, he says, it is not only high time, to put it mildly, to stop and quit terrorism; as his example shows, it is possible to do so in practice.

On such a narrow path, the former terrorist seeks to preserve both his internal and his external balance. If he is seized one day, he will have to answer for his participation in the attack against the OPEC ministers. Those three victims of Vienna, though, as has long since become clear to the police as well, were not killed by shots fired by Klein. Contrary to plan, he even had spared two hostages, incurring, as he reports, massive criticism by "Carlos" and comrades.

But it remains an unsolved legal question whether he will be held responsible for the brutality of the others, which would mean that he would have to figure on life imprisonment as a coparticipant, or whether he will be classified as an accessory and thus would get away with a lesser penalty.

Somewhere among likeminded leftists, whom he calls "the so-and-sos," Klein at present is writing a book which is to come out in a few months. "If with this interview and with my book," Klein says in the SPIEGEL interview, "I get 10 people away from the guerrillas, I will have accomplished more than the BKA [Federal Criminal Police Bureau] with its 100 million marks."

For "I know of 17 and 18 year olds who would like nothing better today than to put an ad in the FAZ [FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE] to get a gun and enter the terrorist scene--crazy. They have to wake up."

He is familiar with the fatal process of dropping out—how one goes to seed rather than growing up in a desperate situation at home, how one finds his way to leftist groups out of massive behavioral disturbances, how one wants to ruin what is ruining one and then ends up with the "Revolutionary Cells." He describes this in an article of his own written for DER SPIEGEL, entitled "I Am a Real Frankfurter" (see below).

The face of this character from the environment of the Frankfurt poor made the rounds of the papers for the first time in 1974 when, as chauffeur and bodyguard rolled into one, he met French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre at the Stuttgart airport together with attorney Klaus Croissant—imprisoned in the meantime—and drove him to Stammheim for his Baader visit.

At that time Klein was a clerk in the lawyer's office of leftist attorney Inge Hornischer. Through her he got to know one of her friends, atom executive Klaus Traube. Together with others he visited Traube in the Rhineland, where the specialist was in charge of the "fast breeder" project in Kalkar, and then also went on vacation with him, triggering later through his participation in the Vienna OPEC attack the illegal "bugging attack" against Traube—one of the momentous legal and constitutional conflicts of the Federal Republic. Like Traube, Klein learned about it all initially from DER SPIEGEL.

Klaus Trauber told DER SPIEGEL about Klein at that time in the following words: "He was a very childish person, with whom one could not really converse.... I could not mentally reconcile the childishness of this man, his somewhat adolescent ways, with the kind of danger he represented, as it turned out later."

To demonstrate this danger once then turned out to be enough for the Frankfurter Klein. During the OPEC raid, his "baptismal of fire," he was himself

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critically wounded by a shot into his abdomen. He was taken to the Vienna General Hospital and identified before "Carlos" and his comrades-in-action carried him on a stretcher into the plane which they used to kidnap the oil ministers as hostages.

Today Klein regards his gunshot wound almost as a personal bit of good luck. He was able to display it time and again to his underground comrades when he wanted to keep out of further terrorist actions, and it finally offered him the chance of preparing the risky maneuver of his defection.

Interview About Terrorist Plans

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 7 Aug 78 pp 70-79, 81

[Interview with Hans-Joachim Klein about the assassination and kidnaping plans on the international terrorist scene: "'Snooped on the Pope for a Month'"]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Klein, you have been on the run for 2 and 1/2 years, since the attack on the OPEC conference. In the meantime you have quit terrorism. You are hiding not only from the police but from your comrades. Whom do you fear more, your own people or the police?

Klein: Neither must be allowed to nab me. If my former people get me, they'll kill me. When this interview is in print, I'll have nothing to laugh about. And if the fuzz catches me, I'll go into the clink--who knows, perhaps for good. In terrorists' trials, after all, it is only the collective guilt that counts.

SPIEGEL: How long will it in fact be possible for you to keep up playing hide-and-seek with your own people and playing cops and robbers?

Klein: Forever, I hope. I have to go on living like this, illegally, with well-forged documents and with the help of so-called so-and-sos, comrades supporting me. Only a tiny number of people know who I really am.

SPIEGEL: Is this "forever" really indefinite? You need money, you want to move around, you are being a burden to others. Are you in a position to earn money of your own?

Klein: The chances of being productive are not exactly rosy, and where I live they are especially poor. Unemployment is making itself felt there. I am an automotive mechanic by trade, and here and there I repair some cars or do some other things. Besides I happen to be writing a book, and I get an advance from time to time.

SPIEGEL: You already have a publisher then?

Klein: Yes, a German one, and a publisher abroad has expressed interest. But it goes on and on; I am not a born writer.

SPIEGEL: When will the book come out?

Klein: Probably quite soon. I really was supposed to read galleys today.

SPIEGEL: Do you figure on confiscation?

Klein: That cannot be ruled out. But whoever confiscates the book cannot be quite right in the head, for the books doesn't say, "Rebuild the Red Army Faction," or something like that. It says exactly the opposite. If with this interview and with my book I get 10 people away from the guerrillas, I will have accomplished more than the BKA with its 100 million marks.

SPIEGEL: You have to figure each and every day that your underground anonymity will blow up, that somebody will not keep quiet after all, that you will be seized.

Klein: First, in the first few months after Vienna, I was terribly careful and also very nervous. Whenever I opened the door to my room in any hotel, I always figured that something might explode or that someone blows me away. But as time passes, all that quiets down. And if something really does happen, I don't have a chance anyway. In other words, if they get Buback or Schleyer, they can get me too.

SPIEGEL: Are you armed?

Klein: A year ago I sent my gum to DER SPIEGEL. Since that time I have been unarmed. What use is it really for me to drag a gum around? The only thing that might happen then is that some night perhaps some crummy burglar comes in and I do away with him because I think he is one of the guerrillas. Among the so-and-sos I am with now, though, there was a huge debate because I said I don't want any weapon. No one at all could understand that.

SPIEGEL: What kind of people are those, those so-and-sos?

Klein: They are leftists.

SPIEGEL: Do they themselves have arms?

Klein: They do not have any, but they can easily get some.

SPIEGEL: Do you have any contacts with terrorism?

Klein: Them? No, no.

SPIEGEL: Can you sleep well at night?

Klein: Me? Well, actually I can. At first not so well; everything was very shaky then.

SPIEGEL: You are bound to be worried about the lynch court murder of Schmuecker by the "2 June Movemnt," aren't you?

Klein: Of course I know that they want to kill me. And for that reason I don't travel all over the place. I am not afraid of death, but I want to live.

SPIEGEL: What did you think of that lynch court murder at that time?

Klein: When it had happened, I was very excited. I thought it was right for them to have killed Schmuecker. It looks like he really cooperated with the Office for the Protection of the Constitution people. Then there can be only one thing: blow him away. At the time it was a question of making it clear to everyone that whoever quits is done for.

SPIEGEL: In your letter to DER SPIEGEL you wrote last year that there was a "teensy-weensy but important difference between treason and prevention." Do you still see it that way?

Klein: Yes, treason is not my job. I am no fuzz.

SPIEGEL: And if prevention is not possible except through treason?

Klein: I did put an end to the matter of the two heads of the Jewish communities in Berlin and Frankfurt.

SPIEGEL: How far had the plans proceeded for the attacks against the two Jewish community heads which you revealed in your letter to DER SPIEGEL as far as actual implementation was concerned?

Klein: They had been pretty well completed. The two were to be shot and killed. It was to be done by people of the Revolutionary Cells. Galinski normally is under heavy guard when he sits in his office in the synagogue. From his house to his office, however, he goes by foot or by bicycle. He was to be shot en route from home to the synagogue. The Frankfurter, virutally the same way. The RZ [Revolutionary Cells] first had to swipe some cars, however. Another action was to take place in March 1976. A JAL plane was to be brought down, with a smuggled-in explosive case.

SPIEGEL: Who planned the attack?

Klein: [It was] planned by Hadded. People from "2 June" and from the RAF [Red Army Faction] were to execute it.

SPIEGEL: Who?

Klein: That I won't say.

SPIEGEL: You know who?

Klein: Of course I do.

SPIEGEL: Are they still running around free?

Klein: Some are, and some are in prison. The thing with the plane did not come off, though. A hostess discovered the unaccompanied cosmetics case, got it out, and then it exploded in the Bangkok air terminal. After Mogadishu,

as I read in the paper, three Lufthansa planes supposedly were to be brought down by bombs. After all I had experienced, that couldn't be right. I said at the time: When the first one is brought down, I'll flush out the whole shebang. There were huge discussions with the son-and-sos. But what have people who are flying somewhere or other to do with the dead of Stammheim, with the madness of Mogadishu? Who flies to Mallorca? Pensioners; certainly not rich guys.

SPIEGEL: Buback, Drenkmann, Schleyer may be liquidated--that is your moral standard?--but a kindergarten, which was involved once, or pensioners should be spared? Was that your idea of guerrilla warfare at the time?

Klein: What was done in 1972 in Frankfurt or in Heidelberg, against the Amis, against the Vietnam war--those, as far as I was concerned, were the only truly political actions. The rest was self-portrayal. As recently as 3 years ago I said: With bombs one can change something. If they don't listen to us this way, we'll fling a few bombs. Then they will have to react. Today I don't see it that way any more. Now the only thing that one is changing is the climate in Germany--and that way one is raising a new generation of terrorists.

SPIEGEL: When did the first scruples come? When did you become shaky?

Klein: After Vienna, after OPEC.

SPIEGEL: What did you feel when at the attack on the OPEC conference you threatened people with arms, making them mortally afraid?

Klein: I won't start putting on a show of penitence, but it makes me vomit that three people were killed there, because they were killed for nothing. As far as I am concerned, that is murder. There was no reason for it at all. If I now stand here and say I regret it from the bottom of my heart, it sounds awfully sticky. But when I think about seeing that Iraqi there...

SPIEGEL: You feel guilty?

Klein: Not really guilty. I feel a little cheated about the rest of my life. Cheated, of course, also by myself, because I believed in it with a blind rage. As a result of the OPEC operation—the first I took part in, my baptismal of fire—I was disappointed no end, cheated in my political expectations.

SPIEGEL: Previously there was nothing? How is it possible then, that you, with no experience in the terrorist scene at the time, were immediately allowed to take part in such a delicate, spectacular matter?

Klein: I belonged to the Revolutionary Cells, and I was the only one who had been with the Bundeswehr [FRG Armed Forces] and could handle the whole mess-firearms and explosives. Actually the people were to have received military training for the OPEC operation in an Arab country, but there was not time for it any more.

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SPIEGEL: In what country?

Klein: I won't say.

SPIEGEL: In South Yemen?

Klein: In an Arab country. That's all I will say.

SPIEGEL: Why?

Klein: Because it would be contrary to my political ideas, and the Arab intelligence services would then be after me. I know too much. I even dined once with one of their foreign ministers.

SPIEGEL: Whose idea was it to attack the OPEC conference in Vienna, and with whom did the plan originate?

Klein: The idea is that of an Arab president.

SPIEGEL: In Libya? Of Colonel Qadhdhafi?

Klein: No comment. All our information about the conference, particularly about the security measures, we received from that country, which itself is an OPEC country and took part [in the conference]. For example, the conference was supposed to end officially on Saturday but then lasted a day longer. We therefore postponed everything until Sunday. That came in very handy for us, because we weren't quite ready. There was an enormous problem, you see: the arms arrived very, very late—not until Friday night.

SPIEGEL: Where are the people from? Where did they meet?

Klein: I had come from Frankfurt, in early December. Together with Boese. It was the first time that I crossed the border with forged documents. First we were in a hotel near Saint Stephen's Cathedral, in a deadend street. The next one who arrived was Sanchez.

SPIEGEL: Called "Carlos." When did he arrive?

Klein: The same day. He stopped at the Hilton. He loves Hiltons. Then came another four of the Revolutionary Cells. They, in pairs, rented an apartment 70 kilometers from Vienna. They only took part in the preparations though.

SPIEGEL: But knew beforehand what they were for?

Klein: Yes. The commando--Khalid, Yusif, Joseph and Nada--had arrived 2 days before the operation.

SPIEGEL: Did everyone know what his part was?

Klein: Yes. When Carlos arrived, we went over it. Boese translated everything for me. I didn't know any English yet at that time.

SPIEGEL: Carlos was the boss?

Klein: Yes.

SPIEGEL: Had he taken special precautions to remain incognito as far as possible?

Klein: No, he was quite relaxed. The famous beret, incidentally, he bought in Vienna.

SPIEGEL: How did the talks proceed? Were there any reservations? Did everyone agree? Was that the first time you had seen Carlos?

Klein: No reservations were uttered. Carlos, I had met in Paris as early as mid-1975. I was there together with Boese. I did not catch much about Carlos. They spoke English, which I could not understand. At night Carlos showed us some weapons—the "Scorpion" and other special handguns, Egyptian secret handguns. The Revolutionary Cells had just received a "Scorpion" and did not know how to handle it yet. It is a teensy—weensy Czech submachinegun, 7.65 caliber. If you snap it shut, you can carry it in your pocket like a pistol.

SPIEGEL: Was it only in Vienna that you learned about the planned attack against the OPEC conference?

Klein: No, earlier—in Frankfurt. I was told there that the OPEC ministers were to be kidnaped. At first I said that it could not be done. Petroleum ministers require an enormous amount of security; you can't get near them. Then I learned that they had inside information. At that point it started looking a bit easier. And then I said: Okay, I'll take part.

SPIEGEL: Who briefed you in Frankfurt?

Klein: Brigitte Kuhlmann. I first met her in a wood. We always had a nice little spot.

SPIEGEL: Why did the Palestinians, if they were going to stage the attack on OPEC, not go it alone? Why was it necessary for Germans to be a part of it?

Klein: The Palestinian leader Haddad, who is said to have died recently (I don't believe it)—he wants to get his money's worth. The Revolutionary Cells get a pile every month. Anyway, that's the way it was then; whether it still is so today, I don't know. Every month 3,000 dollars—sometimes more—and they also get arms from him.

SPIEGEL: Through couriers?

Klein: No they pay regular visits to the country, you know. And if it happens that no one comes, they would just pile up. The dough is dished out.

SPIEGEL: Does all that come from Libya?

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Klein: No comment. The Palestinians have logistical problems in Europe. Therefore Carlos (incidentally, he was the chief of finances for Europe) for instance established a huge logistical headquarters in Paris, which then was flushed out. But Carlos could do that only with the support of Germans, of Europeans, familiar with the situation.

SPIEGEL: How are arms and equipment brought to Germany, to Europe?

Klein: In diplomatic bags, for example. When I returned from the country to Vienna the first time, I, together with Boese, at the private residence of the ambassador picked up a huge diplomatic bag full of arms which an ambassador had hauled through customs in Rome.

SPIEGEL: What in fact was supposed to be the political significance of the OPEC operation?

Klein: The contradictions in the Arab area were to be made worse, and Palestinian resistance strengthened. The Palestinians were again being liquidated in Lebanon, and a great many had already been finished in Jordan. As far as I was concerned, it was an operation in support of the Palestinian struggle of liberation.

SPIEGEL: What did the plan look like?

Klein: We nab the oil ministers. Then we deliver each to his country, but before he gets out a pro-Palestinian statement has to be read out. Iranian Oil Minister Amuzegar and Yamani of Saudi Arabia were to be killed.

SPIEGEL: Was there not money involved as well?

Klein: No money was involved. Some papers wrote that we wanted to haul away millions and millions. There was no such demand. Nor did we get any money.

SPIEGEL: Or needed any?

Klein: The plan was to read out this letter in Vienna. The next thing was to get out of Vienna. No one was to be able to figure out what in fact was going on—except that a few mad Arabs are running around. Not until we were in the air was the really political part of the plan to begin.

SPIEGEL: But a couple of murders were part of the plan from the start.

Klein: In the case of Yamini I had some misgivings; he didn't mean much to me. But I had no problem whatsoever with Amuzegar. As far as I am concerned. he is still a swine par excellence; among other things the SAVAK (Iranian intelligence service--Ed) is under him.

SPIEGEL: How were the two ministers to be killed?

Klein: En route. Not in Vienna. There is power behind them, and perhaps one would not have let us leave Vienna. It simply had been discussed briefly

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that Carlos will do it himself--get rid of the two. It is customary for the leader to do that.

SPIEGEL: How were the parts distributed in Vienna? Did Carlos tell you: "You stand in the hall with a submachinegun and secure the entrances and exists"?

Klein: I didn't have a submachinegun. I had a pistol and a revolver and a couple of handgrenades.

SPIEGEL: What kind of a pistol was it?

Klein: It was the Czech revolver which I later sent to DER SPIEGEL. In addition, a Beretta, 9 mm, brandnew, and Russian or Chinese handgrenades.

SPIEGEL: How can one so heavily laden...

Klein: ...Yes, that was a problem. The Vienna police probably are still trying to figure out what vehicle we used to get to OPEC headquarters. We took the streetcar, right to the door.

SPIEGEL: The whole commando in one streetcar?

Klein: Yes, in one. It was a funny picture. We couldn't sit down with all that junk. And the conductor, he was staring, for it was Sunday, early in the morning, and the streetcar was completely empty. Particularly Yusif, he really looks like a true Arab. Straight in front of OPEC we got off.

SPIEGEL: What did you have to do?

Klein: My job was to get in together with Joseph, to secure things, to search the people and send them to the conference hall.

SPIEGEL: What people?

Klein: The ones in the lobby. We knew there was a lobby with a telephone switchboard. We had figured on a real shootout in the conference hall, even in entering the building, with bodyguards and secret service people. Amuzegar, as you know, is a bosom friend of the shah. At first we simply could not believe that he was running around there without any bodyguards. But the inside information was 100 percent correct.

SPIEGEL: If necessary, the commando would have stormed the OPEC headquarters?

Klein: Yes; but that was not to be expected.

SPIEGEL: And if it has been necessary after all? Was the commando in a position to do so?

Klein: Oh yes, we had plenty. But then everything went off very nicely. The policeman standing at the entrance even nicely said hello to us.

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When we were inside, Carlos gave the signal to begin by opening his bag and taking out a submachinegum. At that moment we all rushed up, in the previously agreed order. I was next to last; behind me was Joseph with the explosive. Carlos was first, then Khalid, then that Nada...

SPIEGEL: Gabriele Kroecher-Tiedemann, who has just been sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment in Switzerland.

Klein: No comment. Carlos, Khalid and Nada were to go into the conference hall immediately. And so they did. Joseph, too, with the explosive. Naturally he was to start fixing things at once in a corner, and that's what he did. Nada also had the job to block the elevators.

SPIEGEL: And then it happened.

Klein: Then there was shooting in there. I did not worry about it, for I had things to do outside.

SPIEGEL: Why was there shooting in the conference hall?

Klein: I found out only later. A Libyan OPEC employee had attacked Carlos, apparently grabbing his submachinegum. There was a brief to and fro, with the magazine dropping out of the gun. At that point Carlos pulled out his pistol, which he had carried in his belt, and hit him—in the shoulder. He then put the magazine back in the submachinegum and fired the rest from the pistol into his head of chest.

SPIEGEL: Another seven bullets?

Klein: Yes, to set an example, as he put it. It was definitely unnecessary. One shot in the shoulder is enough. So now he was defenseless. One of the oil ministers later said he thought it was the Israelis who were attacking OPEC. Carlos keeps complaining about his big nose; he is often taken for a Jew.

SPIEGEL: You heard the shots outside. How did you react?

Klein: I looked around quickly. But I really was fairly safe in the narrow hallway. The people were standing with their faces against the wall. It was all very complicated because I didn't know any English. I kept shouting nothing but "jacket out, jacket out." I did not want to check them for weapons; that was too dangerous for me.

SPIEGEL: Did you wear a mask?

Klein: Yes, the only one to do so. I wanted to go back to Frankfurt. I wore a ski cap leaving free only a strip for the eyes.

SPIEGEL: You also fired, though. Why? At whom?

Klein: The first time at the telephone. The secretary kept phoning. I wanted to prevent that. I kept shouting, "Finish!" I didn't want to speak

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German, because they weren't supposed to know that I was German. But the secretary kept calling unperturbed, and that's when I shot the phone to pieces.

SPIEGEL: Did it occur to you to shoot and kill the secretary as well?

Klein: No; that's baloney. I don't shoot a secretary just because she is telephoning. But later there was a big discussion about why I didn't. I was also criticized for not having killed the Iraqi security officer. I said: I don't kill him; all he wanted was to get away, stepping backward, his hands stretched high.

SPIEGEL: Had it been agreed before the operation when there would be any shooting?

Klein: Of course, but there was a row there too. Carlos said: Anyone who wants to get out is shot; otherwise the fuzz outside finds out what is going on inside. But we ourselves sent people out to pass on our information; so the fuzz finds out anyway. Well, the Iraqi security officer then leaves. At the time I didn't yet know that he was from security.

SPIEGEL: And if you had known?

Klein: I would have fired only if he had attacked me.

SPIEGEL: Gabriele Kroecher-Tiedemann behaved the way Carlos had ordered.

Klein: In our command there was only one woman, and she called herself Nada and spoke a little German. Anyway, I saw how someone wants to get out backward. Okay, I let him go, looking a bit in his direction. At that moment Nada comes out of the conference hall and runs toward him. She puts her pistol to his chest. Complete idiocy. The character, and he really was huge, took her, held her close and dragged her along. Then there was a bang, and he was down. There he lay. His jacket was askew, and I saw he was carrying a gun. I took it away from him. He was still alive then. He lay there in an awful pool. I had completely run out of steam.

SPIEGEL: For carrying on?

Klein: I was completely confused.

SPIEGEL: At the sight of the mortally wounded man?

Klein: It must have been a head wound. Whenever he made a sound, some stuff came out, out of his mouth.

SPIEGEL: There was more firing, with yet another person dying.

Klein: I didn't see it at all. I only heard about it later. It must have been a pretty old fellow. He went into the elevator and probably wanted to scram.

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SPIEGEL: Nada fired at him?

Klein: Yes, into his back.

SPIEGEL: And then you too fired once more.

Klein: Yes. Suddenly four close-combat fighters were jumping around on the stairway. They were part of an Austrian squad that had been established only a couple of years before after Palestinians had seized a train with Israelis in Marchegg. The police were wearing steel helmets and were armed. They were making an enormous noise. So I went back, and that is when it started right away. I was lucky. The hallway was fairly narrow, and I was standing in a blind spot. In other words, they had to fire round the corner or advance far enough for me to be able to fire back. Joseph was standing opposite me, also in a blind spot, providing cover with his submachinegun.

SPIEGEL: And then you fired?

Klein: Yes.

SPIEGEL: How many times?

Klein: Five or six, until my gun was empty. But when I was about to reload, I got it.

SPIEGEL: A shot in the abdomen.

Klein: A shot in the abdomen, a ricochet into my shoulder, a grazing shot at my thigh. I dragged myself a few meters into the kitchen. Finished. Yusif stopped with his gun somewhere near the corner. Later Carlos shouted something. A handgrenade was thrown, and then there was quiet.

SPIEGEL: Were any of the Austrian police wounded?

Klein: One got a shot in his behind. I saw that again briefly later when I was lying in the hospital in Vienna.

SPIEGEL: How long were you in the kitchen?

Klein: God knows. At some time or other a petrominister came--the one from Cabon, I think. He is a doctor, he looked at me, and they told me that I absolutely had to go to a hospital; otherwise I was finished. The wound burned a lot. No blood came out at all--perhaps a few drops. The whole thing looked as if someone had quickly cut me with a knife.

SPIEGEL: Did you lose consciousness?

Klein: After being hit I didn't take in anything at all any more. I only know that Carlos took my gun and the handgrenades and my briefcase, emptying my pockets, so to speak. I then put my cigarettes back into my pocket, and the lighter--that's a present from someone.

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SPIEGEL: How long did the blackout last?

Klein: Quite long. I remember being taken down the stairway in the OPEC building, my jacket pulled over my head. About two people supporting my arms, I know nothing. Someone asked me if I was a terrorist or a hostage. I only shouted, "My fight name is 'Angie'" [in English]—after the song by the same name of the Rolling Stones which I liked. I did not notice at all being taken to the hospital. In the hospital I once briefly regained consciousness when I was fingerprinted and photographed.

SPIEGEL: Was any consideration given to your comrades leaving Vienna without you? The transport might have endangered your life of course.

Klein: It was definite that as soon as the plane takes off I am on it. It had also been agreed that I would be finished off if it had turned out that I was paraplegic.

SPIEGEL: Who would have seen to that?

Klein: Carlos.

SPIEGEL: The plane with the OPEC ministers first flew to Algiers. There you were put in a hospital again. How long were you in there?

Klein: Nine days.

SPIEGEL: Not longer?

Klein: No, they kicked me out when I could be moved. After 5 days they removed all the hoses and took out the stitches. And then injections in huge amounts. One morning a security officer came in to say that the plane would be ready at noon.

SPIEGEL: To go where?

Klein: An Arab country.

SPIEGEL: Which?

Klein: I won't say.

SPIEGEL: Did you meet your buddies again?

Klein: Them and some others. Many of the Revolutionary Cells were there as well; they happened to be receiving military training.

SPIEGEL: Carlos too?

Klein: He had been there a long time.

SPIEGEL: Were there reproaches against you?

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Klein: No, the spokesman was Haddad. Haddad is boss down there.

SPIEGEL: Did Haddad direct the Carlos force?

Klein: There is no Carlos force. Carlos is a member of the Haddad force. But he has now quit.

SPIEGEL: Carlos has quit? When did he do so?

Klein: Shortly before Entebbe, about May 1976.

SPIEGEL: Why?

Klein: Hard to say. Anyway, it all has to do with the OPEC affair. In an Arab country where the OPEC plane landed, Carlos let himself be bought. He must have got a vast amount of money. He then stopped the operation. They told him: Stop the operation without killing Amuzegar and Yamani and without doing the whole show.

SPIEGEL: How much money did Carlos get?

Klein: God knows. It must have been quite a bundle. When Carlos quit the Haddad force, he was terribly afraid that they would kill him. Therefore he wrote a letter, making a few copies. Boese had to fly to a certain country and take the letter to some government man. A copy was also deposited with the Revolutionary Cells in the Federal Republic.

SPIEGEL: What does the letter say?

Klein: That Carlos quits the force and leaves the country he was living in at the time.

SPIEGEL: Is the letter to be taken seriously?

Klein: Yes, certainly. Carlos also told Haddad about the letter so that he doesn't get any dumb ideas. And he said: "Okay, go on your way."

SPIEGEL: Does that mean that superterrorist Carlos has been out of action since Spring 1976?

Klein: What is certain is that he quit at that time, and I don't think he joined up again. A superterrorist? The papers and the fuzz made him that, and he liked it. He said: The more little stories they write about me, the more dangerous they make me, the better it is for me, the less ready will the regular fuzz be to catch me. For him it meant security somehow.

SPIEGEL: How does he dress? What language does he speak?

Klein: He always speaks English or Arabic; actually always extremely cool. The first week and a half he ran around Vienna unarmed. Then the RZ brought a gun and a few handgrenades, and he got those.

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SPIEGEL: Is he vain?

Klein: Yes, there are a number of little stories. He is extremely anal. He washes and takes showers incessantly. We always kidded him, for he powders himself from head to toe. And he has a trace of breasts. Once Haddad suggested to him that he get himself a new face. But the only thing that interested him was whether doctors might be able to remove his tits.

SPIEGEL: How does he behave in a group?

Klein: There is enormous solidarity, but he also always really behaves like a boss. He has got a leader mentality. Time and again he tried to give orders to the Revolutionary Cells despite the fact that they are an exclusively German guerrilla group.

SPIEGEL: Does Carlos have a political concept?

Klein: A political concept? In any case, he knows a lot about politics. He even knows about Germany, about the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats; he knows the score there.

SPIEGEL: Did he tell about his stay in Moscow?

Klein: Yes; I now know the fine difference between beluga and malossol caviar.

SPIEGEL: What does he think of the Soviet Union, of Soviet communism?

Klein: He didn't talk about that in my presence. But he still hopes to be able to return to Moscow. He says they only expelled him from the university, not from the country, because he took part in a foreigners' demonstration.

SPIEGEL: What would Carlos want in Moscow?

Klein: Live there, because he is wanted everywhere.

SPIEGEL: You said Haddad was the actual boss, not Carlos. Does Haddad play the role on the international terrorist scene which is being attributed to Carlos?

Klein: No question about it. Every talk he had with any of us, he made detailed minutes of, filing them in his archives.

SPIEGEL: How does Haddad influence individual terrorist operations?

Klein: He conceives them and them dispatches the people for planning them. OPEC, Entebbe--his doings.

SPIEGEL: What is his political aim?

Klein: He told me how it was when the Israelis destroyed his village and chased him out. That day he swore he would fight Israel for the rest of his

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life. He has contacts with almost all guerrilla groups and always makes sure that the individual groups do not establish liaison among each other. That was possible only with his permission. For a long time Haddad was a member of the Central Committee of the Palestinian organization PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine]. Then there was a huge row there, perhaps in connection with OPEC. They kicked him out, demoting him to ordinary member of the organization.

SPIEGEL: But the PFLP lets him has his way nevertheless?

Klein: Yes, and it was purposely not made official. He goes with his little suitcase to various Arab countries and has it filled. And he gets it filled only as long as he represent the PFLP position.

SPIEGEL: And where does he get his funds?

Klein: From some Arab countries. Every now and then he also gets some from Germany--involuntarily. For example, at the hijacking of the Lufthansa plane to Aden in South Yemen. There they pried loose 5 million dollars. That too was a Haddad commando.

SPIEGEL: Did Haddad also get money from Qadhdhafi?

Klein: Why don't you ask Qadhdhafi some time? He has denied it constantly.

SPIEGEL: In othe words, whenever there is mention of international terrorism, the name of Haddad is bound to come up?

Klein: They always say that the individual groups—the RAP, the 2 June Movement or the Revolutionary Cells—are completely independent. That isn't so at all. Nothing is launched without Haddad. The most dramatic operations of all staged by the Revolutionary Cells was conducted in Haddad's behalf. That was about 1970 to 1971, one of the first bomb attacks, the incineration of a whole factory in Berlin. It must have been connected somehow with the Israelis.

Then there was another plan, also Haddad--which never became know. It concerns al-Tajir, personal wealth of 13 or 14 billion dollars. He wanted to buy up half of London. He was to be kidnaped. We wanted to get 40 to 60 million dollars for him; that was in spring 1975, I was in London then.

SPIEGEL: What was supposed to execute the plan?

Klein: Carlos, Michel Moukarbel and I. Boese was to take part as well, Brigitte Kuhlmann, someone from the RZ who can take good photos and yet another Arab who has been shot and killed in Beirut in the meantime.

SPIEGEL: And how was this to be done?

Klein: It was a pure blackmail operation. But the necessary information which we were supposed to get from a diplomat didn't come. Only after 3 weeks

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did we in fact see al-Tajir for the first time in front of his house on Kensington Road, with two bodyguards. He was constantly going somewhere. Carlos then had the affair called off.

If Haddad didn't want it, it didn't take place. An example: The "2 June" wanted to kidnap the pope—that was in April 1976. For a month the "Holy Father" was checked out in detail. How he is constantly hopped in his chair to those funny audiences. With him German prisoners were to be blackmailed out of jail. Haddad told RAF and "2 June': If you want to kidnap the pope, you have to make it a suicide action. No Arab country can officially tolerate your running around free after that.

SPIEGEL: You keep mentioning the Revolutionary Cells. Apparently they are far more important on the terrorist scene than has been known so far--also as far as the police are concerned.

Klein: I am very much surpised at that. The Revolutionary Cells continue to be powerfully underestimated. After all, they already rendered logistical assistance at the Olympics massacre. Boese himself told me that he had his hand in providing quarters for the Palestinian "Black September" commando.

SPIEGEL: And Boese was the RZ boss?

Klein: Yes. Boese of course also took part at Entebbe; he was killed.

SPIEGEL: Why did Boese not take part in the OPEC operation?

Klein: One thing is clear: leaders of groups never take part in operations. That was Haddad's decision. I was to take part at Entebbe. But there my gunshot wound came in very handy. I went to a hospital.

SPIEGEL: But you continued to be considered part of them; otherwise, you surely would not have been made privy to such murderous plans.

Klein: Surely I don't get out and then get in again, and if I want to get out, I certainly don't broadcast it.

SPIEGEL: When did you first get the notion to quit terrorism?

Klein: Shortly after Vienna, in February 1976. The fact that they were blasting me for having let the Iraqi fuzz go had been a kind of crucial experience for me. I then wanted to send a letter to Germany which would say so more or less, 30 or 40 pages long. But to get out was not all that simple. I knew too much, and it won't work without assistance. As late as after Entebbe I had to make new contacts for Carlos. I knew where "2 June" was and knew the connections with the RZ. So I had to travel around. And besides, they intercepted, read and destroyed my letter.

SPIEGEL: Did you sense any distrust after the letter.

Klein: I had to be careful as the dickens. Before getting out, I even had to contribute once in a while. I suggested kidnaping Princess Caroline of

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Monaco to get money. She was living in Paris at the time. But I already realized then that in the next 2 or 3 weeks I can take the jump once and for all. I even had already written the first 60 pages for my book, in the RZ hut in the Italian mountains—not, as is often presumed, in the Aoasta Valley.

It is against the people of "2 June" that I must guard especially. As late as a month before I quit, they spoke about all of their things in detail, about the Lorenz kidnaping for instance. How Lorenz got his comeuppance, how they took care of him. Of course also some completely different things, about which I won't say anything.

SPIEGEL: Did you later have any contact with the prisoners who were released as a result of the Lorenz kidnaping blackmail?

Klein: No, but I did with the people who left the clink in Berlin--Viett, Rollnik and Plambeck. I trained them for a month in the military camp in that Arab country. Sometimes they were a little awkward, but they learned to handle arms. In that training it is like being in the army. There are three basic positions. The first is taking aim through the notch and the front sight, the second is to put the barrel on the back of your hand, when you regularly burn your bones, and the third is to take some lunging step, but that is no use at all. To shoot from the hip is forbidden.

SPIEGEL: What are the targets?

Klein: The landscape, rocks. Besides there is a huge firing range, with dynamiting and firing of antitank rockets—also British antiaircraft rockets, which hardly ever worked.

SPIEGEL: Was it not danger to handle such explosive stuff?

Klein: No. But I almost did kill Inge Viett one time. The big firing range for heavy weapons is in the desert. We were staying there for a few days, with a tent having been put up. I was getting the weapons ready in the tent and put a magazine into a worn British Sten submachinegun and pulled back the lever, when suddenly the gun went off and a whole series of bullets marched out, right through the tent. The Viett girl came in pale as a ghost. A bullet had missed her head by only a few centimeters. Very embarrassing. I was at least as pale as she was.

SPIEGEL: How did you finally manage to get out?

Klein: I could not get out until I had established contact with people helping me. I had virtually no money, and only stolen documents which weren't much good. Besides I am a real Frankfurter through and through; I practically know only people from Frankfurt.

SPIEGEL: When were you able to make your first contacts?

Klein: In February 1977--with the people that are still helping me, with the so-and-sos.

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SPIEGEL: Has it ever occurred to you to surrender to the police?

Klein: No, I don't want to go to jail.

SPIEGEL: Assume you knew that you would get 10 years in prison.

Klein: No. Once, I was 19 then, I spent 8 months in a cell by myself in a prison for juveniles. Because of auto theft. I was not as well off then as many a political prisoner these days. Some people will raise a hullabaloo when they read this, but it is true. Even 10 years would be too much for me. Even if they let me go again after 3 years—what then? Then I still have my "friends" of the past on my neck, more so than ever.

SPIEGEL: But you would be rid of an enemy--the police.

Klein: Oh, they aren't my enemy any more. For me they are no more than a problem now. If I went and spilled everything, including what I am not saying here or in my book, there might be an amnesty. But I won't do that. That's not my job. I did not invent the guerrillas. I was part of them only a short time. And my friends who are helping me now—I would then lose them as well. Nor would any of them understand, though none of these so—and—sos today, for example, would protect someone who continues to engage in terrorism. Nor could I reconcile it with my own conscience. The road to Vienna was a shitty way. I realize that now.

SPIEGEL: Mr Klein, we hope for your sake that you will do the right thing.

Description of Terrorists

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 7 Aug 78 p 73

[Profile of international terrorists: "Escaped, Arrested, Shot"]

[Text] "Carlos": 28, cover name of terrorist leader Ilich Ramirez Sanchez from Venezuela, wanted worldwide; accused of numerous terrorist attacks in Europe and, among other things, leader at the attack on the Vienna OPEC conference in December 1975.

Wilfried Boese: One of the first international activists of the West German "Revolutionary Cells." Recruited by "Carlos" first as courier and procurer of arms, he was killed by the Israelis in Entebbe in 1976. The Palestinian organization PFLP honors him as one of its "martyrs."

Brigitte Kuhlmann: Arab cover name "Halimeh." Student of education from Hanover. Trained, together with Boese, especially for hijacking operations in a PFLP training camp. Killed at Entebbe.

Michel Moukarbel: Art student in Paris from Lebanon. A member of the PFLP and "Carlos'" closest collaborator, he revealed the terrorist headquarters in Paris to French counterintelligence, DST. Shot and killed by "Carlos."

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Gabriele Kroecher-Tiedemann: 27, was released from prison as a result of the Lorenz kidnaping blackmail after having been arrested in 1975 on suspicion of having attempted to kill members of the police. Arrested in Switzerland in December 1977 after the kidnaping of Vienna industrialist Palmers. Month before last [June 1978] sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for having tried to kill two Swiss customs officers.

Inge Viett: 34, kindergarten teacher by profession from Berlin and militant head of the "2 June Movement." In 1976, while in detention pending trial, escaped for the second time from the Berlin Women's Penitentiary.

Gabriele Rollnik: 28, former social science student, member of "2 June." Installed the "people's prison" in which the kidnaped Berlin CDU Chairman Lorenz was held captive. Also accused of having participated in the Drenkmann and Palmers cases. Escaped from prison in 1976. In 1978—together with Till Meyer, freed by her—arrested in Bulgaria and extradited to the Federal Republic.

Juliane Plambeck: 26, joined "2 June Movement" via the prisoners' Caritas "Red Aid" in 1974. Like Viett, wanted for having participated in the Drenkmann and Lorenz cases. One of four women who escaped from prison in Berlin in 1976.

Klein About His Life

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 7 Aug 78 pp 80-81

[Biographical sketch by former terrorist Klein: "'I Am a Real Frankfurter'"]

[Text] How did I come to take the leftist trip? My progenitor thrashed me there. He was with the fuzz at one time--the Kripo [criminal police]. I can't get the word "father" over my lips. You might say that my contact with him was primarily skindeep. He is a wardrobe but one with nothing in it.

I was weakly, developed extremely late. When I was born, I almost didn't make it. That probably has to do with my mother. She was Jewish and had been in the Ravensbrueck concentration camp.

But not even that I learned from my old man. It was revealed to me by a so-called educator in the reform school in front of the assembled crew. I was 17 then. I left the ranks crying.

I don't know anything about my mother to this day, not even when she was born. Four pictures of her I always carry with me. I took them out of my old man's photo album when I took the final jump from home.

The only nice time of my youth I spent with my foster parents. But when I was about 9, when my old man married again, I had to go back to him. Once, at 15, the ice gave way under me in the Ostpark in Frankfurt, and someone got me out at the risk of his life and took me home. Instead of being glad that I was still alive, he thrashed me half dead.

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A thrashing and into bed on the slightest occasion. With a rolling pin, with ropes and with cooking spoons.

I put up with it all. What could I do? I simply was afraid of the man, stood in the corner and didn't do anything any more. Every few days, especially Sundays, I was locked in. Door shut, locked, and the old man slept in the next room with the key.

Once when I was 17 I was locked in my room again, with his "Bubi" [little fellow], a parakeet next to me in its cage. I was sorry for it in its small cage, and so I just let it fly away. Just like that—not because I wanted to let my old man have it. When he saw that the bird was gone, it really started. He thrashed me so hard I though I would kick the bucket. I crapped into my pants and all.

I had been at the youth welfare office before at times, showing them what I looked like. But when will such a youth office actually do something? That night I went to see a representative of the youth office. I trusted her. Two days later I got into the reform school.

But I hadn't been there more than an hour when I was beaten something awful. The educator was a former furniture maker.

One year; then I went away from there. Before that, they had put me into psychiatrics, in Landau, probably because of development deficiencies. There they crammed me full of psychopharmaceuticals and hormones. At age 17, I still had no hair under my arms or pubic hair. Then it slowly started to sprout, and I also grew some more.

When I quit the reform school, where could I go? So I went back to my old man. Then the locking out started. If I didn't come home by 10, I couldn't get in. I would then sleep in the cellar.

Shortly before I got into the Bundeswehr, I had my very first girlfriend. She was almost 20. She gave me a little necklace, which my old man then tore off me one day. He thought it was effeminate. I let him have it then, for the first time, quite a powerful blow. From that moment on he didn't try to come close to me any more.

The leftist groups, I met when the student revolt started. I was 20 then, shortly before I went into the Bundeswehr. My old man had always painted the nicest picture of the fuzz. The police, he said, were there to protect the women, our mothers, our girlfriends. At that time the "riots" started, and being a curious person I wanted to see them close up.

I saw how the fuzz, like devils, went on a rampage in the blockade of the printing plant of the Frankfurt BILD. I saw three of them hit an 18-year-old woman. Two ideas I had of the world were destroyed all at once--one, that women are poor and weakly, and, two, that those who were supposed to protect the weak, three of them, are beating up this poor creature.

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Something clicked in me at that moment, and I swiped the fuzz one, and got one myself. At that moment my superstition was gone.

So I got to talk with such groups. The first 3 months it was all Greek to me. Then I slowly dared go to a teach-in. I saw, for instance, how they smoked Gitanes there, and since that time I have only smoked black cigarettes. I really had a fantastic respect for the students. As far as my progenitor was concerned, the students were nothing but rowdies and radicalniks.

First I thought students later all become fancy gentlemen, and that's why they are raising hell now. But when I saw them getting their heads bashed in, I thought they must have a reason.

I first wanted to refuse military service. In the Bundeswehr I was often in the clink. Undermining of the armed forces. For instance, I stuck up posters and distributed leaflets against militarism.

A long way to terrorism. We read a little bit of Mao, and everyone interpreted Mao in his own way. We understood none of it. In the meantime, however, I had a hell of a circle of acquaintances on the leftist scene—for instance the base plants group, the later "Revolutionary Struggle."

The first bomb had not yet been thrown in Frankfurt when I started sympathizing with the guerrillas. I thought it was necessary to sing a different tune here for once. I adopted the entire ideology as well. The slogan of Ulrike Meinhof that fuzz "can be fired at" I never accepted. Nor did I equate my thrashing progenitor with all police. That would be too cheap.

Until I got my first gun-that too was a development process. At some time or other I said, I've had enough, because nothing is going on any more. When the "Red Aid" was founded, I immediately was part of it. In mid-1975, however, I quit again saying: You're only conducting a pseudoleftist policy, send your packages to the clink, and that's all.

The first pistol I put in my pocket the night when I heard that Holger Meins kicked the bucket in the clink. Something snapped inside me. Comrades who had known me a long time then had a hard time stopping me from doing something crazy. The pistol I had got from my depot. Every RZ member has his depot and his false ID.

Today I look at things differently. There is in fact somebody who in the clink got orders to kick the bucket—not Holger Meins but someone else. He fortunately survived. This person got into the clink, and she was told: You have to kick the bucket, we need someone dead. Since that time I have in fact found it difficult to say that Meins is only a poor victim of the system.

The gun didn't come out again until I went to Vienna, apart from target practice. The way to OPEC was a long, continuing matter. There was my work in the legal left, in the Vietnam movement. There they really staged genocide. Olof Palme, for instance, had courage, but Willy Brandt surrounded himself with a halo and, for reasons of power, kept silent.

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Then there was still the urban district work in Frankfurt, the squatting. We hit like tinkers there. They kick the little grannies out of the houses and bring them into these mammoth towns, these suicide centers.

What is there left for me to do in my life? Difficult to define. To start with, I consider the meaning of my life to be to survive. That is quite a difficult job in itself.

I would like to join a leftist political group again, work in it and then conduct a realistic policy. Some kind of project, an alternative movement for a better life, without all that environment junk.

If I were in Franfurt today, I would want to take part in the project for an alternative newspaper. Of children's shops. I have been busy with children in the meantime. They like me. But I do live a very restricted life. I have to have a lot of consideration for the people I live with so that they don't get into trouble on my account.

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

TERRORIST PERSONALITY: ROLE OF FEMALE IN TERRORISM

Heidelberg KRIMINALISTIK in German 1976 pp 289-296, 357-363

[Report by Dr Wolf Middendorff, Freiburg]

[Text] Summary [Part 1]: Following a definition of its concept and an overview of the history and the present status of terrorism, its various forms are dealt with: individual terrorism, group acts, ordered acts and approved murders, bombings, arson, kidnaping, skyjacking and bank robbery. Criminological evaluation is first made, and later summarized, of cases in Russia, Ireland, the United States, the FRG and other countries. After dealing with the problem of distances, there follow finally outlines and recommendations for combatting terrorism (1. An eye for an eye? 2. Trends toward firmness; 3. Avoid the creation of sanctuaries!) and prevention (1. Police work must be upgraded!) 2. Preventive measures.). Due to the length of the article, it is being published in two successive issues.

Editor

1. Definition--History--Causes

Today there is much talk about terrorism, but the question is rarely asked about the exact significance of terrorism. A UN committee has attempted for several years to come up with a definition of this concept, with no success.

Terror primarily means fright, and terrorism is, according to volume 18 of the Brockhaus encyclopedia, a violent form of the political power struggle. It is differentiated as to state terrorism, military terrorism and group terrorism by revolutionary and extremist groups. These groups, which are frequently encountered in our century, commit specific attempts at assassination and nonspecific anonymous acts of terrorism, for the purpose of "challenging the power of the state to counter-terror, to shake confidence in the reigning order and to discourage the majority".

In the following report I am using the historical-biographical method, as I have described it in my "Contributions to Historic Criminology". The emphasis of evaluating facts is placed on the psychology of the criminal, i.e., understanding. Understanding is the expert evaluation by the historian

and comprehension by the psychologist. The criminologist Mezger has defined psychological understanding as "the categorization of a given intellectual happening into a scientifically effective context of the senses." Mezger further differentiates this understanding into phenomenological, motivational, characterological and sociological understanding3. Modern historians too are more interested in personality rather than social conditions, since "world history is not principally being determined by economic statistics, as the present vogue dictates, but rather by human passions. Since the latter remain constant, every era and also every reader is reflected in the images of the actors... Anyone wishing to explain historic happenings must describe the human beings which make them happen"4. At the same time we must remain cognizant of the fact that, as Theodor Mommsen put it, "history itself reaches to the borders of teh incomprehensible and includes the unexplored depths of the human psyche and the fate of humanity"5--and this applies to the historian just as much as to the criminologist. Anyone quarreling with the scientific validity of psychology and psychoanalysis can take solace from the words of Andre Green: "It could be that it isn't very scientific. But in this area, man's understanding of structure and history--is there anything that is more scientific?6".

The so-called nihilism of the past century in Russia, which to begin with was not necessarily negative, finally had no other goal than the destruction of the state. We have a document from the year 1869 which was called the "revolutionary's catechism." It's first article started as follows: "The revolutionary is a man consecrated to death. He has neither personal interests nor business, neither personal feelings nor ties; no property of his own; not even a name. His entire being is dominated by one exclusive interest, a thought, a passion: revolution. He must practice withstanding torture and must be ready to die at any time. Laws, conventions and civilized society's moral code have no meaning for him. He only lives in this putrefied order so as to be able to more quickly and more surely destroy it. To him, everything is moral which contributes to the victory of the revolution; everything that gets in his way is immoral and criminal."

This catechism divides "this entire putrified society" into categories, depending upon whether such a category should, upon the victory of the revolution, be eliminated immediately or some time later. "Aristocratic, rich or stupid creatures" are initially to be bled white by blackmail and other means. Women are particularly esteemed by the revolutionaries: they are their "most precious treasure." The catechism says nothing about the goals of the revolution; it only concerns itself with total, comprehensive and mindless destruction. It recommends an alliance with highwaymen, which it calls the only true revolutionaries in Russia8.

Even outside the catechism it is always emphasized that criminals, the so-called criminal stratum of society, are the natural allies of revolutionaries. In the early phases plans were already being made to finance the organization with such means as robbing postal transports or poisoning one's parents so as to come into an inheritance. Subsequent paragraphs provide for "disorganization" activities, the liberation of prisoners and the liquidation of spies within the ranks. "Expropriation" stood for obtaining money through robbery, especially bank robbery.

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The revolutionaries realized that they would not attain their goals within the foreseeable future; nevertheless, they wanted to try to shake up the population by constant act of terrorism. This is perhaps the place to make a distinction between terrorism as a condition of sustained exercise of violence for the purpose of creating fear, and revolution as a one-time event. Transitions are possible between the two forms of exercising violence; we can recognize them in the French Revolution, which also knew the reign of terror on the part of the state⁹.

In the course of history some material has been accumulated on the activity and personality of revolutionaries, especially those of revolutionary women. Differences among those revolutionary women are considerable. On the one hand we might consider the activities of the Princess Cristina di Belgiojoso (1808-1871), who played a preeminent role in the Italian liberation movement 10 ; on the other hand, we might remember experiences with revolutionary women after World War I, whom Hans von Hentig described as an exceptionally good subject for criminological study. According to him, it can be explained that during politically turbulent times mentally ill women were active in revolutionary movements. Their role was restricted to the conduct or the initiation of a collective act of desperation or of political assassination. To von Hentig, female revolutionaries appear particularly significant whose activities are based on grudges which can be either remediable or irremediable. "In one case the unhappy woman's grudge can be remedied, one part at a time, through improvements in her fate; in others there is no possibility of rising above the depressing depth of their inferiority; at best a detoxification through religious substitutes or a sublimation in the direction of artistic achievements or humanitarian efforts. Women with irremediable grudges are permanent revolutionaries; whether they pacify their fantasies with ideas of reform or operate actively in the political life," depends on external circumstances. "In peaceful times these women's graduges hide behind occupations hwich permit the causing of pain or the sight of pain from social motivation. They become teachers, physicians, nurses; they love and train animals; they engage in caring for young people; they fight prostitution; they fight for womens' rights--they are forever fighting." Says von Henting in conclusion: "If the revolutionary woman plays a fermenting role in cultural evolution, if some consciousness of deficiency drives many an intellectually outstanding woman to make great achievements, woman is in revolutionary times an extraordinary threat for several reasons. Experience has shown that in revolutions women as a rule show greater resolve than do men"11.

In the context we might mention the terrorist activities of the English suffragettes; in their battle for womens' rights they initially made a difference between violence against inanimate objects and violence against persons. On 1 March 1912 a group of some 200 women broke almost all show windows with rocks of hammers in the elegant shoppijg district around London's Piccadilly Circus. When this action did not provide the desired results, they switched to arson. A renowned physician wrote a letter to the TIMES in which he expressed his opinion that one half of English women were crazy as a result of being in the change of life. Belligerency, he thought, was a symptom of mental illness.

In the spring of 1913 another threshold was crossed; several rural railroad stations were set afire and some bombs were set to explode. Arrested suffragettes went on hunger strike in jail. Parliament gave the government the so-called "cat-and-mouse law," which empowered the minister of the interior to set free any prisoners who became debilitated in prison and to have them rearrested as soon as they had regained their health. One of the suffragette leaders, Mrs Pankhurst, went on hunger strike no less than 12 times.

Suffragette activities claimed their first victim in June 1913, when during the Epsom horserace a woman threw herself in front of an approaching group of horses and died of her injuries 4 days later. In early 1914 the suffragettes' actions increased in violence; among other things, they cut up paintings in the National Gallery. The outbreak of World War I then deflected their aggressiveness against other targets 12.

Among the reminiscences of male revolutionaries and anarchists there are the books by Rudolf Rocker, "The Memoirs of a German Anarchist" and more recently, Milovan Djilas' "The Young Revolutionary--Memoirs 1929-1941" 14.

Today terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon. It would take too much room to list individual occurrences. But it appears appropriate to discuss the justifications given by terrorists in many countries for their acts of violence.

Groups and individuals find their justification in the believed or pretended necessity to defend themselves against "violence from above." Thus they construct a type of emergency defense or emergency help against the state and its institutions. Criminologists and so-called peace researchers have given considerable aid to this. Thus, at the Twenty-third International Symposium of Criminology in 1974 in Maracaibo, Venezuela, much less was said about modern crimes of violence, like the taking of hostages and skyjacking, than extensive discussions about the so-called "institutionalized violence" of the state against the freedom of the individual. For this purpose the concept of violence was stretched to such an extent that the original legal and criminological significance of the word was completely lost.

A few definitions are given here to illustrate this ideological trend. It is for instance considered murder if not everybody gives aid to starving children in Ethiopia. In our latitudes, it is considered violence if someone is being addressed and forced to listen. It is violence if one's time is being wasted by authorities. Economic competition is a source of violence. Stock market speculations are violence. New forms of credit management are considered violence against the economic situation of the faimly. Continuing occupational education constitutes violence against workers who are forced to study for the sake of profits for the enterprise. Latin Americans primarily have emphasized generally that violence against the state is a means of proving that an individual is alive and to preserve his human dignity. Violence is the only language that unites mankind, and the following words by Eva Peron were cited: "Violence in the hands of the people is not violence, but justice."

Norwegian peace researcher Galtung defines violence by stating that if effectively serves to keep human beings from reaching thier potential. A consumers' union constitutes violence, he says, because the system is oriented toward reward and is based on promises of euphoric wellbeing, and 'herefore restricts man's scope of activity15.

Galtung also speaks about structural violence in place of institutionalized violence, which he describes also as social injustice. According to him, it is structural violence if 1 million husbands keep 1 million wives in ignorance. But Galtung and other peace researchers like him consider the destruction of property only a kind of training, "a blow against the bourgeois within us, a liberation from shackles present heretofore, an act of communication."

Though this kind of thinking appears absurd to reasonable people, it plays a big part in many countries in the political discussions of leftwing movements of all hues; this type of justification permits any illegal act of violence to be converted into a legal one and to make it justifiable.

In a publication entitled "Violence and the Use of Violence in Society" (Guetersloh, 1973) the Chamber for Public Responsibility of the Evangelical Church in Germany says this: "Because of its basic dangers, the use of violence presupposes that without it there is no chance of a change in inhuman living conditions. It can therefore be seriously taken into consideration only if all other means for improving conditions have failed or else hold no promise whatever. Even then some other conditions must be fulfilled: a viable concept of a new, operable order must be available which could replace the old, embattled order. For its part, the desired order must be oriented toward human rights and must provide living space to those who have heretofore been oppressed. The use of violence must be a promising means to the firmly defined goal of doing away with present violent oppression within a foreseeable span of time."

In the following section, it will be understood that cimres of violence in the traditional sense mean violations against existing laws. Criminology is a legalistic science; the subject of its investigation can therefore be only that which the state designates as a crime 16 .

II. The Forms of Terrorism

1. Individual Acts of Terrorism

The term "disorganization" quoted above was understood by the Russian nihilists to mean also the "systematic annihilation of the most dangerous or the most prominent members of the government and other persons of the government and other persons who are the main pillars of the political and social order which we hate."

This terrorism was not conducted systematically, but manifested itself in spontaneous individual actions, e.g., for revenge. Petersburg Chief of Police General Trepov visited the detention prison on 25 July 1877. Since he was annoyed about the demeanor of one particular detainee, he ordered that

the man be flogged. When news of this became public outside the prison, the revolutionaries decided to take their revenge on General Trepov. But since apparently there was disagreement about the time and place of the assassination attempt, Vera Sassulitch decided to take the matter into her own hands. She had already spent 2 years in prison for revolutionary activity, had been deported and had later learned the profession of midwife in Kharkov, where she was living under police observation. Since the spring of 1877 she had been working in Petersburg as a typesetter in the print shop of the "Land and Freedom" organization. On 29 January 1878 she asked for an appointment with the chief of police and was immediately admitted, since she was a member of a prominent family and General Trepov knew her father well. She fired a shot at the general which wounded him seriously, but not fatally. She offered no resistance to her arrest.

For reasons which are now obscure, the prosecution did not consider this assassination attempt to be a political act and the trial was conducted publicly by a magistrate. When the jury found the accused innocent this acquittal evoked enthusiastic approval among a wide segment of the public. Among West European circles of sympathizers Vera Sassulitch was called the new Judith or the Moscow Charlotte Corday. She was able to flee abroad before she could be arrested again 17.

Anoterh individual who attempted the assassination of Czar Alexander II singlehandedly was one Khalturin, an artisan cabinetmaker with roots in the peasantry. As a young man he wnated to emigrate to America, but missed the boat. He joined a revolutionary organization and for him the thought that the czar had to be killed by a man of the people became an idee fixe. He conceived a plan of blowing up the winter palace. Since he was a skilled worker, he obtained a job in the winter palace where he did maintenance work. He had quarters in the basement of the building together with three other carpenters; above his quarters was a security office and above that the so-called yellow room, where as a rule the czar took his meals with his family.

Little by little, Khalturin smuggled small quantities of dynamite, disguised as sugar, into the winter palace. Whenever the czar was in residence in the Crimea, this was easy to do, since while the front gates were heavily guarded, the rear entrance was open to the employees and to anyone they brought with them. When toward the end of November 1879 two maps of the winter palace were found in the hands of an arrested terrorist on which the dining room was marked with a red cross, security measures were tightened and a gendarme moved in with the carpenters. But Khalturin was not to be deterred from his preparations; he could move about freely within the palace. One day he found himself alone with the czar in the latter's study; he had a hammer in his hand and could have easily killed the czar from behind. But his courage left him. He took a small object from the czar's desk and carefully put it away as a souvenir.

On 5 February 1880 Khalturin lit the fuse which was to explode about 100 lbs of dynamite stored in a crate in a corner of his room. He then left the palace. The explosion shook the huge building; 11 people were killed and 56 wounded. But at the moment of the explosion the czar was not in the yellow

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room; but even had he been there, nothing would have happened to him. (Khalturin's attempt was similar to that of Elser against Hitler on 8 November 1939 at the Buergerbraeukeller in Munich.)

About 2 years later an assassination attempt took place against General Stelnikov in Odessa, who was hated by the revolutionaries as being a particularly brutal prosecutor of the military court. Khalturin was waiting nearby in a carriage to take the assassin to safety. However all participants were arrested on the spot and were hanged 4 days later under fictitious names. Khalturin's identity did not become known until later; he had once again shied away from an act of violence at close range¹⁸.

2. Assassination Attempts in Partnership

The most significant and eventually most successful assassinations by Russian nihilists were committed by groups in which two women participated in important functions.

The first was Vera Figner. In justifying her terrorist activities she once said: "If that part of society which is capable of enthusiasm cannot find a sphere of activity in which it cannot activate its strength and its enthusiasm for the benefit of the people, the situation becomes impossible to bear and all the rage if directed at the bearer, owner and representative of that power of the state which is isolated from the public: the monarch"19.

Vera Figner was born in the Volga area on 24 June 1852. Her grandfather on her mother's side had been a district judge. She spent her childhood on her parents' estate; between the ages of 11 and 17 she attended an institute for aristocratic girls in Kazan, from which she graduated at the top of her class. In 1870 she married a man who later became an official in the ministry of justice. In 1872 she went to Zurich where she studied medicine. During that period she became a revolutionary and socialist and separated from her conservative-bourgeois husband. On returning to her country she worked as a rural physician and joined the revolutionaries. Having later been denounced by two former comrades, she received a death sentence which was communted to a 20-year prison sentence which she served in the cells of Key Castle. She was one of the few active revolutionaries to survive the czarist empire; thanks to her comprehensive memoirs we have gained considerable insight into the planning of assassination attemptes on Czar Alexander II²⁰.

The other leading personality among female revolutionaries was Sofia Perovskaya. She was a general's daughter, had also spent her youth on an estate and later broke off all connections with Petersburg society to devote herself exclusively to the revolutionary movement. The graceful and pretty woman exerted great magnetism upon her environment. According to some of her comrades, she was hard as steel and was not bothered by thoughts of death and the gallows.

On 25 August 1879 the executive committee of the revolutionary organization condemned the czar to death, and a series of assassination attempts followed in short order. The main effort was directed to blowing up the czar's royal

train on the way back from the Crimea to Petersburg. With tremendous difficulty, organization members were housed in buildings near the tracks; some even found employment as train guards. In some cases the attempts consisted of digging a tunnel under the tracks and to put a landmine in it. One of these attempts was unsuccessful because the route of the royal train had been changed at the last minute. In a second attempt the electrodes were wired wrong and no explosion occurred²¹. On the third attempt the wrong train was blown up, when the czar, unlike his usual custom, rode on the first train and not the second.

Within a few years there were six attempts at the czar's life; 21 would-be assassins were condemned to death and hanged. As a result, the revolutionaries doubled their efforts. A truly major blow was planned. One group led by the Countess Perovskaya rented a shop in Sadovaya Street through which the czar frequently rode on his way to the riding school. From the basement of that house a tunnel was dug to the center of the street and a mine implanted. The police found out about these preparations inasmuch as the renters of the store apparently did not fit the neighbors' idea of small business people. Under the pretext of a health inspection the police searched the premises, but in such a casual way that the searchers found neither the hole leading to the tunnel nor the barely hidden earth which had been removed from the tunnel 122.

In order to finally meet with some success, Sofia Perovskaya had planned four additional attempts upon the czar's life with bombs and pistols in case he should change his route again. In the early afternoon of 12 March 1881 the czar, accompanied by only a few bodyguards, rode along the Catherine Canal rather than through Sadovaya Street. The assassins were standing along the route, their bombs wrapped in small parcels. None of them attracted the attention of the police or the security guards. As the czar's sled passed one of the assassins, he threw his bomb; two cossacks were hurt, but the czar was unharmed. Even though the driver was under orders in case of an attack to drive home as quickly as possible, the czar ordered him to stop because he wanted to look after the wounded cossacks. As he descended from the sled another of the assassins threw a bomb at his feet. The czar died of his injuries a few hours later.

After the assassination, the police and the justice department worked quickly and efficiently. Three weeks later five conspirators were condemned to death and executed, Sofia Perovskaya among them. In her final words at the trial, she made this declaration: "My conscience told me what I had to do, and I did it. I would do it again, and I await your verdict with serenity."23

3. Ordered Assassinations and Approved Murders

This chapter will deal with a few case of terrorism by the state. Uncovering such deeds is often difficult because government agencies are in the habit of denying their participation and because there is many a gradation between a clear order and a silent, halfhearted approval. Frequently it is therefore possible only to determine the final actual perpetrator, though this is often quite unsatisfactory.

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An attempt at assassinating Stalin was one of the examples of Third Reich state terrorism. After the 20 July 1944 uprising, the countries at war with Germany were highly encouraged. The assassination of Stalin would possibly have served to reverse this development. A Russian POW who had been trained as a killer and agent for 2 years, was delivered by airplane behind the Russian lines along with his wife, a Russian woman whom he had met and married while he was a prisoner of war. He was equipped with special weapons, was to occupy an apartment in Moscow and to look for an opportunity of killing Stalin on the way from the Kremlin to the headquarters of the Soviet general staff. The enterprise had however become known and the world-be assassins were arrested before they even reached Moscow²⁴.

This category also covers what was probably the only spectacular action by the so-called werewolf in the final phase of WWII. A few SS-men and a female Hitler Youth leader were dropped by parachute behind the America lines. The woman scouted out the address of the mayor of Aachen who had been appointed by the United States forces, and he was shot and killed in his apartment on 25 March 1945. In 1949, an Aachen court found two of the participating men guilty and acquitted the woman²⁵.

The other side organized similar actions in WWII with greater success. The regional commissar for White Russia, Gauleiter Kube, had become a danger to the Russians, especially the partisans operating in White Russia, and became a special object of hate for them. This was not because he oppressed Jews and partisans with particular vehemence; on the contrary, he protected the Jews in his area and thus became an obstacle to organizing the resistance movement. A partisan woman was successful in being employed by Kube as a maid and he was killed by a bomb during the night of 22 September 1943. Himmler's reaction to this deed was that Kube's death was a blessing for Germany, since "his treatment of Jews bordered on high treason" 26.

Even before that and for the same reasons, Reinhard Heydrich, the deputy Reich protector of Bohemia and Moravia, had become the victim of an assassin. The Czechoslovak government in exile in London was worried about the unrest manifesting itself in the protectorate and feared for its own position in negotiating with the allied governments. The cabinet in exile decided therefore to liquidate Heydrich so as to provoke German reprisals, which were in turn to give a lift to the Czech resistance movement. Thus two Czech noncommissioned officers were dropped by parachute and on 27 May 1942 they killed Heydrich on his way to Prague²⁷.

The borderline between so-called commando actions and murder can be quite vague; criminologists have always seen some connections and commonalities between soldiers and criminals 28 .

Another area of state terror is the concentration camp. The Nazi system used women as well as men as concentration camp supervisors to implement the desired terror. Shortly after the end of WWII a British military court condemned supervisor Irma Grese to death for, among other things, two murders at the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp²⁹. Toward the end of 1975 a trial concerning many murders at the Majdanek concentration camp started in

Duesseldorf. Among the 16 accused there were 6 women. In the Majdanek documentation which was prepared for the Nuremberg military tribunal, we find the following: "The female SS personnel committed particular acts of cruelty. The commission determined many facts which were based on incredible acts of cruelty committed by the female executioners of the camp. Hunger, unbearable overwork, torture, humiliation and murder were used with incredible sadism as a means of mass extermination of the camp's detainees." The female defendants were described as follows: "They are the type of disadvantaged, frustrated failures which the criminologists had already come across in other Nazi trials as occupying leading roles." 30

These characteristics coincide with observations made by prisoners in concentration camps. Margarete Baber-Neumann, who was a prisoner in both Russian and German concentration camps, reported how quickly women prisoners who were given authority, "within a few days changed into different human beings; how a depressed, suffering, 'simple' prisoner turned into a self-confident, bossy, haughty tyrant who would not countenance disagreement, let herself be flattered, dealt out punishment, and showed no scruples in taking away property of other prisoners in her block. One such block leader could make life miserable for several hundred people." One prisoner named Gerda Quernheim, a nurse by profession, worked as such for an SS physician and specifically assisted in killing all living newborns. When on one occasion a death certificate was issued by mistake, Gerda Quernheim "corrected" the mistake by having the still living infant killed.

The SS recruited female supervisors from among the German population, and Buber-Neumann reports how on their first day these newly recruited women started at the passing prisoners with fear in their eyes. "Some of them started to change as soon as they put on their uniforms. Once they wore boots, their step became firmer and the rakish tilt of their caps seemed to give them immediate self-confidence." These women soon noticed that when they could report brutalities to the SS men they rose in their esteem. "One could see the sorry spectacle of seeing these factory workers giving commands after their first 14 days as if they had been raised on a barracks parade ground and soon they threatened the prisoners with denunciation and beat them with their fists, just like their seniors"³¹. Isa Vermehren described the female supervisors similarly and said that in the human soul the uniform replaces conscience under the moral guise of blind obedience and has a diabolic effect³².

This chapter is the place as well for cases in which actual or supposed traitors are liquidated on command of the terrorist organization. Between July and December 1956, 66 "traitors" were killed by order of partisan leader Grivas 33. Ireland's IRA is in the habit of condemning "traitors" in so-called cangaroo courts, shooting them in the knees then abandoning them. 34

An explanation for this type of almost incomprehensibel obedience in torturing and killing is to be found in the studies of psychology professor Stanley Milgram. Milgram made experiments involving two subjects, one of whom was the "student" and the other the "teacher". The student was seated inside a chamber, attached to a chair; the teacher was seated outside with a switch-board which enabled him—or so he thought—to give the student electric

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shocks of varying intensity if the student gave the wrong answers. To begin with, the teachers had no misgivings about giving the students slight shocks; the conflict started when the student pretended to be in pain, protested the shocks and demanded that the experiment be stopped. Despite these protests and demands, 25 out of 40 teachers complied with the orders of the test director and punished the students with the most severe electric shock available. Prior to the experiment, psychiatrists had prognosticated that only 4 percent of the "teacher" subjects would give strong electric shocks. This forecast proved to be completely wrong. Sixty percent of the Yale students serving as subjects proved to be absolutely obedient.

Some of Milgram's colleagues expressed the opinion that experimental subjects drawn from the general population would react differently and would be nowhere near as obedient. Thereupon subjects were recruited off the street, and the result was exactly the same. Milgram's experiments were later replicated in Germany, Italy, South Africa and Australia; the precentage of obedient subjects was even slightly higher than in the United States. The highest percentage, 85 percent, was registered in Munich. One of the "victims" wrote this about his "teacher": "A young man of whom I had assumed that he would discontinue the experiment. He went along up to almost 450 volts and demonstrated complete willingness. This frightened me and I felt that I was participating in a sinister game. I realized that under these conditions any of us would be capable to go to extreme lengths, even including murder... What would I do? I don't dare answer this"35.

Later on Milgram modified the experiment in such a way that an additional person was inserted between the "teacher" and the director of the experiment; he was the one who ordered shocks to be administered. Ninety percent of these persons, who were less directly involved with the "suffering" students than the person who actually administered the shock, were prepared to give the orders to do so.

Milgram explains these results on the one hand with a tendency toward aggression in every human being, which asks to be triggered at any time; on the other hand, with the necessity, deeply imbedded in everybody, for being obedient, without which an orderly existence within the community is impossible. "That is perhaps the most important finding of our experiment: normal people who work in their jobs and have no particular hostility, can become involved in a terribly destructive process. Even when beyond that the destructive results of their activity is fully realized and when they are asked to do tlings which are incompatible with fundamental moral concepts, only few people have the inner resistance to refuse to comply with such orders." Added to this is the fact that if responsibility is shared, the burden on the individual becomes lighter. "It is easy to shirk responsibility if one is but a link in a chain" I will later on return to the problem of distance which has been touched upon above.

In this context we might remember the methods used to indoctrinate soldiers in training to lose their fear and inhibitions and to develop feelings of hate for the enemy37.

4. Bomb Terrorism

Ireland, particularly Northern Ireland, may serve as a particularly impresive example for continuous bomb terrorism. Many Irish people have the tendency to regard bombs as an old, proven "home remedy." Irish bomb terrorism is nothing new either; on 25 August 1939 a bomb exploded in the main business thoroughfare of Coventry, England, which killed five people, injured about 60 and caused great material damage. Two Irishmen were condemned to death and executed for this deed 38.

In today's Ireland there exists a directed and undirected small war between Protestants and Catholics on the one hand and Irishmen and Englishmen on the other. Since 1969, more than 1,500 people have been murdered there and more than 15,000 injured. Since early 1976 and until last April, 93 people have been killed by terrorists in Ulster--considerably more than in a comparable period during the last few years. Minister for Northern Ireland Rees used an act of terrorism as the occasion for launching a bitter attack upon the [female] vice president of the political wing of the "Provisional Irish Republican Army", cited her words that British soldiers should be sent home in coffins, and added that she ought to be very satisfied with the last action.

Irish bomb terrorism has for some years been exported to the mother country as well; on 18 December 1973 an explosion in the government district of Whitehall in London injured 52 people. Within a period of 10 days a total of 78 people were injured in London alone in 25 attacks using explosives. In September 1975 a bomb exploded in the lobby of the London Hilton hotel which killed two people; 38 were near-fatally injured and many others less severely. It was the fifth bombing within 9 days. Police investigation was concentrated especially on the 21-year old Irish woman Margaret McKearney, whose warrant described her as being "probably the most dangerous and most active female terrorist." The same month saw the conviction in London of three Irishmen and one Englishwoman who in bombings had killed seven people and injured 86. Among those convicted was 40-year old Anne Maguire who had helped to manufacture the bombs. Her guilt was proved by small deposits of explosive under her dirty fingernails. Her friends and relatives called her an amiable and loving individual. She was kindhearted, helpful, and a devoted mother. Her husgand, her two sons aged 17 and 14 and she herslef were sentended to a total of 38 years in prison.

Toward the end of 1974 the British Home Secretary convinced the lower house of parliament to pass a special law directed against Irish terrorists which, among other things, makes possible the detention of supsected IRA members for up to 7 days without any arrest warrant. At the same time, the Home Secretary ordered an end to force feeding of Irish hunger strikers in British jails. To date, no new prisoner has gone on hunger strike since then³⁹.

At the moment there is no apparent way out of the Irish dilemma; the controversy between the two hostile groups goes much deeper than in other countries and the Catholic or Protestant terrorists hide among the populace and float about like fish in water. Irishmen have always been known as being "habitually outraged" (Bloecker).

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5. Arson

Arson is an old terrorist weapon. In 1862 a number of conflagrations broke out in Petersburg which public opinion ascribed to students and Poles. There are also some theories according to which the police was involved in arson. However, for the government these fires were a gift from heaven and an excuse for severe repressive measures 40 .

In our days, this type of action invludes the Frankfurt department store arson by German terrorists. The defendants, Gudrun Ensslin, Andreas Baader, Thorwald Proll and Horst Soehnlein, who were sentence by the Frankfurt Land court on 31 October 1968, had gotten together because they had identical political goals. As stated in the verdict, they were "deeply convinced that the existing societal order, capitalism, and especially the German legal system, are merely an expression of the existing regime of repression which must be radically overthrown. Defendant Baader especially quoted Stokely Carmichael and Herbert Marcuse. After the four defendants had repeatedly participated in demonstrations, they arrived at the decision that their efforts to date could not succeed in view of 'the stupidity of a saturated consumer society.' They now wanted to light a torch which would activate the masses. These plans were firmed up in Munich: a department store fire would be engineered in the center of Frankfurt/Main, where they were unknown."

On 2 April 1968 the Schneider department store in Frankfurt was set on fire; damages, paid for by the insurance company, amounted to DM 280,000. During the trial Ensslin and Baader additionally justified their actions by citing the "U.S. genocide in Vietnam;" that alone, they said, was reason enough for their resistance. In the verdict it was stated that there could be no question about a resistance situation in the FRG. The FRG was said to have the most liberal constitution in its history which guarantees a democratic and social constitutional state with only slight defects. Even a convinced activist, it continued, is aware of the fact that he is violating a norm of the national community. In favor of the defendants it was said that during the time prior to their arrest they had been living in socially sickly conditions. "Contrary to the opinion of part of the defense pleadings, personal conflicts are not exclusively the result and expression of societal controversy; another deciding factor is the inherited psychological personality trait: environment and genetic inheritance both play a role. The thought cannot be excluded that the defendants seek to comprehend, explain and finally to justify their situation, which is described in greater detail in the verdict, on the basis of societal controversy in order to provide an alibi for themselves in their own minds. This may provide an explanation as to why the defendants let themselves be carried away to commit this act."

The reason for the great amount of attention given to the Frankfurt department store fire was the fact that it was a preliminary step toward the forming of the so-called "Red Army Faction," which is thought to have been born during the late summer of 1970 when its leading members returned to Germany from the Near East. The name was adapted from the extreme leftists, militant Japanese underground organization "United Red Army." Directions and instructions for the bombings to follow were taken from South American guerilla organizations, from Palestinian underground organizations, or from the teachings of Mao Tsetung. Subsequent events are too well known to deserve detailed discussion here 41.

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6. Kidnaping

In January 1971 British Ambassador Sir Goeffrey Jackson was kidnaped in Montevideo by Tupamaros. After spending almost 9 months in a so-called people's prison he was set free. In this, as in other cases, the British Government had declined the payment of ransom or even to make political concessions⁴².

After initial hesitation, the U.S. Government adopted a similarly inflexible stance; out of 27 kidnaped diplomats in several countries, 10 were killed. "But many U.S. Foreign Service officials agree that unless this firm policy had been followed as well as the refusal to accede to the demands of kidnapers and extortionists, a considerably greater number of diplomats would have been kidnaped and killed"43.

7. Skyjackings

The number of skyjackings, especially for political reasons, has declined considerably during the last few years. Among Arab terrorists who engaged in skyjacking, Leila Khaled was most prominent. She had been driven into the active resistance movement by the Six-Day War in 1967 and joined the PLO. In her biography entitled "My People Shall Live" she says that her first skyjacking (she participated in two) was a manifesto of Palestininian humanitarianism⁴⁴.

8. Bank Robbery

In an attack on the Kerson branch of the Imperial Treasury in the summer of 1879, Russian revolutionaries stole one and one half million rubles⁴⁵. Since that time terrorists have always obtained their financial resources through bank robbery and similar exploits. One of the last spectacular actions was the robbery of a mail train 16 km south of Dublin by a bank of 12 masked men who were most likely members of the IRA and who collected about 1 million Irish pounds. Mention should also be made of bank robberies perpetrated by German anarchists⁴⁶.

PART II

III. Criminological Evaluation

Summary: The July issue [PartI] provided a definition of the concept of terrorism and an overview of its history and present status, as well as its various manifestations. Part II will give a criminological evaluation, first separately for Russia, Ireland, the United States, the FRG and other countries, followed by a summary. After dealing with the problem of distance, there follows an outline and recommendations for combatting terrorism, as well as for its prevention.

Editor

In our attempts to explain and elucidate the terrorist's personality, we must first note, from a purely criminological standpoint, that we know very little about a person who has become a criminal. "In view of the great variety in punishable offenses and their backgrounds, we cannot expect to be able to generalize about the 'personality' of criminals. As a general result of comparing officially designated major criminals with control groups, the closest we can come is something like this: criminals appeared more often, and to a greater extent than others, to suffer from an internal disharmony and were beset by internal tensions; secondly, they were not inclined to come to terms with themselves and to work out difficulties themselves; but thirdly, more inclined to blame others and, through aggressive acts, to abreact externally on the spot"47. We might recall here the studies by Milgram mentioned above.

Other criminological studies have shown that there are no basic differences between the personality of a murderer and a noncriminal. Under certain external circumstances, any man can become a killer 48 .

We might add here that especially where political murderers and terrorists are concerned, facts and documentation are often sparse; in decades gone by, such individuals were not examined by psychiatrists or psychologists, even if that had been possible. Today terrorists as a rule resist this type of examinations or, as in the case of San Francisco's Patricia Hearst, the experts arrive at conflicting conclusions. We must try therefore to use the small body of material with historic and criminologic insight so as to obtain an insight into the personality of terrorists which "cannot be had by objective and measurement methods" 49.

1. Russia

A police report provides the following characteristics: "She wears her hair short, wears blue glasses, is sloppily dressed, disdains the use of comb and soap and lives in civil marriage with one or more equally repulsive males." This report was written in Russia in 1869⁵⁰. Elsewhere it states that men and women who called themselves nihilists represented a great number of different types. "They are an illustration of what Pascal called 'the highest and the lowest of mankind' and of course also a mixture of the two, also a mixture of cleverness and stupidity. Apart from fanatics and gamblers there are a few insane persons and many naive ones. And these pages are shadowed by a future inhuman trait. The last chapters feature idealists who in some cases are prepared for the sake of attaining a goal to use any means at all; people who no longer know compassion and who are ready to sacrifice others as well as themselves for a cause which they consider just. The story is tragic, but it has its funny aspects" 51.

In the great Petersburg nihilist trial of 1877, the 198 defendants included 87 aristocrats, 19 high officials, eight officers, 33 members of the clergy, 11 merchants, 13 men of wealth and 17 peasants⁵². In early 1875 arrest warrants were issued for 770 propagandists for nihilism; 612 of them were male and 158 female. It was estimated that these propagandists had converted 20-30 people to their teachings.

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One group of propagandists wanted to recruit urban workers, and several young women accepted jobs in factories with forged passports. However, within a few weeks they drew suspicion upon themselves and had to leave the factories. A school was established in Moscow slum, where their doctrine was taught in this way: a teacher told the students that the eagle was a bird of prey and added that any government which used the eagle for an emblem was just as greedy and bloodthirsty as that bird. Also, the children were taught that the number 1 was smaller than 70 million, which the teacher explained as follows: "We have one czar, and we are 70 million." Using the motto "students to the country," nihilists tried to enter the villages; among other reasons, the experiment failed because the peasants were suspicious and believed the strangers to be spies and thieves. The result was that only a few intellectuals were recruited.

In other experiments, communes were formed and sewing shops were established. The women of the commune worked while the men engaged in endless debates, which did not sit well with the women. This reminds us of Simone de Beauvior's saying: "The comrades are only pashas too." The communes were dissolved very quickly and the women sometimes carried off the sewing machines since they had been impressed with the fact that property constitutes theft.

In summary we can say that the various anarchist and nihilist organizations consisted mainly of intellectuals or would-be intellectuals, the middle class, the clergy and low-ranking members of the aristocracy⁵3. In his book "Man in the Revolution," Albert Camus talks about the "sensitive murderers"⁵⁴.

Among the activist women, we have mentioned Vera Figner and Sofia Perovskaya. In her memoirs, Vera Figner wrote this: "From the age of 24 on, my life was inextricably tied to the fate of the Russian revolutionary party⁵⁵." Sofia Perovskaya was equally devoted to the common cause; while instinctually interested in men, she would not devote herself to her own personal happiness so long as comrades were in jail and the people were suffering despotism. She too, like Vera Figner, had worked as a nurse in the countryside. She had to abandon her work when the police were looking for her.

Articles about the Russian nihilists frequently mention the fact that some women were even greater fanatics than the men. Several criminological studies have called attention to special cruelty on the part of women 56. Russian women were certainly no less talented as organizers than were men.

In trials with the death penalty as a possible outcome, Russian nihilists generally behaved with courage and dignity 57 .

2. Ireland

In Dublin's Stephen's Green Park there stands a monument to Countess Constance Markievicz, sometimes called "Ireland's Joan of Arc." She was a colorful, even eccentric personality and was in the front lines of the 1916 Easter Revolution against the English. She preferred to die rather than to surrender and was the last to capitulate with her group. She was sentenced

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to death by the English, pardoned "only" because of her sex to life imprisonment and set free already in 1917. She persisted in fighting for Irish liberty and later on served two more years in prison⁵⁸.

Today's Irish terrorists who belong to the IRA or one of its factions are less flamboyant and spectacular. We have already referred to young Margaret McKearney; in Scotland Yard jargon she was referred to as "the blond bomber." She was educated in a convent and today works as a secretary to a tax advisor in Dublin. She regularly travels across the border to Northern Ireland to visit her parents, or to England to plant bombs. There is no extradition treaty between Great Britain and Ireland.

A member of the IRA named Maria McGuire has left the organization and has wirtten about her experiences⁵⁹. She calls Sean MacStiofain, one of the prominent IRA leaders, a murderer. He is, she says, as emotional as he is given to tantrums and has no sense of humor. He is so staunch a Catholic that he has always refused to import condoms from Northern Ireland to the Irish Republic, which were used there to manufacture acid bombs. He would rather be caught in a car with an automatic pistol than with such a means of protection. Says Maris McGuire: "We were floating on a wave of senseless acts of murder..., but they did not know on what other course of action they should decide"⁶⁰. Maria's father was an official at a ministry of the Irish Republic⁶¹.

3. United States

We have more information about U.S. women than about Irish women who are active terrorists. Back in 1954, Lolita Lebron, a 34-year old Puerto Rican and mother of two children, participated with three men in an attack on the House of Representatives in Washington, DC. The assailants, supposedly fighting for Puerto Rican independence, entered the public gallery of the House and fired wildly into the chamber. It was a miracle that only five House members were wounded. At her trial, Lolita Lebron said this: "I went to the capitol of the United States to offer my life for the independence of my country. Great goals are attained only through great sacrifices." As she was saying this on the witness stand, she held a rosary and a prayerbook in her hands 62.

The strongest personality of the ideological scene of our times is, or was, Angela Davis; she never left any doubt that as a black and a communist she was hoping for a revolution in the United States. Her biography indicates that she stands head and shoulders above other revolutionary women; on the other hand it is clear that she is afflicted with exactly those limitations which are the mark of an ideological fanatic 63 .

Diana Oughton, born in 1942, joined the Weathermen underground organization by way of the student movement and the SDS. A 2-year stay in Guatemala made a full-fledged revolutionary out of her. In March 1970 she was killed in an explosion of home-made bombs in New York. She too came from an upper class family, like most young women who want to change society through violence.

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In November 1974, 27-year old Jane Alpert surrendered to the law in New York. She had been accused fo bombings in 1969, was released on bail and then disappeared in the underground. She stated that she had changed completely during the intervening 4 years and had become a feminist; also, that she now recognized male dominance in the leftwing organizations. Men, she said, had forced her to commit terrorist acts for which she had not been prepared. She considered her reappearance a positive step in her life⁶⁴.

Susan Stern's life too was one of confusion. Her parents were divorced; she got married, had an abortion, was divorced, became an organizer and demonstrator, was arrested, convincted, freed, and attempted suicide. At the age of 29 she was a trained social worker but never practiced her profession. Her life is one of exhaustion as a result of leftwing activities and jail sentences⁶⁵.

5. Federal Republic of Germany

The Rauball Archive contains short biographies of 43 German anarchists. Intellectuals are the majority of this group. This becomes especially clear in the recital of personal circumstances of the defendants in the Frankfurt arson verdict. In a summary by Horchem we find that out of the 22 activists constituting the nucleus of the "Red Army Faction" (RAF), 12 were women. Eight out of 20 activists who later joined the RAF were women. "RAF concepts and activities are also the result of an explosive emancipation of the participating remale activists." Horchem believes that no precedent exists for the personnel composition of the RAF and similar groups. "Women do not merely act as helpers, informants and scouts, but as active fighters, who carry in their overcoat pockets or in pocketbooks pistols of up to 9 mm caliber which they use resolutely when threatened with capture. Some of them act not only as equals, but as leaders--like Ulrike Meinhof in her writings--like Gudrun Ensslin in her instructions from her cell." In agreement with the results of criminological research, Horchem states that the biographical data do not permit firm conclusions to the effect that an individual is predisposed toward becoming an anarchist revolutionary66.

Other Countries

In the guerilla war of the Algerians against the French, the Algerians used women and sympathetic Frenchmen to hide members of the resistance movement and to maintain communications. In addition, young European and Algerian women planted bombs 67 .

In Italy, 30-year old Margherita Cagol was killed in a firefight with the carabinieris. She came from a wealthy, conservative Catholic family from Trient and had been for 5 years the wife and assistant of the leader and theoretician of the extreme leftwing terrorist organization "Red Brigades," which is accused of engaging primarily in abductions and armed robbery.

Ambassador Jackson, kidnaped by the Tupamaros, spent many months carefully observing his "jailers." Among his guards there were some female teachers. He noted that in mathematical games and thos requiring the use of logic the

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the women were the better players; while the men appeared more aggressive and emotional, the women were more cool and calculating. The women made only small concessions to basic humanitarianism, "which at any moment could be superseded by greater, predominant, ever-present and deadly practicality." In another case, Jackson found out that a fellow captive had been found and liberated by Uruguayan soldiers before his captors were able to shoot him. Only one woman had, during the moment of liberation, insisted on executing the order to kill the captive. Her male colleagues prevented her from doing so and even restrained her so as to avoid a general bloodbath⁶⁹.

6. Summary

From the many cases we have cited we can see the leading roles intellectuals, and among them particularly women, have played in most terrorist organizations over the last few decades. The political scientist Clutterbuck states in his survey that most guerilla fighters have had a relatively cultural and agreeable childhood. More than 90 percent of 55 guerilla leaders had an above-average education and came from families with a middle class income or even above-average wealth. Clutterbuck partially explains these young peoples' ideological and terrorist activities with guilt feelings due to their sheltered childhood and their privileges 70.

We must ask ourselves what came first with these people: frustration, e.g., disturbed family ties which then led to terrorism, or terrorism which caused frustration, i.e., which destroyed family ties. Arno Plack wrote in his book "A Plea for the Abolition of Criminal Law," that a destructive character manifests itslef first, and this character would then always enable the activist to find a worthy cause in behalf of which he could give his aggressions free rein. The high idelas, he says, are interchangeable; the flag being waved is mrerly a symbol for confrontation. "A motive for violence free of destructive moment should become transparent through pragmatic insight. Anyone who is motivated toward violence from a purely rational standpoint should have to worry that the violent means he proposes to use have a recognizable relationship with the objective being sought. Only an intellect suffering from strong pressures of aggression can delude itself into being unaware of the fact that it is entirely hopeless to topple the existing order with a few bombs."71

In reading the biographies of former and present-day female terrorists, we note how little is written about their private lives, and how little they have to say about it themselves. Primary emphasis is devoted to their struggle, their party or group and their political work toward improving world conditions, thus neglecting their close and personal relationships, especially those with their families.

Elsewhere we have mentioned the close relationships between terrorism and revolution. In 1935, psychiatrist Alfred Hoche wrote: "It is no coincidence that in all minor or major revolutionary activities there is always participation by psychopaths with their instiable need for sensation and for 'action'."⁷²

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A close relationship exists also between terrorists, revolutionaries and "normal" criminals. Von Hentig has shown these relationships in describing the personality of Saint-Just, whom he called a criminal Utopian⁷³. Vera Figner wrote in her memoirs that violence as a weapon of political struggle leads to brutality, evokes the instincts of a predator, and gives rise to base breaches of confidence. "In fact, things went so far that they led to horror of one's fellow man"⁷⁴.

Historical experience shows that as a rule a revolution is successful only when the revolutionaries consist of a mixture of intellectuals and unscrupulous and uncaring criminals who destroy any kind of resistance. The efforts at overthrowing the regime by the Russian December revolutionaries serves as an example for the fact that decent staff officers were not equipped for a violent overthrow with the necessary prerequisites 75.

History shows that murderers can become heroes and heroes can become murderers. Politics occasionally forces colonial powers to deal on equal terms with those whom they had prehaps perviously condemned to death. Colonel Grivas permitted his EOKA partisans in Cyprus to kill at random. In his memoris he wrote: "At 1800 hours they saw an Englishman who watered his lawn with a garden hose. Pavlou advanced to the garden wall and shot him at point blank range; when he screamed and fell, Pavlou fired three more shots into the dead body and fled...I sent him my congratulations for that attack" 6. Elsewhere Grivas describes his dispatch of "groups of executioners 7. In Greece Grivas was presented with medals and promoted to lieutenant general. Later he returned to Cyprus and permitted his followers to continue killing—this time their former comrades in arms.

As renowned a historian as Franz Georg Maier wrote that the church's participation in EOKA terrorism is "a dark page in history." The clergy refused on principle to condemn terrorism, even when a Cypriot was killed by an EOKA commando raid during a prayer service⁷⁸.

7. The Problem of Distance

The problem of distance is as important as its neglect by criminological research to date. The following will examine the personality of the terrorist, especially the female terrorist, from three aspects:

- -the extent of inhibition against killing depends upon the distance from the victim.
- -Split responsibility lightens the burden of conscience of individual participants.
- -The criminal's power of imagination of the consequences of his action is often surprisingly small.

Behavioral research has described the existence and the modus operandi of inhibition against killing. The greatest action energy occurs in an individual killer who confronts his victim at a minimum distance. He must overcome the greatest amount of resistance. Charlotte Corday may serve as an example,

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who stabbed Marat to death, or Mornard, who killed Trotskyi with an ice ax. Some political killers or terrorists shy away from that type of deed. We are here reminded once again of Khalturin, who despite his fervent hatred of the czar did not attack him when he was alone with him and could have done so without difficulty; he preferred to loan his conscience with an indeterminate number of victims of a bomb explosion without assurance of success. This of course gave him a better chance for a getaway, though terrorists like Khalturin were on the other hand always ready to lay down their lives.

The distance increases somewhat when the killer shoots his victim within range of sight with a pistol or similar weapon. We know that Stashynskyi, who killed two Ukrainian politicians in exile, passed up an excellent opportunity for humane reasons⁷⁹.

In concentration camps of the Third Reich killings were perpetrated at minimum distance. In those cases the factor of command or approval from above was added, which relieved the killers at least partially of their responsibility; also a factor of hibituation which plays a big part in all criminal acts as well as in life generally. Additionally, these victims had been purposely estranged from the killer through propaganda, by having for many years been depicted as sub-human⁸⁰.

Bombings can serve as the best examples for demonstrating the effects and consequences of distance. The individual who plants bombs does not as a rule see the immediate consequences of his deed. The Irishwoman Maria McGuire writes that only long after the start of her terrorist activity did the thought of cripples and widows occur to her and that she had earlier and otherwise sublimated this knowledge in the course of events⁸¹. One of her predecessors, the famous revolutionary Maud Gonne McBride, considered the possibility during the Boer War of impeding Irish participation in this war on the side of England by sneding one or two troop transport ships to the bottom of the sea by planting bombs in them⁸². It is a likely assumption that she hardly realized the actual consequences of such a plan.

It is a generalized phenomenon with all criminals, especially simple murderers, that very frequently they do not give consideration to the consequences of their planned actions, and/or are unable or lack sufficient imagination to do so.

Max Frisch wrote something in his "diary" which occurred to him during a flight and which is of general validity: "Flying above a small town, which looked like one of our architects' models, I suddenly realized that I would be perfectly capable of dropping bombs. It would not even take a chauvinistic rage, not even an incitement of many years' standing. All that is needed is a small rail station, a factory with smokestacks, a small stream boat at its gang plank. There is an itch to throw down a series of black and brown geysers, and already one is gone;... you don't see any blood, hear no gasps for air; everything is quite clean, from an inhuman distance, almost funny...I am thinking of the difference between dropping bombs and opening my pocket knife and approaching a man, the only one whose face I can see... I don't believe I am capable of that. With the bombs, that is different—I'm not certain at all"82.

Another factor must be considered in bombings especially: the victims' anonymity.

Killers in a group share their responsibility and thus fare better to a certain extent. This is even more true for helpers; their distance from the victim is often much greater than that from the actual killer.

The commander of an action is often the most remote from the victim. In this context, Jaeger mentions Eichmann, of whom Hannah Arendt says that he, like all other long-distance killers, have "an absolute lack of power of imagination"84. Lenin too, according to his biographer Payne, had never seen a killer commando at work and had never observed the consequences of terrorist actions which he had ordered⁸⁵.

The lines of demarcation between commander to killer to helper to sympathizer can be vague. It will for instance never be clearly established whether for instance Trotskyi's murderer was merely a tool of his mother⁸⁶.

Horchem has written in detail about the circle of sympathizers of the German terrorists: without a close and a wider circle of sympathizers, the RAF could hardly have been effective. Anarchists frequently were given support without the supporter's detailed knowledge about their identity and activities. Horchem estimated that in the FRG 2,500 to 3,000 sympathizers are prepared to aid activists by providing hideouts and identity papers⁸⁷. In individual cases it would be difficult to establish to what extent this is caused also by a lack of imagination or by conscious purposeful ignorance.

Finally, we might ask how many people are responsible for terrorist killings, at least morally, who innocently or from ideological motivation make funds available to terrorist organizations which are supposedly destined for humanitarian purposes but whose use can hardly be controlled. It is well known for instance that Lybia's head of state finances terrorist organizations throughout the world⁸⁸.

- V. Control and Prevention
- 1. An Eye for an Eye?

Historically, efforts have been made in the fight against terrorism to retaliate in kind. One hundred years ago the Russian government protected a semi-secret society of militant monarchists which called itself the "Holy League." Its members were to protect the czar, spy on the terrorists, demoralize them and kill their leaders. "In other words, the idea was to beat the underground with its own weapons" The League imitated the secrecy of a group of conspirators and adopted a ritual similar to that of a freemasons' lodge. Its members cam from high officialdom, the aristocracy and financial circles. Hoodlums and secret policemen were recruited. There was no lack of money; nevertheless the venture was not very successful. "The League's enterprises reminded one of an operetta. Needless to say, its existence was an open secret even though the press was forbidden to make any mention of it" "90".

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In fighting Kenya's Mau-Mau, the British were more successful with similar, but less civilized methods. Since it had been impossible to force the Mau-Mau to capitulate by using regular troops and the regular police force, the nucleus of the Mau-Mau leadership was destroyed by so-called pseudo-terrorists. These pseudoterrorists were under teh command of a British police officer; the group consisted of Europeans who had blackened their faces and captured Mau-Mau who had been "turned." The pseudo-terrorists used exactly the same methods as the Mau-Mau, until the latters' terrorism was destroyed. The British police officer received a high decoration from his queen for his achievement 91.

Earlier on the English had after World War I in Ireland established a special auxiliary organization, consisting of hired former soldiers, who fought the Irish with their own terrorist methods. Both sides escalated their acts of violence and competed with one another in senseless murders⁹². This met with little success. Churchill justified the frequent reprisals in his book "The World Crisis--The Aftermath"93.

The legal basis for special measures to combat terrorists in Britain and in most countries using traditional English law are lwas similar to the Internal Security Act. The English represent the view that comprehensive legal means must be available for every possible emergency, but that in actual practice these measures must be used sparingly. It must not be the function of a constitutional state to castrate itself.

2. Trend Toward Inflexibility

We can discern a trend toward inflexibility against terrorist demands in the entire Western world today. Too many things have been learned the hard way because one of Bismarck's principles was either unknown or ignored. "The bleeding-heart sentimentality of our century, which sees in every fanatical rebel and in every hired barricade fighter a martyr, will lead to more blookshed than a firm and resolute justice, if it had been used from the beginning..."94.

Hardly anything has been more detrimental to the esteem of the FRG as a constitutional state than the capitulation in the Lorenz case. Marcus criticizes the reaction by the German authorities by saying that the citizen becomes disconcerted when "he sees that the highest representatives of the state look like a flock of alarmed chickens as soon as a handful of anarchists go into action. Thus he sees less of a danger in the increasing number of crimes than in the inability of government officials to control this development and to keep it within tolerable limits"95. We can speculate as to whether the attack on the German Embassy in Stockholm would have ever taken place, if some resoluteness had been shown in the Lorenz case, especially since it is by no means certain that in case of a refusal Lorenz would have been killed. We have a sufficient number of examples wherein after blackmail had failed the victims were set free?6.

In cases of hostage taking in prisons the whole world nowadays makes it a firm practice never to give in, since otherwise there would be no end to it. Whenever there are mutinies in prisons today, the objective is hardly escape any more; primarily it is the quest for improvement of living conditions in the institutions.

We have already stated that the United States no longer pays ransom for its diplomats. This policy too has shown some success. The members of hazardous occupational groups have so far always agreed to remain "unprotected" which is, in effect, their best protection. Thus for instance the unions of penal institution workers in the United States and France have always been in favor of resolute inflexibility. Other countries, among them Israel, Canada and Turkey have long been known for never giving in, even in skyjackings.

During the kidnaping of Netherlands industrialist Herrema the Irish government never left any doubt from the very beginning that it would never give in, "even if a member of the cabinet were to be taken hostage." The wife of the victim approved of this attitude by the government. As a matter of fact, the kidnapers, in planning their act, had believed Herrema to be a German and that they would therefore have few problems.

Current practice in Italy is for the public prosecutor to proceed against the families of kidnap victims by confiscating ransom money being held in readiness, thus preventing additional kidnapings. Contacts between kidnapers and the families of their victims are prevented as a matter of principle.

The Venezuelan government is inflexible on principle and has for instance always refused to publish manifestos by the terrorists. When a U.S. firm whose manager had been abducted published the kidnapers manifesto in foreign newspapers on demand by the guerillas, the Venezuelan government impounded the entire enterprise.

3. Prevent the Creation of Sanctuaries

One of the requirements for maintaining the constitutional state is the inadmissibility a priori of the creation of sanctuaries from pursuit; that squatters are tolerated in unoccupied houses or that wanted anarchists march at the head of a demonstration or, as happened in Hamburg, that anarchists participate in a demonstration together with highly placed members of the government. If such things are tolerated, more damage is done to the constitutional state than would be by resolute action against them. Horchem has correctly indicated that the development of a terrorist starts in small matters, e.g., with occupying houses, and can then under certain circumstances end with bombings⁹⁷.

We have 2 tendencies to take the wrong direction in furthering the constitutional state. I can for instance imigine no other legal system in the world in which it would be possible that at a trial 44 motions of prejudice (to date) be made. Juridical logic has the fatal inclination to degenerate into absurdity.

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4. Police Functions Must Be Upgraded

As far as police functions are concerned, they must be upgraded in the public and published opinion. It is significant, for instance, that in the British and U.S. press the legal system and the police are both called "the law." You can read for example that a criminal was arrested "by the law." In other words, police actions in Anglo-American countries are as a rule strongly considered to be legal, while in our country there is a tendency to look for a wrong in the first place on the part of the police rather than its opponents.

The question arises additionally whether in fighting terrorism the police should not use women to a greater extent than heretofore. When a security agent confiscated one of the two pistols carried by President Ford's assailant Sara Moore and checked her identity, this was apparently done in a fairly benevolent manner. After the assassination attempt, there was speculation in the U.S. press whether the agent would have immediately made an arrest if instead of Sara Moore he had been dealing with a male. The same thing would probably have happened if Sara Moore had been checked out by a woman. She might have been a bit more thorough and suspicious and might have sensed something which the man didn't. According to an old Latin saying, a man's wisdom is located deep in a woman's heart.

In Britain and the United States greater use has already been made than in this country of a woman's greater insight into the nature of other women by increased placement of women in police work; thus in London for instance women are members of the special mobile command which deals with problems of national security 98 .

In today's Israeli police force one out of every six officers is female and women do exactly the same work as men. The use of women in police work makes even more sense since we may expect that in the future the number of women members of terrorist organizations will grow in the same measure as is the case with emancipated female criminality⁹⁹.

Generally speaking, terrorist activity will increase, at least in the Western world. Here we must differentiate between those organizations which work on a national or regional basis and those linked only by a general ideological tendency, such as the urban guerillas in Western democracies. Terrorists linked by a strong ethnic or ational and/or religious common cause may have some success against the states which they oppose. Whether or not terrorists in the FRG or other Western democracies will have success depends upon the strength of resistance against them. Duerrenmatt has put it bluntly: "Arafat has already come into his own at the UN; Meinhof will be next to make speeches there."

5. Preventive Measures

This brings us to the extremely important problem of prevention, especially the danger posed by the sympathizers who mostly come from the ranks of the intellectuals. We might think that Zehm exaggerates when he says that the

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predominant portion of the German intelligentsia is basically disloyal to the state. But the political scientist Sontheimer, in his book "The Misery of our Intellectuals", has very seriously pointed to the dangers from that group. He defines the intellectual as a person who stands at a more or less critical distance from the society around him. Sontheimer deplores the fact that leftwing intellectuals are working for the destruction of societal values for which the West has created its libertarian institutions. But increased powers of resistance can arise only from an increased feeling of commonality and strong common values.

We cannot deny the fact that members of certain professions are more prone to succumb to th- theory and practice of terrorism than are others, e.g., social workers and theologians. It is all too easy to confuse "complete understanding" with "complete forgiveness."

Legal limits for sympathizers must be drawn by law and justice. Law professor Schroeder, in an article in the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG of 12 April 1976, criticized the excessively lenient sentences given to Professor Brueckner in Hanover and Father Kaiser in Oldenburg.

The intellectual borderline toward the sympathizers is even more difficult to dran than the legal one, an it is easy to come into conflict with freedom of expression. After the assassination attempt on President Ford there was vehement criticism in the United States of the fact that Lynette Fromme, of all people, was featured in teh cover pictures of themost ipmortant weekly news magazines. In this way, it was said, she obtained exactly what she wanted and certainly had not merited. In the United States too the lack of common values was deplored on that occasion and the great demand for them was emphasized.

We must draw a sharp dividing line between public opinion and published opinion. When the police fired shots during the first spectacular taking of hostages in Munich in 1971, 80 percent of all publications criticized that order to fire, while on the other hand 85 percent of the 1,100 letters addressed to the Munich police approved of that action. There is hope in those figures.

FOOTNOTES

- 1. Wiesbaden 1973, p 578.
- 2. Gieseking, Bielefeld 1972.
- 3. Edmund Mezger, Criminology, Beck, Munich 1951 p 8 et seq.
- 4. In memoriam Emil Ludwig, Moscia 1959, pp 21-22.
- 5. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 27 March 1976.
- 6. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 17 March 1976.

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- See Constantin de Gruenwald, At the Roots of the Revolution, Paul Neff, Vienna, p 157 et seq., Egon Cesar Conte Corti, Under the Czars and Crowned Women, Anton Pustet, Graz 1949, p 300 et seq.
- 8. Avram Yarmolinsky, Czars and Terrorists, Verlag fuer Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, Hanover 1957, pp 189-191.
- Andre Castelot, The Great Hours of Paris, Paul Neff, Vienna 1961, p 68 et seq.
- Anny Latour, Cultural History of Woman, Fischer, Frankfurt 1965, p 167 et seq.
- 11. Hans von Hentig, The Woman Revolutionary, SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEIGSCHRIFT FUER STRAFRECHT, 1923, p 29
- 12. Trevor Lloyd, Suffragettes, The Emancipation of Women in the Western World, Editions Recontre, Lausanne 1970, p 83.
- 13. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1974.
- 14. Molden, Vienna 1976.
- 15. See Johan Galtung, Structural Violence, Rowohlt, Reinbek 1975.
- 16. Former Russian Major Lev Kopelev describes in his autobiography the goals of communism with the following words: "The fanatic followers of the most noble ideals promise eternal happiness to their successors, but destroy their fellow men without pity—or they offer paradise to the dead, but kill and maim the living while considering themselves virtuous heroes. They are convinced that they do bad things only for the sake of the eventual good; that they lie in the interest of eternal truths."
- 17. Yarmolinsky, pp 259-261.
- 18. Yarmolinsky, pp 301-304 and 357.
- 19. Note the good description of the revolutionaries in Yuri Trifonov's novel "The Time of Impatience," Scherz, Munich 1975.
- 20. Vera Figner, Night over Russia, Malik, Berlin 1928; see also Paleologue, pp 454-455, experiences by Vera Figner after the revolution. She died in 1942.
- 21. Later it was said that one of the assilants had purposely aborted the explosion. He entered into the service of the police and faced a Soviet court after the revolution. Yarmolinsky, p 296.
- 22. Ibid., p 319.

- 23. Harry Wilde, Political Murder, Hestia, Bayreuth 1962, p 109; Yarmolinsky, p 330; about subsequent assassinations, see Middendorff, Political Murder, a contribution to historic criminology, Publication series of the FRG Federal Criminal Police Bureau, Wiesbaden 1968, p 45.
- 24. The Third Reich, WW II, No 46, 1975, p 284.
- 25. Ibid., No 52, 1975, p 558.
- 26. Heinz Hoehne, The Death's Head Order, The History of the Waffen-SS, Vol 2, Fischer, Frankfurt 1969, pp 389-390; and Gerlad Reitlinger, The Final Solution, The Extermination of the Jews of Europe 1935-1945, Kindler, Munich 1964, pp 259-260.
- 27. Middendorff, Political Murder, p 93.
- Middendorff, Soldier and Crime, MONATSSCHRIFT FUER KRIMINOLOGIE UND STRAFRECHTSREFORM, 1971, p 30.
- Edgar Lustgarten, The Business of Murder, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York 1968, p 85.
- 30. DER SPIEGEL, No 49/1975.
- Margarete Buber-Neumann, A Prisoner of Stalin and Hitler, Munich 1962, pp 192, 230, 252-253.
- 32. Travel Through the Last Act, Christian Wegner, Hamburg 1948, p 62.
- 33. Charles Thayer, Guerillas and Partisans, Ruetten and Loening, Munich 1964, p 157.
- 34. See also Middendorff, Political Murder, pp 194-195, about political murders by the German Free Corps.
- 35. ZEIT Magazine, 2 October 1970.
- 36. Stanley Milgram, The Perils of Obedience, DIALOGUE, 3/4, 1975, p 16.
- 37. Middendorff, Soldier and Crime, pp 43-44.
- 38. The Trial of Peter Barnes and Others, The IRA Coventry Explosion of 1939, edited by Letitia Fairfield. William Hodge and Company, Edinburgh 1953.
- 39. DER SPIEGEL, No 49/1974.
- 40. Yarmolinsky, pp 142-143.
- 41. See "The Baader-Meinhof Group", assembled by Dr Reinhard Rauball, de Gruyter, Berlin 1973, which also contains the text of the Frankfurt verdict.

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- 42. Ambassador Geoffrey Jackson, Kidnaped by the Tupamaros, Herder, Freiburg 1974.
- 43. Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism Without a Future, Seewald, Stuttgart 1975, p 203.
- 44. See Middendorff, Violent Criminality, p 45.
- 45. Yarmolinsky, p 265.
- 46. See Middendorff, Bankrobbers and Their Victims, DAS POLIZEIBLATT, Land Baden-Wuerttemberg, April 1976, p 51.
- 47. Anne-Eva Brauneck, General Criminology, Rowohlt, Reinbek 1974, p 268.
- 48. Middendorff, Crimes of Violence in the United States, de Gruyter, Berlin 1970, p 86.
- 49. Detlev von Uslar, Psychology and World, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1972, p 9.
- 50. Yarmolinsky, p 152.
- 51. Ibid., p 10.
- 52. Wilde, p 76.
- 53. Yarmolinsky, p 275-276.
- 54. Rowohlt, Reinbek 1974, p 134.
- 55. Night Over Russia, p 68.
- 56. See Middendorff, Criminologic Prognosis, Luchterhand, Neuwied 1967, pp 130-131; and Trifonov, p 355.
- 57. See Vera Figner's epilogue in "Night Over Russia," p 230.
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- 61. See also the portrait of Rose Dugdale in KRIMINALISTIK, 1975, p 24.
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- 68. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 11 June 1975.
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- 70. Clutterbuck, p 178.
- 71. List, Munich 1974, pp 56-58.
- 72. From the Shop, Lehmanns Verlag, Munich 1935, p 68.
- 73. Saint-Just, SCHWEIZERISSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER STRAFRECHT, 1920, p 80.
- 74. The Attempt on the Life of Czar Alexander II, Malik, Berlin 1926, pp 74-76.
- See D.J. Goodspeed, Conspiracy and Revolution, Ruetten & Loening, Munich 1963.
- 76. DIE WELT, 29 January 1974.
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- 78. Cyprus, KOHLHAMMER, Stuttgart 1964, p 165.
- 79. Middendorff, Political Murder, p 52.
- 80. Herbert Jaeger, Crime in a Totalitarian System, Walter-Verlag, Olten and Freiburg 1967, p 286.
- 81. p 148.
- 82. Coxhead, p 31.
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- 96. Middendorff, Abduction, Skyjackings, Hostage Taking, Kidnaping; pp 33-34.
- 97. Terrorism and Violent Crime, edited by Eugen Kogon, Aspekte-Verlag, Frankfurt 1975, p 61.
- 98. See: The Police, 1975, p 392; and: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, September 1975, p 2.
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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

STATEMENT BY REVOLUTIONARY CELL EXPLAINS ATTACK

REVOLUNTIONAERER ZORN (Zeitung der Revolutionaeren Zelle) in German May 75 p 5

[Text] Here is the full text of the statement by the Revolutionary Cell previously published in the press only in an abridged version:

On the occasion of 1 May the Revolutionary Cell has put some holes in the nests of the Federation of German Industries (BDI), the Confederation of German Employers Associations (BDA), the Chamber of Industry and Commerce (IHK) in Mainz and Ludwigshafen and the Aliens Police in West Berlin.

The capitalist associations are responsible for the crises this lousy system keeps producing at ever shorter intervals--sharing the responsibility, we mean, for the fact that the big ones use these crises to push and restore their health, such as the oil concerns, the banks and the automobile industry. Where one pushes to restore his health, the other has to pay for it. The ones who have to pay always are we, the young, the workers and employees, the women, the foreigners, the Aunt Emma's with their little shops. What we are supposed to pay for is the chaos being caused by that money-grabbing pack of big wheels who have no use for people--pay for not only with less and less money in the purse, with ever higher prices, but above all with fear for our existence. Because fear makes people pliable, fear breaks their backbone, fear is to nip any resistance in the bud. And many start to keep their mouths shut, start railing at the foreigners, call in sick less often, arrive more punctually, work more and hope that not they but the other person will be hit. They want to break our backbone by forcing us to tremble for our jobs, and we tremble not because we find that work so nice, because we cannot stand being without it, but because they have not left us anything but our strength to work. Work in this lousy system does not honor one, however, but finishes one physically and mentally, makes one ugly, makes one old, stupefies one, causes abilities to go to seed. "The young are not against the old but against what has made them old," a Renault worker has said.

And with laws and regulations tailored for us, they take away from us all possibilities of determining our own fate, whether they are the special laws for aliens, of article 218, in order to subject us women to their will, or the innumerable laws which are meant to prevent any effective form of opposition and to turn us into criminals if we occupy our plant, like the cement workers of Erwitte, if we fight against the environment-polluting nuclear plants like the people in Wyhl, Schweinfurt and elsewhere. So as to suppress particularly the foreign workers who are caused to come to this country and chased away again just as it happens to fit into the plans of the capitalist

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pack—who in fact realize best that we down here belong together and must not let people play one against the other—the special institution of Aliens Police has been created. These blackmail and spy and quite often, through deportation, put foreign workers and students in the prisons and concentration camps of their home countries. The Aliens Police are an organ of direct suppression, the first kind of a force of fuzz directed especially against workers.

Early this year the economic mafia of the BDI, BDA, DIHT [Federation of Chambers of German Industry and Commerce] (as the central organ of the IHK), the Central Association of German Craftsmen, the Main Association of German Retail Trade tried to make millions of youth knuckle under and additionally to pull the teeth of the apprentices movement. After first having produced a million of young unemployed, they offered to create 150,000 new apprentices' positions tied to numerous conditions which are not only to prevent the wobbly professional training reform but also to cancel the things the apprentices' movement has gained in a laborious struggle. And the whole thing, on top of it, is to be financed with our tax monies. We, on top of it, are to pay for their letting 15-year-olds work on their own, for 15-year olds being told off: Work, shut up and be thankful!

We launched attacks on the occasion of 1 May because it is the day of struggle of the working class. It was the fascist Hitler who made it the day "of labor," with the trade unions adhering to that change in name and meaning after 1945. We have something against these events of peace, joy and sponge cake if only because one cannot notice anything at all in the way of joy. How can one enjoy oneself if at best one is allowed to make boring marches with a red carnation in the buttonhole, if one then has to listen to people saying that there is nothing left in the way of struggle any longer, that the economic difficulties simply exist and that we "all" have to make sacrifices, if we see the union bosses on the VW Supervisory Board themselves taking part in forging plans which put thousands of coworkers in the street and has [sic] an active share in helping to camouflage this and embellish it. If today everything is quite different from what it used to be, as the speakers on the occasion of 1 May try to make us believe, how is it that we have the feeling that we are not really living but only work ourselves stupid? If everything is quite different, why don't we feel at ease but lonely and unhappy? Why is it then that the work increases all the time, getting faster, louder and duller all the time? Why do we have to shut our mouths and become ass kissers although we despise ourselves doing so?

There is no "Day of Labor" because there is nothing to celebrate about any labor unless we completely determine it ourselves and do it on our own. The only thing to do about that labor is to fight it. The history of the workers movement is a history of the struggle against such work with every available means, with calling in sick, with slowing down, with small and large strikes, with demonstrations, with occupying plants, with barricades, sabotage, armed actions, resistance at all levels, in all fields, with every means at our disposal. [That] is the only way for us to remain human beings, to become human beings. The comrades who occupied the German Embassy in Stockholm in order to free the political prisoners in the FRG concluded their statement with this sentence: "We will be human beings."

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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

REVOLUTIONARY CELL MEMBER ON USE OF VIOLENCE

REVOLUTIONAERER ZORN (Zeitung der Revolutionaeren Zelle) in German May 75 pp 6-8

[Interview with the Revolutionary Cell Member]

[Text] Several months ago we gave an interview to an Austrian underground paper. We are publishing here some extracts from it. The whole interview would be too long, but we hope to be able to publish it soon elsewhere.

[Question] In Austria the debate about the "urban guerrilla" concept is being conducted exclusively with reference to publications from the FRG. In the following questions I want to refer primarily to the criticism against you by leftist groups and organs in the FRG and ask you about relations between the legal left and the urban guerrillas in your country. Why don't you tell us something about how you happened to join the guerrillas, what your group is doing and how long it has been in existence, so that one knows how something like that actually comes about.

[Answer] I am a member of the Revolutionary Cell, which came into being a few years ago at a time when the RAF and the 2 June Movement were already in existence. We began with the knowledge about those two groups--in other words, with what we learned from the press and so forth. And there were a few comrades who thought it was proper also to put the question of armed struggle on the agenda here and now, with us being able to draw on experience from political work with the masses. Well, what are such a handful of people to do who say that the propagation and practical taking up of armed struggle is proper but who have no concrete and practical experience it it? Who said to themselves, "The way we have done work with the masses so far is not enough"? Who say, "What the RAF does, or 2 June -- that's not the way we want it either"? Who only always were able to draw a line in a negative way? We were not in a position to name something new in a positive and concrete way. The comrades then said to themselves, "Let's us give it a try." The only strategic deliberations (and they were fairly concrete after all) in fact were only that one should tie in to social conflicts. If previously we had staged demos and organized teach-in's, we now thought it was right and necessary to go beyond those forms of struggle, also beyond flinging rocks, throwing Molotov cocktails, and also to go beyond the experiences with demos, agitation, the frustration of constantly being demoralized by the fuzz, when we got bashed, when squatting did not work, when only a few people came to a demo and so on.

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Actually that is what also happened to the others and to me. For me too the wholly subjective experience in the work with the masses was the basic element in the question, "What actually is the struggle to look like from here on in, and what might a new revolutionary strategy look like?"

As far as I was concerned, the Vietnam conflict had been crucial. It was a new stimulus--particularly the mining of ports by the United States at the time--with my actually feeling to kinds of new things. The first was that I instantly understood that our forms of struggle are not sufficient for in fact being able to take up new positions, for establishing something like a counterforce. The other was to at last want to be the fighter in this struggle. That means that for many years I fought with the feeling, the awareness, in the respective areas in which I found myself, of having to and being able to agitate, while what one actually is oneself, what one wants to liberate in oneself, what one wants to put into action--that all that drops out in the phase during which one quite intensively conducts work with the masses. This does not mean that we are not obliged to continue doing that too but we ourselves must always change as well in this struggle and avoid the enormous danger in work with the masses--to leave oneself out in the process.

[Question] Let us now deal with an argument employed by liberal circles and also various leftist factions: "The class enemy too is a human being, and how can one develop a human struggle?" What this sentence probably contains is the question as to whether the forms of struggle, the contents of struggle and the methods of struggle are not determined by capital and therefore likewise are authority oriented, power oriented, infected by violence, inhuman, terrorist.

Connected with this there then is always also the assertion that the masses reject your actions; in fact by your struggle and by this way of conducting the struggle, you are bound to become more and more isolated from the masses, and on a very current basis you are held responsible for solidarity movements, having come to a standstill—as, for instance, the hunger strike of the RAF comrades. In other words, where the entire left at that very time wanted to unfold its solidarity movement in a real broad way, and just then the urban guerrillas killed van Drenkmann. And that is not the first case. On comparable occasions, arguments have been put forward that the appeals to the public, etc. are not there, that they submerge completely in light of the terror actions staged in the meantime by extreme leftists.

[Answer] First, about the possible prevention of solidarity demonstrations through our practice: Surely the ones who prevent demos and campaigns are not we but those who use the argument. If there is an occasion for a campaign (for instance, because of the death of Holger Meins and against prison conditions)—a campaign in public—this occasion is not gone just because the urban guerrillas kill von Drenkmann. The leftists who hide behind this argument do not want to be lumped together with us—in the press and in public opinion. They have not waged a hunger strike campaign before that either, or they wish for a campaign based on a moral and humanitarian self—inarge without anything happening to them and without somehow too much unrest

developing. In addition there are of course also people who reject the class struggle altogether—in other words, reformists of all shades, for instance the leaders of the DKP or of Socialist Bureau 2000, people concerning whom an action like that of the urban guerrillas in the case of von Drenkmann has a positive function to the extent that this speeds up a polarization within the left, with the result that one can see more quickly and more clearly who has a revolutionary claim and who has long since departed on the reformist steamer.

As for the question of means, of "methods of violence": One can say, for one thing, that what I have said earlier shows that urban guerrillas of course are not a military fetishization of violence, a Red Army, but that guerrillas are a quite comprehensive thing. As regards violent forms, however, it is of course clear that we too employ weapons such as are employed by the other side and have to work with handguns and bombs and blackmail and kidnaping. But if the phrase "Learn from Chile" is to have any meaning, among a number of other things of course, it is that all examples to which we somehow have access have shown this: The rulers in countries such as ours or in countries kept underdeveloped, cannot be spirited away through fond wishes, or made to disappear through campaigns of refusal and strikes; nor can they be removed by building a counterculture, through a countermilieu.

That much fool's freedom they are prepared to grant anyway as long as the foundations of their system are not shaken.

It turns out, however, that as soon as a form of resistance starts to become dangerous for them--regardless of whether those resisting are armed or not armed, are children or adult or whatever--this resistance is broken with every means at their disposal, including the most brutal violent means.

And when it does happen through enlightenment of the masses and a further developed state of awareness about their conditions and of the causes and through elections, as for instance in Chile, then every attempt is indeed made to prevent the implementation of their wishes and ideas and programs and their parties and representatives [sentence as published]. And if all that is not possible with more or less peaceful, diplomatic and scheming means, quite brutal action is taken, with the most unimaginable slaughter of people.

We therefore consider the argument as to whether terrorism boomerangs against those offering violent resistance to be a philosophical one in light of the reality we confront, in light of the cruel methods of power in the hands of people who are in power which are applied and which we have to resist and which we can eliminate once and for all only with violence.

By "we" we mean not the urban guerrillas--little groups--but of course a guerrilla force employed by the masses.

Besides, I do not want to prophesy, or some such, what the forms of confrontation will look like tens of years from now. That may turn out to be quite different from what we can imagine today. But this does not change anything about the present assessment and the conclusions, which we necessarily must draw from it now and ever anew.

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the comfortable bourgeois pattern of behavior. This whole contribution only was intended to point out how much the relevant reproaches against us urban guerrillas miss the mark—to whom precisely the imputed modes of behavior are completely alien.

[Question] As far as I know, none of you so far has landed in the clink. 1--How come? 2--What happens if it does occur?

[Answer] Of course the clink is a question that is very important to us. I have already said how the question of traitors is quite different from what is generally imagined. The same way, great security also in the execution of dangerous actions is feasible only with such a group structure, such a mutual relationship of comrades. Nevertheless it is possible for some of us to be nabbed by the fuzz. Of course, the fear of prison exists, but it can be overcome and takes a back seat to what we want.

Since there is complete identity of life and struggle (I can't think of a way to put it in a less highflown way at the moment), or the trend is there of its being implemented, one has to employ all that one has and is and can do. Only then is each struggle at the same time something like a step toward liberating oneself. And, you see, in the clink the struggle is not over; on the contrary, innumerable people in prison have demonstrated to us all along that the there too the matter continues -- whether we think of Max Hoelz, of Santa Notarricola, of the political prisoners in the FRG today or of the Tupamaros. The hunger strike of the FRG prisoners has not achieved its purpose--that is, the cancellation of all annihilation measures, the torture of isolation--but it has also made it clear that even in isolation you can continue to wage a united struggle in the clink with the last means that remain at the disposal of an utterly defenseless person. And it showed (something not known before) that the last remnant of moral substance which the addressees of the hunger strike must have if they are to be moved to take the desired action--that it no longer is there as far as the rulers in this country are concerned. Therefore in the future other, new, militant forms of struggle in the clink and from outside are the means needed. This realization and experience is the result, above all, of the murder of Comrade Holger; most people did not expect the rulers to go that far, here and now. Such a wrong estimate we will not let happen again on our part; a murder such as that of Holger, we will not allow to happen again. And we will do everything possible to turn into reality what Comrade Marighella said appropriately: "As far as guerrillas are concerned, there is no such thing as impenetrable prison walls."

The mutual awareness that the clink is not the end of the line, not a blind alley, that then too we are joined with all those fighting outside and that liberation from the clink too is a priority task for all those outside—all this makes it possible for us to approach the thought, "What am I going to do if I should happen to go there?" in a cool and calm manner.

[Question] The ideas you have been developing so far in your various answers show a great deal in the way of differences in position compared with other guerrilla groups. Perhaps you can sum up in conclusion what distinguishes you from other urban guerrilla groups in the FRG.

[Answer] I have already said that in the case of urban guerrillas it is not a question of "politics" such as are conducted by virtually all other groups. To be an urban guerrilla does not mean attending conferences, writing papers, implementing individual actions, installing theoretical committees; rather, it means identifying completely with this kind of existence, it means complete identity of life and politics. That shows immediately how insane it is to make the charge against us that we are reducing the confrontation to a military level, that we are not emancipatory, that we are not trying piece by piece to turn theoretical and practical experience and insights regarding realities into action. On the contrary, we think that the comprehensive war against the system of the rule of people over people at the same time and with equal weight includes the fight against the capitalist system in ourselves. The one would be nothing without the other. An urban guerrilla force with the best weaponry and military tactics is doomed to failure if it has not taken up the comprehensive struggle mentioned. It is taken care of at the latest by informers of the Federal Criminal Police Bureau. The same way, a self-experience group which exclusively tries to comprehend and get to know itself, without the fight for liberation in the lead--such a group gets stuck. It may manage to erect some scope for its insiders, but it will land in the impotent, in the helpless, ghetto without becoming dangerous to those in power. If it could not be integrated or at least sealed off its freedom of movement would soon be gone. We try both--to promote the worsening of social contradictions, to begin guerrilla warfare against the ruling system and at the same time a change of ourselves.... In concrete terms, that means, for instance, prevention of the development of new hierarchical structures. Precisely this is difficult in illegal work, because for a thousand kind of reasons, for example, solutions of problems through division of labor keep offering themselves, which then can have fatal results in the development of operators and the rank and file. Through our constant efforts for all of us to develop omnilaterally, through our discussions and conversations, through the fighting of old wrong attitudes, by avoiding the error of relegating to a backseat problems among us because of allegedly urgent tasks--as a result of all of that we always tend to cooperate and deal with one another with equal rights, self-determined and with absolute trust. This is also a determining factor, for example, in preparing and executing each individual activity of the urban guerrillas, the Cell. We talk about our fear, we stage an action as a test of courage or on the orders of a commander. We try to analyze, to reduce intellectual arrogance. To prevent any kind of instrumentalization of other people by us, to see them as individuals, as persons, and to behave accordingly. A successful struggle (meaning, for example, the greatest possible probability of not being arrested soon, not being betrayed) is feasible only if the members of an autonomous nucleus in some town or other know each other 100 percent. If through joint practice, through conversations, through an existence which does not view any problem, from the question of reproduction to the love relations of individuals with others, as one to be solved individually, [word or words presumably dropped] is insured. The fact that one can behave in a completely open manner toward each other will prevent dozens of mistakes one might otherwise make and is much more likely to prevent the infiltration of fuzz. All that of course sounds better than it is ever carried out, that's for sure, but no one will claim that we achieve it all casually. We have to see to it constantly that we don't relapse into

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In other words, there are two kinds of violence and two kinds of dead. One aspect of violence is the violence of those in power, for insuring their power, for suppressing the masses of the exploited. On the other hand there is the resistance of small parts of the people, the resistance of the masses, resistance at various levels and in every conceivable sector of society, with every conceivable means. In other words, any more than one can say that the body of von Drenkmann and the body of Holger Meins are both victims of senseless use of violence or in both cases are grounds for closing ranks or taking a stand against violence "as such," one cannot say that the adoption of the "same" means—that is violence, pistols, revolvers—automatically reproduce [sic] system—supporting attitudes. What would be inhumane is to want to forgo taking up the struggle or postpone the taking up of the struggle with a big theoretical ado and shift it to other people in the knowledge, but with the aid, of such phony arguments.

[Question] Another quotation: "Class rule in normal times is maintained by the economic relationship of violence, not by the fuzz, by the military, by the judiciary. There is no direct suppression in this country such as existed centuries ago, but a depersonalized objective power and bondage relationship."

This leads to the reproach that the erasing of politicians or high judicial officials, the blowing up of public buildings and altogether the attack on institutions and persons does not make any contribution to class struggles, but that in the case of institutions it is a question of reparable damage, and in the case of people a question of exchangeable masks.

[Answer] The depersonalized power and bondage relationship cannot be taken as grounds for the bombing and killing being wrong. The means and possibilities of intervention depend on the current state of confrontations and one's evaluation of them. Of course, buildings, cars, etc., are repairable, but when it comes to ideology, it is more difficult to repair it again. Of course, persons are replaceable, but it is not all that easy to do away with unrest again. Occupied buildings are also vacated again, strikes also cease again, quite often without anything having been accomplished, street actions also cease again, with a few exceptions without anything having been accomplished. Whoever comes up with such a stupid argument ought not to have got out of bed. Then nothing has to be repaired, and those in power don't get angry. With our struggle, which comprises all forms of struggle in the respective appropriate situation -- from sabotage in the plant to disappropriation and kidnaping -- we want to hit this state where it hurts most and expose it for what it is, to fight and gain positions of power and to be successful. All members of the ruling class are to feel insecure in their houses; they have been sleeping peacefully long enough. They are to be forced to protect every single asset with their fuzz. We want the urban guerrillas to become a mass perspective and not a matter of a few people. Anything else would then really be only an end in itself.

[Question] You have now taken a stand, with quite a number of individual examples, on charges by the left or the bourgeois, and in part one can see what kind of understanding is connected with ideas such as the armed struggle of urban guerrillas. Perhaps you can now describe it in great detail as it relates to your group and your practice.

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[Answer] Well, we, the Revolutionary Cell, cannot claim that we will become a party or a Red Army. We are very cautious there; we are no movement but only a part of it. What we want is to organize a counterforce in small nuclei which operate, fight, intervene, protect autonomously in the various sectors of society, which are a part of the political work with the masses. And at some time or other, when we will have become a great many nuclei, the direction of advance for the urban guerrillas will have been created. That takes time, but we are prepared for a long struggle. How that is to be done? Well, first of all only in the way we have done it so far, with all the existing contradictions; at the moment we are still entirely geared to political work with the masses. That can and will change only to the extent that the objective and economic living conditions get worse, when class contradictions become more acute and the struggles increase, and of course [depending on] whether we are in the proper position with our politics—that is, being substantial participants in these struggles, promoting them.

We do not claim to have a complete revolutionary theory. We have difficulties, of course, but there are parts of this strategy which in practice have already proved right. We do, however, demand that the left, both verbally and practically, have it out with us, that it at long last start to implement its taking sides with the MIR and the Red Brigades in such a way as to ask itself what the struggle could look like here, in this country (which is much more important). Instead of only erupting in gushes over the class struggles in Italy or in other remote places. To implement this demand means that we are obliged time and again to confront the left with the question of armed struggle.

(The interview was conducted in February 1975. We have made slight changes at some places compared with a complete version circulating in the FRG and West Berlin.)

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["Slightly abridged version" of Red Army faction May 1982 "Position Paper"; passages within slantlines denote boldface as published]

[Text] We talk about what we have experienced in recent years and what we want to do about it. This naturally must be confined here to general definitions.

//We say it is now possible and necessary to develop a new phase of the revolutionary strategy in the center of imperialism.//

As a precondition for this, we want to take some of what has accumulated in the past 2-3 years in discussions, tests and real steps to form the groundwork on which matters can proceed.

We can proceed from the fact that the idea and the concept have been a success. The practical beginnings show that it is possible and apt: guerrillas and resistance—a front.

We Have Defined 1977 As the Transition From the First to the Next Stage of the Guerrilla

The clash between guerrillas and the state in 1977 was a catalyst for a sudden change in the political situation here. The conditions of the struggle have changed within the dialectics of attack and reaction, and as conditions change, the forms of our struggle can and must change, too.

After 1977 nothing was the same--neither the state nor the left nor the FRG's role in international politics nor the position of armed struggle in the center within the scope of the international class struggle.

We made mistakes in 1977 and the offensive became our most serious defeat. We will talk about this in more detail later.

The situation today—that the effect of the confrontation has made us stronger than we were before—shows that our mistakes and defeat were not the decisive matter.

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Basically, the 1977 offensive was a culmination of and decisive for our struggle since 1970. The entire phase of the struggles for the formation and development of the RAF was focused on the one question of power, namely, whether these prisoners would be released whom the state connected with the RAF and the raison d'etat—just like the struggle in general for the enforcement of the urban guerrilla's concept. Whether armed policy would really become fixed in the FRG and thus open up revolutionary prospects was the first basic question of power which in the years before and until 1977 was the centerpiece of all actions, encounters, searches and media campaigns.

Therefore, the government announced our "failure" a hundred times; therefore, the clamor of a large part of the left created the impression a thousand times of the "futility" of armed struggle. Solitary confinement, prison security wings and the show trial in Stammheim were supposed to wipe out what had emerged. Finally, 1977.

We are sure today that they decided in favor of Schleyer's death and of the possibility of letting almost 100 people be blown up in Mogadishu and that they were resolved to liquidate the Stammheim prisoners because they really hoped and believed this would put an end to it once and for all or at least for the following years.

The dialectics of developments, which now make everything look entirely different, clearly show what guerrillas are, what the state is and how the struggle is going.

They were almost successful; however, the irony is that they created a situation which enabled us to continue our struggle under changed and consequently better conditions.

In undertaking the huge and boundless efforts to bring about our end by smashing our 1977 offensive, which took them by the throat like nothing before, they were forced to become a pure strong state, enforce the subjugation of the entire spectrum of the opposition, crush every critical gesture and confront all segments of society as an inescapable apparatus.

In this way in the fall of 1977 they created new relationships and conditions for existence for the basic opposition—as an immediate experience and as a perspective of future struggles forcing everyone to establish a basically new relationship with power or give up.

At this point this objective situation, reduced to the very simple question of whether the guerrillas were possibly really finished now, subjectively became the moment of existential experience for many who no longer had any prospects so that if this really was the way things were, all their hopes and ideas for a new life were finished, too.

There can be hope only as long as there is a struggle.

They want and need guerrillas; our defeat is their defeat.

From this new experience of the necessity for guerrillas, the leap to a new awareness is easy: if the guerrilla struggle is their own cause, implementing this cause can only mean for them placing themselves politically and practically in the framework of the guerrilla strategy—on whatever level.

This leap is the inner, active element embodied by real persons, the element of changed conditions regarding the struggle here //for the development of the revolutionary front in the cities.//

The point for 7 years was to bring the spirit and morality, the practice and political orientation of an irrevocable breakdown and destruction of the system into this political desert of appearances, goods, packaging, lies and deception. Guerrillas.

Based on the connection and identity with the struggles in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America, the point was to forcibly go into and gain a foothold in the system.

What the termed a phase of survival and solidification was the phase of implementing our concept here, a concept which will survive and be implemented even if the illegal armed groups that exist at a certain moment were to be annihilated.

A concept implemented by force, of course. In every respect and instance. Not only against a historically unprecedented apparatus of repression but also against the idea of people whom we would have preferred to meet under different circumstances.

In this landscape, flattened and levelled for generations, the idea of liberation has hardly been able to reach the hearts and minds through the thick layers of corruption, estrangement and deformation.

Now the question of whether an armed struggle must and will be fought in the FRG and West Europe is settled.

It is evident.

This does not mean that the guerrillas are safe. That has never been the case. However, the existence of the guerrilla policy is now the basis on which the struggle will be developed.

In the International Class Struggle the Development of an Authentic Revolutionary Strategy in the Imperialist Center is of Immediate Interest

In the present conflict the international liberation struggle is no longer an isolated guerrilla activity but has become concrete reality. At this point the situation here must be fully grasped so as to direct resistance

in the cities into the opposite direction, namely, from here to the front in the international class struggle.

This will form the strategy which has its roots here; in the existential hunger for a different life; in the experience of the totality of the imperialist center; in the necessity of resistance here //which the revolutionary front assumes in the center as another sector in addition to the struggles in Asia, Africa, Latin America.//

This means turning oneself radically into the starting point of the development of the anti-imperialist struggle wherever one is allied with guerrillas, with the struggle for liberation.

//It means struggling under an open strategic concept where everyone is part of the revolutionary front here who—through the common goal of the destruction of the imperialist system and the revolutionary transformation of society, and as a result of the seriousness of his own situation, and of his history and subjective development—places himself into the concrete struggle and into the framework of guerrilla policy.

//And it means that from the very first moment it is his concern-just as it is ours--that the front in the center develop; that it is his concern in which direction it develops.//

This is what we mean when we say: fighting together; one front.

If you will, our line of action until 1977 differs from the current line inasmuch as the important thing until 1977 was always direct armed struggle or what prepared for that step, whereas the important thing now is for guerrilla, militant and political struggles to merge as integral components in the prospective escape point for strategy for cities which is to be developed.

We say this: Even if an armed and illegal organization forms the core of this strategy, the strategy gains its full necessary strength only when armed policy is merged into //one// aware and purposeful attack against the hinges of the imperialist center with militant attacks, with the struggles from the entire breadth of oppression and alienation, and with the political campaign to convey its process. We place our focus on the subjective facet of the development from the dialectics of 1977—the possibility for the front in the center. It is always in the center here. It represents the decisive element in the struggle in the imperialist centers from which inevitably—if only because of the evolving objective contradictions and conditions under this mode of rule of crisis management and transformation of any social development into an instrument of domination—no revolutionary conditions can emerge but only destruction and decay.

However, it goes without saying that nobody pulls himself onto a new stage by his own bootstraps. The qualitatively changed situation at this time

has emerged from the objective development of the international class struggle and can be comprehended only in this struggle.

//After Vietnam the conflict shifted from a situation of confrontation—the center of the liberation war, the front and the hinterland—to a line which on a worldwide scale runs clear across every sector, every continent and every country because each sector, due to its intertwining and significance in the overall system, might become the trigger for the collapse of the power ratio—and thus become purposefully [tendenziell] the frontline of the liberation war.//

What this means for the anti-imperialist struggle is that the campaigns against this unity of imperialist reaction must now be waged in parallel on all fronts.

This involves various segments of one single frontline.

And being formed by campaigns waged side by side, each segment—and thus also the West European sector—can become a real front capable of shaking imperialism only through its own strength and its specific topical and historical conditions.

Thus the leap from the dialectics of confrontation in 1977 to the qualitatively changed, subjective conditions of the struggle here, and our step to the basis of the process of contradiction in the interior of this center, have been fully integrated in the development and the necessity of and the opportunities for the international class struggle. This came just in time, so to speak.

The state did in fact act in keeping with this interrelation in 1977.

Near the end of the first phase of the formation of a U.S. chain of states, by our defeat the state boasted that it was that very superior power which wanted to appear as though its bounds were not at all in the national state but within the dimensions of the global counterrevolutionary project; by virtue of its mission for the U.S. state system, this leading European power proposes to enforce the internal state power and the internal West European political power against any form of resistance so as to be able to wage the attack internationally.

However, they thereby pushed the conflict forward in two directions along whose lines the decisive battles will certainly take place: laterally for the purpose of combatting guerrillas as a standardized West European state policy, against which the prospects of the West European front of guerrillas has become real; and into the depth of society, from which the most radical polarization and the most severe tearing away in the FRG's history of society from this state and from its logic and laws ensured—and thus the opportunity for a revolutionary front.

It is pointless to analyze the internal changes here in detail because the attitude and the practice of life of those who have been struggling since then contain the changed situation and simply proceed from it.

We simply state: As never before, the fundamental opposition is absolutely through with this sytem; this opposition is cold, devoid of all illusions, and no longer approachable by the state.

There is nothing left of a "change in the system" and "alternative models" in the state. They are simply ludicrous.

It's all done and finished--and only after the demise of the system will prospects for life become imaginable.

Imperialism no longer has a positive, productive future left; it only was a future of destruction.

This is the core of the experience which forms the root of the new militant attitude in all spheres of life.

This new militant attitude is reflected materially in the foundations of economic life, in armament and war plans, in the basis of the natural and social living conditions, and in individuals themselves where alienation and oppression have turned into massive deformation and mortification of individual richness of thinking, feeling and the personality structure.

Most people despair about this. Imperialism has perfected and systematized its rule in the centers to a point where people cannot find the strength to resist. Rapidly increasing suicide rates, escape into sickness, alcoholism, misuse of medicine and drugs—this is the reaction to the reality that has emerged from the history of defeats, suffering and sorrow, and from a depoliticizing for which external violence can no longer be regarded as the cause.

However, it is this dimension of misery from which the existential depth of the fighting and the hate now spring.

This is no longer the spontaneous, brief rage, that has been burned up over the years.

This is the soil from which the revolutionary front is now developing in the center.

Anti-Imperialist Front

In the past 2 years, there has been a lot of leaflets and actions spreading the slogan "one front with the RAF," and we are aware that the need for, and receptiveness to, this extends through all politicized spheres.

Yet, there is still an enormous discrepancy between whatever exists potentially as a front in the way of need, readiness or beginnings and its implementation in the form of a development process, organization and development.

The front will not be set up automatically through parallel struggles and their proclamation.

The front deteriorates with its proclamation, and the mobilization for it will again disintegrate unless this concept is seized more than before as the practical question of how it might work and ensuring that it will work, and this must be done not just by ourselves alone.

The front will become reality only if everyone, regardless of where he is, makes it his own cause to find out in practice the aspects and forms of unity of the illegal armed struggle and the legal political-militant resistance, including their instruments, tactics and structure—meaning their sphere of action and development which is illegal—and to consciously promote them within the strategic process.

 $//{\rm Our}$ front either stands for the development of the political and practical interconnection of the attack against the imperialist power, or it is nothing.//

Our experience from the past 2 years, in which we managed to form the initial nucleus of this new guerrilla structure, shows us how easily the interconnection forms spontaneously, how strong it is in the subjective and objective-material respect as an option for attack, and how difficult it is, on the other hand, to get the process of strategy going as a continuous process beyond individual political initiatives, actions and limited practical interconnections.

This is the knot that must now be severed.

What is at stake in this connection is not morale, zeal and performance. It is important to gain with complete consistency—once the decision for this struggle has been made—the realistic concept of how the system here can really be cracked, and to determine one's own place in this.

The following is what we once experienced ourselves and what we are experiencing now with those we directly know:

//The decisive factor for the breakthrough on which our progress depends is the struggle of those who have begun, or intend to begin, the struggle under this concept to comprehend themselves as subjects of the anti-imperialist front; to foresee this front in and with themselves; to devise political initiatives and actions for its sake; and to visualize themselves as involved in everything they have started, including the front of attack.//

Since the initial discussions in 1979 on the unity of the anti-imperialist struggle, it has time and again been practically the same obstructions

within and between the individual anti-imperialist groups which have prevented what could have been attained long ago--the acting front.

We have no use for sham fights over the militant action fetish or over the conjuging up of the "alliance with the masses." Struggling to arrive at an ovowal of us or, vice versa, cautiously waiting to see if any connection with us would be discovered during the conflict are likewise superfluous.

It is a fact that the only result is that the simplest subsequent steps are not being taken.

//Front// means more than actions.

Front, that is, fights which in their common aim merge into one fight and //thus// can be united politically and practically will exist in many forms in the West European center. The anti-imperialist front in the FRG--that is military attacks, uniform, coordinated military operations aimed at foiling imperialist strategy; this means taking political initiatives to pursue policies and initiatives which support current resistance; this means a structural and organizational fight for the ability to act; this means in every moment of its development a fight for the possibility and practical purpose of discussions and communications for the process of strategy.

//Front// means something other than moving the guerrillas one structure farther away from legality.

We have said that a "legal arm of the RAF" does not and cannot exist. Naturally, we have connections to all kinds of people, and naturally we pursue a concrete guerrilla policy—anti—imperialist resistance, however, can become only as an independent, specific development in this field, a part of the anti-imperialist front with regard to the common aim, and only there the separation will be overcome. [Sentence as published]

Only in this way can the fight on this terrain become politically effective and gain continuity and strength—and basically self-determination and full responsibility at every point of the fight of revolutionary policy in the West European center is substantial.

Always discussing the same point where isolated standpoints and convictions are held against each other, the narrowness of the individual thinking of groups, the lack of determination to become active oneself—all this simply disappears where the assessment of the situation prevails to the effect that the anti-imperialist front is urgently needed although it is weakly developed. It can, however, hold a potentially strong position in the West European center and have enormous possibilities in the international liberation struggle.

//The relevant fighting front against the imperialist strategy must be the next direct aim.//

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All the knowledge about imperialism and its plans, emerging from all the documents, and the determination and fire of militant actions are in vain if a decision does not result in establishing cohesion in fighting each single development.

//What characterizes the current resistance and the conditions of the fight in the cities, namely the political, structural and practical elements and lines of the attack against the core of capitalist power--the FRG state and NATO---must be extracted and offensively developed.//

The situation is as follows:

The anti-imperialist fight is lagging behind the offensive of the contradictory but still unified imperialist machinery. The beginnings of the anti-imperialist mobilization were not directed against imperialist reconstruction after Vietnam and the beginning of the crisis and the preparation and beginning of its offensive—resistance was in disarray in this phase and was eventually paralyzed by the collapse of the 1968 leftists—but against the reactionary attacks which had been continuing for quite some time on all levels.

The offensive by the imperialist machinery is under way, there is great spontaneous resistance, but anti-imperialist policy is providing no effective orientation within this resistance.

//In order to do this, this policy must be an initiating and relevant factor
in the discussions about and against imperialist schemes which are determining the course of current history://

U.S. war strategy in Europe--

The internal reactionary offensive of the state--

The international roll-back strategy of the imperialist chain of states against the liberation movements, young national states and socialist states.

The situation is such that it is really unknown how history will develop now. In its historic crisis—for the first time in 40 years it must fear for its existence—U.S. imperialism can apply extreme means, and it will do so if the system slides toward an unpredictable crisis and if that cannot be prevented.

In view of its nuclear destruction potential there is a catastrophic aspect which we, the internationally suppressed and exploited, have no reason to fear because this would mean in any case the end of imperialism. However, imperialism in any case means our end. Our approach to the prospect of nuclear destruction is, first, that we will not fear it and, second, that we can and will prevent it only through revolutionary war.

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Developments in Western Europe Have Become a Crucial Point of the Worldwide Dispute

Due to the movement of the international class struggle it has become logical, on the one hand, for the imperialist strategy to launch an offensive in and from Western Europe, with the FRG as the crucial state in this attempt to secure for itself predominance and capital reproduction as a functioning world system. From our point of view, on the other hand, the development of the front in the center is a pure necessity as a prerequisite to overcome the stagnation tendency by the international liberation process in the East-West contradiction and through developments in nationally liberated states. The centers themselves and Western Europe as the point of intersection of the lines running East-West and North-South as well as the line between state and society in particular, are the starting points and the core of their restructuring project.

It is here that they must try to gain military power to exert pressure on the socialist states and against the national liberation struggle and to get the economic power, the rolling economic and social crisis in the country under control, to dominate and annex the young developing states and—as a prerequisite for all this—to forcibly impose an internal political homogeneity, if not as a consensus, at least for tranquillity in their own house.

In this sense they depend on the centers. They must and will try on all levels and with all their might to aggressively enforce the reactionary overall concept in the center.

Medium-range missiles, neutron bombs, stepped-up conventional armament, the concentration and centralization of capital, rationalization, planned mass unemployment, making man an instrument of machines; forcing an energy policy which is indispensable for them as a means of war on the world market; the destruction of social structures in the interests of the police and big capital; the exploitation of workers trying to earn a living, training as a factory of workers; the pigs, judiciary and the clink; and so on //are moves of this militarily conceived offensive and an iron clamp surrounding all sections of the urban society which has long ceased to leave us the choice of whether we want the front in the center or not. There is war. The question is only whether or not there will be a revolutionary front against the reactionary offensive.//

It is against this background that the anti-imperialist front in the center emerges. Its effect cannot be gauged alone by the prevention or nonprevention of current individual imperialist projects here. All its achievements are attained by it and for it as a segment of the struggle of the international front and it is only from this totality of confrontation between imperialism and liberation that the ratio of forces can be created which makes the social revolution possible here.

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//Resistance against the imperialist machinery striking out here—this is also our definition of guerrilla action and the development of an anti-imperialist front—is the offensive and development of the revolutionary front in the center within the scope of its worldwide struggle.//

In the light of the general situation such an offensive is necessary now and must be launched from here.

Internationally, the two blocs face each other, armed to the teeth and petrified by their overkill capacity. Liberation movements have become states, and those which do not yet have a state act as quasi states in their struggle to become one. The main terrain of the liberation movements and the young states has become the sphere of international politics and international relations—between the East—West conflict which is reproduced in these countries, the world market on which and against which they are forced to develop and the new political strength of the liberated national states in the international bodies which give them some leeway of action. This is the logical development, an expression of the strength the national liberation struggle has gained, and an expression of the weak point that the foundation is still the system of states laid down by imperialism.

In this situation the development of a country entails for the political leadership of the young states a dual contradiction—the people's deepening misery and poverty, their underdevelopment and resultant demands for radical solutions as opposed to the inevitability of their struggle for the necessary means which are almost entirely in the possession of the imperialist states. In addition, they have to come to terms with imperialism imposing on them growing obligations which can lead to their catastrophic destruction in civil wars, famine, despair, repression and intervention.

However, they did not choose these contradictions. They are above all a result of colonial history. Even though it has long been ousted from these countries, imperialism profits even from the destruction it left behind.

The guerrillas in the cities and the militant struggle today are the results of a dynamicism the liberation movements have triggered. If as a result of their struggle a movement has emerged here at all after 30 years, the current situation there is primarily marked by the fact that the struggles here are so little developed.

The Struggle for Liberation

As necessary as resistance and the revolutionary offensive are regarding our own situation, this is also our—and only our—opportunity to open up this prospect of the end of the system, a prospect which //in// its function of destroying imperialist power goes beyond this function.

Proceeding from the ripeness for destruction of the metropolis where productive social developments have begun, the revolutionary struggle in its

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goals and in the structure of every combat front point to a social future beyond the historical frontiers of the existing system of states.

In this historical phase of imperialism, which has been forced back to the outer lines and is disintegrating internally in the general crisis, the ripeness of the metropolis to be revolutionized is also its ripeness for the struggle which is radically oriented toward a change of the social conditions into a communist system.

In this system life is not conceived as being in another transitional period or victory as meaning that the state is taken over; this system is the unified process of resistance, counterpower and transformation aimed at liberation.

//Revolutionary policy here is the strategy which considers resistance in everyday reality here as a process of the liberation struggle as well as a part, segment and function of the worldwide struggles by which the goal can be reached only when they are combined.//

This policy has nothing to do with ideology. It does not establish another of these ideological models which supersede each other and which allegedly will be implemented later. It can only be a real process.

As a signal of utopia, it is a long-term and direct strategy--it can also be termed a way of life--where the strategic goal of the destruction of imperialist power is connected with a real change now--

A process, as the front develops which destroys the state's occupation of the political terrain and the individual--

A process which by the production of a counterpower creates the respective conditions of a political-military offensive and as a production and material development involves the restoration of man's full dimension in the relations of the combatants. [The following remark appears at this point in brackets: "Boys and girls, who the hell is supposed to understand that?--D.S."]

Immediate changes, liberated territories and revolutions are entirely integrated in the process of resistance—and they are true only in this way.

The revolutionary strategy here is simply a strategy against their strategy //which attacks their strategic plan in their concrete projects and, by launching material attacks, breaks the imperialist offensive in and outside the country politically and thereby creates an awareness which nationally as well as internationally produces a new process of resistance by the front which blocks their plans before they can carry them out.

//A strategy which as the relevant fighting front here disrupts the consensus in the center of imperialism and by spreading this internal disruption

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internationally deprives them of the legitimacy and attractiveness of reproducing in a new phase the system based on money, manipulation and destruction. In a new phase.

//A strategy which as a radical change of the situation in the metropolis shows the possibility of an end to imperialist power and its existence among the people as well as ripeness for a liberated society.//

Concerning 1977

The problem which had an adverse effect on us during the Schleyer kidnapping was that we--concentrating on our concrete objective of liberating the prisoners--failed to tackle the development of the political goal in the entire offensive, namely, deepening the contradictions in the crisis.

Even though the action had hurt the state to the quick, we failed to act on the political level of the challenge.

In the summer of 1977 the situation of the prisoners had intensified to a point where we could no longer take our time for a liberation action. The prisoners were on thirst strike, and Gudrun was dying.

We knew that we would venture the attack at that time from a state of relative political weakness, but we did want that attack because war does not exist merely as a state of affairs between ourselves and them, but solely if it is being materially developed as a question of power.

Since Stockholm the struggle over the prisoners has become a crucial issue in the conflict between the guerrillas and the state, a crucial issue in whose claim on the prisoners both elements converge as in a crystallization point:

The relationship of a guerrilla with his captured comrades, what kind of terms they are on with each other—a function of this struggle—and the significance of every individual to the whole;

And the power ratio in general because guerrillas in this respect directly and materially pose the question of power to the state because their attack is aimed purposefully at the political crisis since it directly pulls a pillar of their power from under their feet as in the case of Schleyer (only then does a realistic chance exist) and thus makes visible, and simultaneously tears apart, the structure of power by forcing a reaction.

It was our idea to pose to the SPD the question concerning an exchange of the two figures who directly embodied the economic world power of FRG capital to a degree that no more than 10 others might:

Ponto for their international finance policy (and in this the full meaning of the role of the German banks in general and his, the Dresdner bank, in

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particular for the reactionary regimes in the developing countries, and for the FRG monetary policy as a means of the institutional strategy under which European integration proceeds);

And Schleyer for the national economic policy (the rich combines), concerted action [conferences of government, employer and trade union leaders at regular intervals], the FRG as an international model for social peace.

In other words, the power in the state for which the SPD as a government party must make allowances if it wishes to stay in government.

The contradiction at which the action was aimed was the tension between the strategy of U.S. capital, by which the SPD's state image and each of its reactionary maneuvers in domestic and foreign policy since 1945 has been determined, and the banks and concerns or, if you will, the national capital.

National capital certainly cannot devise a policy of its own against the hegemonic—that is U.S.—line, unless you wish to consider the provincially narrowminded variants of Kohl, Albrecht and so forth, or the grand design of Strauss which has come to naught for more than 20 years now to be such a policy definition; yet the power with which it competes and expands within the vertical structure of the entire capitalist mechanism is naturally an expression of a consensus and a self—awareness of the national elites, a self—awareness which Schmidt has to promote upward and downward in both the international and the national context. For the first time the political escalation of the action had been defused by the failure of the Ponto abduction and thus by the absence of one of the supports for the entire tactical and political objective.

However, the decisive mistake we made was not to revise the whole action from the beginning after the federal government had let the first ultimatum expire and it thus became clear that they had given Schleyer up for dead; a revision should have provided the action with quick consolidation.

We had seen from Schleyer's efforts to achieve an exchange that his connections and his influence were not worth a damn against the power of the consolidated imperialist strategy, which proceeded along the lines of the tactics and the psychology of the BKA [Federal Office for Criminal Investigation].

These tactics of avoiding an official government decision, drawing out the action through pretended negotiations so as to end the action as far as the police were concerned, ruling public pressure out from the outset by means of a news blackout, and intending to use the example of these prisoners to gain international "rejection of terrorism" through Wischnewski's trip to the so-called host countries [aufnahmelaender]—this objectively gave us the opportunity and the time to work with this situation politically.

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What this work would have amounted to was immediately using the talks with Schleyer to be able to actually push to extremes the contradictions which meanwhile had again caused the "unity of all democrats" to disintegrate.

These were contradictions that extended to a point where, for example the CSU attempted to deprive Schmidt of the government by suggesting the release of the prisoners and the subsequent promulgation of a state of emergency. This would have spelled the end of all SPD political standing [politim] by the open admission of the state crisis—something which the SPD had to prevent by all means.

It was in this escalated situation where our defensive situation had become evident that the martyr Halimeh commando decided to intervene, to the extent this was possible under objective pressures.

This was the first time that a liberation movement commando intervened directly in the conflict here and made the struggle in the city its own cause.

A great deal has been said about the tactically and strategically erroneous direction of this action which simply gave the FRG the chance to start a counteroffensive of its own.

The responsibility for this is entirely ours.

It was our mistake not to seek a decision in the city itself, a decision which can result only from the power ratio here because the matter at issue is the prisoners representing the struggle here and because it was important to isolate the FRG; instead the escalation was shifted to one of the young national states.

When viewed in the context of an action from the city aimed at the polarization in the city, namely, a breach between the people and the state, the instrument applied—airplane hijacking—was bound to backfire against the attack //as a whole// because it inevitably put the airplane passengers into the same class as objects which is how the imperialist state has always treated the people. In this way the objective of revolutionary action was foiled.

The erroneous planning of the action formed the pincers against the commando which allowed the federal government to operate with the calculation that the commando would naturally try everything, and would continue to negotiate, as long as it still saw some hope that the FRG would release the prisoners.

As far as the SPD was concerned the massacre, like in Stockholm earlier, was the solution because the SPD rejects a popular image whenever U.S. interests—insuring the domination in the center—are under attack. "It was unknown whether the outcome would be tolerable," Schmidt said at the time

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It was the decision in favor of a military solution at a time when a victory of the guerrillas in the FRG, the crucial country of the reactionary integration of the West European states, would have decisively thrown back the FRG's entire concept of imperialist reconstruction.

This decision was a leap to the head of the reactionary counteroffensive to standardize the internal security apparatuses in Western Europe; yet a central component of social democratic policy also collapsed in Stammheim and Mogadishu, namely, covert warfare.

The imperialist state stood there, acting openly in a reactionary manner, an imperialist state which no longer was afraid of being likened to its fascist past, but extolled this past: the desert foxes of Mogadishu as a model for the German youth.

By the same token this state has demonstrated as never before the political weakness of the metropolis states, the internal brittleness of the whole structure which looks so potent from the outside.

Red Army Faction, May 1982

cso: 6131/520

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FRANCE

NEW GROUP SEEKS POLITICAL, NONREPRESSIVE TERRORISM DETERRENT

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 22 May 82 pp 52-53

[Article: "Political Dissuasion" by Marcelle Padovani]

[Text] Would it be possible to combat terrorism--past, present, and future--more effectively through persuasion than through repression? This question is raised.

A group of French officials and specialists have secretly, semi-clandestinely formed a study group on "antiterrorist dissuasion." With no official status, of course. Their aim? To launch a "preventive antiterrorism operation" addressed at possible candidates for the "armed struggle" in France; to encourage the dynamics of "dissociation" or "repudiation of weapons" among terrorists from abroad who have taken refuge in our country: Germans, Spanish Basques, and especially more than 200 Italians (some former members of the Red Brigades, a nucleus of Prima Linea, and numerous "independents").

However, none of these French officials pretend to believe that these voluntary exiles are necessarily "white sheep" who fled unjust persecution. No, their viewpoint is completely different. Convinced that police repression is neither satisfactory nor adequate; convinced that extradition should be reserved basically for common law crimes, they hope to gradually replace them with a system of political dissuasion, discussed and accepted on the European level. Positive discussions have already taken place with German officials. Others will take place with the Italians. With the Spanish, it seems, it is difficult to have a dialogue at this time.

What is the reasoning of this type of "dissuasion group"? As of 10 May 1981, France is leftwing. To accelerate change, it is proper that it give different signals, even to those who have chosen the wrong path, with P.38 in hand. France will never suggest to countries who are victims of terrorism that they abandon the struggle against it, but rather that they integrate a political approach to the phenomenon into their struggle, and therefore conceive of European cooperation differently on these grounds.

Four Suggestions

This is an original proposal, and also a courageous one--at a time when French public opinion is close to giving way to obsessive terror, and German and

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Italian public opinion close to being convinced that France is a made-in-Europe sanctuary for terrorism. There is no lack of presumptions: "repentant" Italians are currently marching before judges and revealing, as Antonio Savasta did, that the military leaders of the Red Brigades had correspondents in Paris to supply weapons; others speak of fall-back bases in Paris for terrorists in trouble.

The "dissuasion group" is not unaware of any of these accusations. It even knows that some of them are not entirely unfounded: the files of General Intelligence speak volumes in this regard. But, the group thinks it is necessary to go beyond this.

Specifically, what will the group suggest to the French government?

(1) To recognize that many terrorists have found refuge in this country; (2) to negotiate with the refugees for their "dissociation," perhaps in the form of a solemn letter renouncing the armed struggle, which still doesn't rule out regular police checks; (3) to offer political asylum, and therefore the right to a legal existence, to those who would request it and would present adequate guarantees; (4) finally, to resort to deportation rather than extradition for those who hesitate to "dissociate."

The "dissuasion group" recognizes that these proposals are meaningful only if the governments of the countries involved also agree to launch a big conciliation effort: for the moment, aren't the Germans and especially the Italians in better control of the terrorist phenomenon than previously?

What do they reply, for example, in Italy? They advance political and technical considerations. (1) We are not in Latin America, say the harshest. Someone who has committed a crime that he calls "political" against the democracy, who has fired on unarmed men and assassinated people, while convincing himself that he was struggling against the state, must be extradited and pay for his mistakes in prison. (2) How, say the "technicians" in turn, will the French government separate the wheat from the chaff? What criteria will it choose: a declaration of non-hostility to provide "peace for the assassins"? Will it also grant political asylum to murderers? (3) Finally, ask the most practical, is the French police force capable of handling a matter which is so complex and unpopular even in France? Isn't there a chance of sabotage, or of a settling of accounts within the world of refugees, between the "hard" and the "soft," between those who "repent" and those who stick to their position? In any case, add these practical people, as in Italy they have managed to make a distinction between small and large "repenters," between the "dissociated" and the experienced killers; so it is good to seek varied solutions for those who have taken refuge abroad; they must be allowed choices other than simply resorting to the benefits of the "law on repenters."

An Interesting Case

Besides, let us take a closer look at this Italian law on "repenters." Of course it encourages the repentant to cooperate with the court and compensates

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them through significant reductions of sentences. And this to the extent than an Antonio Savasta, with 17 murders on his conscience, may get off with 10 years in prison because he talked a lot: no more than a minor terrorist who has little to be blamed for and little to tell. Not to mention those who don't want to say anything, despite their self-criticism.

An interesting case could perhaps push the Italians--whether "hard" or "technical"--toward a more flexible and more varied attitude.

This is the case of Massimo Prandi, alias Ivan of Brescia, age 28, former leader of the terrorist group Prima Linea. Two hold-ups on his conscience. No "knee-cappings" or assassinations. For participation in the armed group, he has been sentenced to 7 years hard labor. In France, where he lives clandestinely, he gets along by earning less than 2,000 francs per month on the black market. He is someone who does not refuse to recognize his responsibilities, while admitting that he is afraid of prison if he goes back to Italy. Can the Italian officials content themselves with only providing two options for him--throwing him into prison or letting him vegetate in the dustbins of terrorism--just as as for those who have killed or who refuse any self-criticism?

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FRANCE

FORMER PRIMA LINEA MEMBER DESCRIBES CAREER

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 22 May 82 pp 52-54

[Interview with "Ivan of Brescia" by Marcelle Padovani]

[Text] Taking refuge in Paris, a former Prima Linea activist tells his long story.

"There were 10 of us. We crossed the French border secretly, at night, in snow up to our waists. That was almost 2 years ago. Did we flee from repression? Of course, but we fled especially from ourselves and the aberration of armed struggle. We had no other choice than to leave Italy. We were cornered. Cornered not so much by the police or Dalla Chiesa's forces as by our former comrades: they didn't understand anything anymore; they did not perceive the absurdity of our "struggle"; they had become a sect and they were thinking more about shooting and killing than about fighting for the working class."

"Our story, my story, is a long one. I would like one thing to be well understood: I am not particularly proud of it. I do not believe that you can leave the armed struggle in any other way than with your head bowed, slinking along the wall, and apologizing to the working class; so as to try then to rebuild an identity bit by bit—a strictly personal identity, of course. You see, I don't believe in a 'network of the repentant' at all. I would also like it to be known that I would prefer today to have no memory—to no longer think about what has been done, or at least to be able to replace the memory of these 10 years of terrorism with the memory of the history of the workers' movement. All things considered, it must surely be more authentic than our own."

"I would like that so much. But I hesitate to return to Italy and I absolutely refuse to give them names—the last few names which the prosecutors may still not know. What purpose would it serve? The armed struggle is over. I ask these judges and the state in general: hasn't the time come to lend us a hand in getting out of this rotten situation and forming more human relationships with those who have abandoned armed violence?"

"Ivan"--this is an assumed name--stops for a moment. He is a tall young man, 6 feet and 3 1/2 inches tall, thin and anguished-looking. Traces of

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self-irony flash in his very restless black eyes--as, for example, when he explains that he has not been able to eat chicken since as a child he saw his grandmother slit one's throat. He has retained the lilting accent of his native Emilia. His speech is politically oriented and cultivated. He became a terrorist just before defending a doctoral thesis on money.

"I was born in Reggio, Emilia, a 'red' region, in 1954. My family were partisans, socialists, and anarchists. My uncle, who was a commander in the Garibaldi Brigades, fled Italy after the war because, according to him, the revolution had been betrayed. It was an environment of disappointed revolutionaries, an atmosphere of overall disillusionment, wasn't it? No doubt: at home when they spoke of politics, it was in negative terms. My father used to say: 'We've been had.' Whatever the case, when I leave Red Reggio for Brescia, home of the Beretta pistols and of Pope Paul VI, a very Catholic city in any case, I am immediately sized up. In school, a Fascist professor nicknames me 'Palmiro.' As for me, I discover the Church in all its triumphant horror. And I am literally forced to try myself against religion. I get through by developing a fixation on Che Guevara. At the time, I even wore a beret with a star like his: his martyr's attitude and revolutionary orientation temporarily helped me to resolve my conflicts. At the age of 14, I begin at the lycee. I convince myself of the virtues of militant antifascism. It must be said that after the Fascist attempt in Milan in 1969, we were all living in terror of a coup by the extreme Right."

"When did I enter the armed struggle? From 1970 on, we were living in an atmosphere of preventive war. Violence was our daily bread. One example is the forces of order within the extreme Left movements. They taught you how to bash someone's face in scientifically, how to hit which specific part of the tibia to break a leg. You have never heard of beating someone up with a hammer? Nor of neofascists reduced to a pulp with a 60-centimeter-long monkey wrench weighing around 3 kilos and held with two hands? I have seen guys, Fascists, whose eyes they were tearing out with a hook. Believe me, at the beginning of the 70's, there was violence which was much worse than the "jambisations." This is just to explain to you that it would be difficult for me to pinpoint the exact moment when a militant in the extreme Left passes from violence to organized armed struggle. I am obviously speaking of the years from 1970 to 1975. After that, it is an entirely different story."

"My entry into the armed struggle, first through the paper 'Senza Tregua,' then the Prima Linea group, therefore doesn't change anything in my life or my practice of militancy. It is only a natural extension of it. Besides, when the Prima Linea is formed in 1976, it declares that it wants to be an 'armed military structure' in the service of workers. In other words, the workers were supposed to be able to call upon it to execute attacks on persons or property within the context of their more general struggle against exploitation. Obviously, this has never been the case. I understand that the idea may seem bizarre to you; at the time it seemed wise to us, and apt to encourage some revolutionary 'shortcuts.'"

"I am saying 'us' to represent solidarity, and so as not to appear to be evading my responsibility. The court considers that I was among the leaders

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of Prima Linea and that I therefore could not be unaware of what was going on: from the assassination of Brigadier General Ciotta to the assassination of Judge Emilio Alessandrini. In fact, I was already on the fringes of the organization. In reality, I began not to be in agreement with it in 1977, for it was at this time that the fringes of the so-called "youth movement," who had no political training, entered organizations such as the Red Brigades or Prima Linea. Prima Linea increases meaningless attacks. The little guys set out, totally feeble-minded, rubbing their hands and asking every night: 'So, what military action are we taking tomerrow?' Fine. As for me, I would have preferred to continue my studies devoted to financial capital. But the organization didn't want any worthless research. It asked us for cards and people's names, saying: 'Comrades, we must be productive and effective.'"

"Thus we come to my departure from Prima Linea in September 1979 after the Bordighera Congress. The armed struggle had shown its true face: a private war between the apparatus of state and the armed groups. We had lost all contact first with the big plants, and then with the small ones. We no longer had a single militant worker. I began to tell myself that our analysis of the situation had probably not been right and that it was necessary to go back to the mass movements as they were and as the working class had chosen them. Only, look: when I told the others of my intention to leave, they asked me to perform a 'last act' to show everyone that I was part of the organization and that I didn't intend to betray it. It involved a 'knee-capping.' I refused."

"Did I participate in armed activities? Yes, but not in this one. A few Molotov cocktails, two hold-ups intended to finance our group."

Outcasts Like Us

"I fled. I needed some space to try to understand the failure of Prima Linea, the failure of the armed struggle, our mistakes, and also the mistakes of others. So I thought a lot about repression. It has become extremely effective in Italy, but it will not be enough. I believe more in reforms which bring freedom than in those which take it away. I should be ashamed, you are saying to yourself, to make such remarks; I, who at the time 'covered' armed actions which hardly increased freedom. Perhaps. I do not know. I only know that I am seeing clearly today, that I recognize our failure, but that repression alone would not be able to stop terrorism."

"Of course, now you are going to tell me: 'But then, you must talk. You must tell the courts everything. You must turn yourself in and pay for your mistakes. Terrorism has still caused close to 100 deaths. Tell everything.' But I continue to have nothing in common with this state, which is still the employers' state, and under current circumstances I am only seeking to halt a machine which is crushing 2,000 people: all those who are in prison or have fled abroad. Let's stop the machine, limit the waste. This is why, although I am against informing, on the other hand, I am convinced of the need for a public 'dissociation' effort, a vast attempt at explanation. As for turning myself in, do you really believe in the redeeming nature of prison, of systems based on paying off sentences?"

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"Besides, let's be serious. I have nothing to negotiate with the state. As I said at the beginning, I left the armed struggle with my head bowed, slinking along the walls. Terrorism has destroyed a politically and socially immature generation. The time has come for outcasts like us to return, or to turn, to reading and to study. For example, to humbly understand the worker's world today. But don't infer from this that I now belong to the 'historic Left.' The Left too has made mistakes. Obviously, you are right; it hasn't killed anyone. This is very important indeed. But, can it remain aloof from those who now recognize their aberrations?"

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FOOTNOTES

- 1. Palmiro Togliatti, former secretary general of the Italian Communist Party.
- 2. 12 December 1969: 16 deaths.
- 3. "Knee-cappings": shooting in the legs.

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SPAIN

SUMMARY OF BOMBINGS IN 1981

Madrid SUMARIO DE BOMBAS ANO 1981 in Spanish 1982 pp 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 16, 19, 20, 23

[Booklet published by the Office of the Explosives Deactivation Squad]

[Text] Index

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 - -Map of Bombing Incidents in 1981
 - -Chart of Incidents in 1981, by Months
 - -Chart by Days of Week
 - -Chart Comparing 1977 With 1981
- --Categories of Bombing Incidents in 1981 (Real, False Alarms, Simulated, Bomb Threats and Preventive Searches)
 - -Chart Giving Totals for 1981, With Percentages
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- -- Types of Devices, Objectives and Resulting Effects
 - -Distribution of Real Devices by Objectives and Categories
 - -Real Devices in 1981
 - -Explosive Material Recovered in 1980
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- -Deactivated Devices or Those Which Exploded
- -Damage Caused by Devices and Money Saved by the EDE's of the National Police
- --Conclusion

Introduction

Of the three principal methods whereby terrorist activity is carried out (psychological action, armed action and action with explosives), action with explosives is basically combatted in Spain by the Explosives Deactivation Equads (UDE's) of the National Police.

This terrorist activity and its response by the UDE's in 1981 is what we are graphically trying to show in this SUMMARY OF BOMBINGS IN 1981. A thorough examination of the information presented reveals phenomena already known, on the one hand, and, on the other, a clear picture of interesting and, at first glance, unusual aspects for one who is not a qualified specialist in antibomb combat.

To make it easier to read and aid in a rapid understanding of its contents and the significance of the appropriate and necessary comparisons, the SUM-MARY OF BOMBINGS IN 1981 consists basically of graphs and diagrams. However, this method of presenting data does not preclude a rather broad analysis of the situation despite the brevity of the contents.

The conclusions will be obvious to the reader, but certain ones merit special attention. In this method of combating crime, we note a substantial increase in the effectiveness of the police; the curve of terrorist action with explosives has clearly dropped in the past 3 years. This is due to political and social factors whose analysis is not a part of this summary and also--as we have just said--to a substantial improvement in police action; in this respect, it should be pointed out that, in a nutshell, the UDE's have achieved noteworthy perfection in their operative methods. This high degree of success is certainly due to the experience they acquired during 7 very difficult years in which they had to pay a bloody tribute in the form of five dead and three dischied in the line of duty.

Terminology

Real Device

This is a set of components arranged in such a manner that, under certain conditions, it can produce an explosion. The components are: a detonator and an explosive.

Moreover, if the device is pyrotechnic, it needs a fuse; if it is electric, it requires a source of energy.

When, instead of an explosive, the device contains an inflammable arrangement, it is converted into an incendiary bomb. And the device may contain a combination of the two arrangements.

Bomb Threat

This is a threat which, for various reasons, may be transmitted orally, in writing or by telephone. When it is real, it may result in damage to persons and property. When it is false, it may produce panic and alarm on the part of the one who receives it.

False Alarm

This is a circumstance in which, due to a threat or the discovery of an unknown object, an alarm is sounded which subsequently proves to be unjustified.

Simulated Device

In the strictest sense, this is a device which contains all the components of a real device except the explosive.

However, the term "simulated" is also applied to a bundle or package which is arranged and placed in such a manner that its objective is to deceive and cause the same alarm which would be produced by a real device.

Preventive Search


A preventive measure taken to assure that no explosive or incendiary device is in the place being searched, even though no threat or other cause for suspicion has been received.

The greatest number of incidents occurs in Guipuzcoa which has a drastic increase in the number of such crimes compared with 1980.


With regard to the various months--as shown on the following page--we see how the "long hot summer" presents a "hotter" panorama, particularly in July. On the other hand, January is the most tranquil month.


The days of the week--also shown on the following page--shows that Monday is the most "active," while Sunday is almost a day of rest. It is curious how this aspect has changed in the past few years; in 1977, the most active day was Thursday; and it slowly changed, going successively from Wednesday to Tuesday and, finally, to Monday. That is to say, it changed from a European pattern to an American pattern.


Finally, the comparative charts for the last 5 years shows us the spectacular increase in terrorist action during the 1977-1979 period and the gradual decline in the last 2 years.



Map shows total number of incidents by UDE's, 1981








Key:

- 1. Incidents
- 2. Year



Comparative Graphs
(January through December)


Commentary


The proportion of real devices to total incidents--10.36 percent--remains at similar levels to those of previous years.

As for bomb threats--generally by telephone--which amount to about 11.8 percent of the total, it should be pointed out that many of them are made in education centers and, significantly, more frequently in May and June.

With reference to cities, we see that the most conflictive is San Sebastian, with the number of real devices reaching the astonishing figure of 60 in 1981. Then come Bilbao with 48, Madrid with 42 and Barcelona with 37. Despite its being a part of the Basque Country, Vitoria has a low incidence--7 real devices--similar to the provinces of Alicante, Sevilla and Palma de Mallorca, and lower than Oviedo, Valencia and Pontevedra (Vigo).

As for the lowest point in real devices, we have Ceuta with none and Badajoz with only one.





Key:

- 1. Preventive search
- 2. False alarms
- 3. Bomb threats
 4. Real devices
- 5. Simulated devices

- 6. Bomb threats7. Simulated devices8. Preventive searches
- 9. Real devices 10. False alarms

Commentary

Most of the real devices have appeared in the streets of our cities, well placed near terrorist objectives, or in placards.

Significantly, the use of military material in these crimes has considerably increased. Generally speaking, its point of origin is Soviet or American. In some instances, French.

Industrial installations and, more especially, the Iberduero Company also show up with a high level of real devices, occupying third place.

Fortunately, postal terror has had a minimum number of incidents.

With regard to explosives, we see in the tables and circular charts (pages 19 and 20) that in 1981 a greater quantity was recovered than in 1980. We notice in 1981 the absence of the Czechoslovak explosive, Semtex-H, used almost exclusively by Armenian groups operating in Spain, and the small amount recovered in 1980. We also note a definite decrease in the use of Amonal, normally of French origin, and a spectacular increase in powders. The latter is correlated in point 7 of the CONCLUSION (page 23), where we see an increase in activity by radical minority groups which generally use explosives of low shattering power, such as gunpowders used for hunting, homemade powders, etc.


(1) XP (2) THT (3) NAGOLITA(4) SENTEX-H(5) DESCONOCIDO (5) DESCONOCIDO (6) (6) (6) (7) POLYORA (8) (9)

Key:

- 1. XP
- 2. TNT
- Nagolita
 Semtex-H
- 5. Unknown

- 6. Goma-2E
- 7. Amonal
- 8. Powders
- 9. Molotov cocktails

Item	Quantity	Item	Quantity
XP	1.2 kg	ETA grenades	28
TNT	3.0 kg	Military projectors	129
Nagolita	1.3 kg	Molotov cocktails	107
Semtex-H	3.5 kg	Electric detonators	105
Powder	82.3 kg	Pyrotechnic detonators	352
Amona 1	8.0 kg	****	
Unknown	112.0 kg	Detonating rope	179 meters
Goma-2E	275.0 kg	Slow fuse	903 meters



1.	Nagolita	5.	Goma-2e
2.	Amona 1	6.	Molotov cocktails
3.	Powders	7.	Hydromite
4.	Sulfur and potassium chlorate	8.	TNT

Item	Quantity	Item	Quantity
Nagolita	0.2 kg	Molotov cocktails	86
Amona1 ;	13.0 kg	Pyrotechnic charges	130
Goma-2E	433.0 kg	Electric charges	131
Sulfur and potassium chlorate	9.4 kg	ETA grenades	26
Powders	18.0 kg	Military projectiles	68
TNT	10.0 kg	Gas bottles	10
Hydromite	30.0 kg	Sulfuric acid	5 liters
•	_	Detonating rope	391 meters
Cyanide	1.0 kg	Slow fuse	82 meters

Conclusion

Compared with previous years, we can draw the following very simple conclusions:

- 1. Considerable decrease in terrorist activity, 1981 showing the lowest incidence of the past 3 years.
- 2. Significant increase in the number of bombing incidents in Guipuzcoa.
- 3. Decrease in the number of real devices in Madrid.
- 4. Increase in the recovery of explosive material and detonators.
- 5. Growing use of military material by terrorist groups.
- 6. Also growing use of systems for activating devices at some distance through radio-control apparatuses. This is a cause for great concern on the part of the Office of the Explosives Deactivation Squad (JUDE).
- 7. Appreciable increase in the number of real devices of an elemental structure and of lower power (homemade powders, etc.) by terrorist groups of little apparent significance (Terra Lliure, Extreme Right, etc.).
- 8. Low incidence, compared with previous years, of devices placed by the GRAPO [First of October Armed Revolutionary Groups].

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TERRORISM IN SPAIN

Barcelona EL TERRORISMO EN ESPANA in Spanish 1982 pp 51-98

[Chapter 2 of the book "Terrorism in Spain" by Alejandro Munoz Alonso, Planeta Publishers, Inc.; translations of the table of contents and chapters 1, 3, 4 and 5 of the book were published in previous issues of the WORLDWIDE REPORT: TERRORISM—passages enclosed in slatlines were printed in italics in the original]

[Text] Chapter II: The Challenge

"We cannot accept activities other than those that have extermination as their objective but we do recognize that those activities can make use of the most varied procedures: poison, a knife, rope, etc. In this struggle, the revolution sanctifies all means, no matter how violent." Sergio Nechaev, "Principles of the Revolution," 1869

Summary

The Arias-Fraga stage (December 1975-July 1976)
Rebirth and baptism of GRAPO
ETA: between truce and internal problems; the "Pertur" case
GRAPO and the far right against the reform: winter of 1977-78
The tragic week: the Atocha massacre
From provocation to amnesty
Case of marginal terrorism: the MPAIAC

The Arias-Fraga Stage (December 1975-July 1976)

With Franco's death, the democratic expectations of the immense majority of the citizens in Spain rose. No one believed in the continuity of Francoism in spite of the fact that the old dictator had stated that he had left everything "tied and well tied." However, fears persisted since no one was ignorant of the enormous possibilities of the minority but powerful sectors that wanted to prolong the authoritarian system. It was true that the first gestures of the king had wakened many hopes but it remained to be seen how they would be carried out. The inclusion of conservative men with reformist leanings like Fraga or Areilza in the first government of the monarchy, still headed by Arias who had been confirmed, fed these hopes. Some thought that the inexact and still remote democratic horizons made terrorism meaningless. In fact, the idea was widespread that terrorism was the extreme and spontaneous reaction against the dictatorship and that when this disappeared, terrorism would fade like a nightmare, the aberrant fruit of the lack of freedom.

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This optimistic viewpoint was abetted by the fact that ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group], the most dangerous terrorist organization, seemed to have established a truce from the very first signs of the seriousness of Franco's illness. Hardly anyone realized that this "truce" might be due to the fact that both branches of the ETA had received the most devastating blows in all its history from July to September as we explained in the previous chapter rather than to a prudent hope of the members of the ETA. Some of the most prominent ETA leaders had fallen into the hands of the police. Under these conditions, the immediate continuation of this Basque organization's terrorist activity was not easy.

However, if the ETA seemed to take a breather in order to resume its terrorist activity in a more systematic and extensive way—as would be seen later—the organizations of the far right carried out attacks in the Spanish Basque Country and in French zones near the border. Cars belonging to Basque refugees and to French citizens were damaged or destroyed in Hendaya, Biarritz, San Juan de Luz and Bayona. Even in Paris a bookstore belonging to the Anarchist Federation was destroyed by the GCR [Guerrillas of Christ the King]. This organization and the ATE [Anti-Terrorist Group of ETA] claimed responsibility for the attacks. Different establishments like bars, businesses or lawyers' offices were also destroyed or damaged in San Sebastian and Bilbao. Leaflets were distributed in Guipuzcoa in which ATE and the GCR warned the clients of French businesses of the danger of being confused with ETA confidentes. They threatened: "You can be hurt or your car burned." Some minor attacks against property were recorded in Cataluna.

ETA's unwillingness to maintain the truce was revealed in January 1976. A group of Basque independents sounded out the Basque refugees in France—concretely, members of the ETA—about their position if the king was asked to grant a "broad amnesty." ETA made it known that "it could not stop its activities" and that it needed "signs of goodwill to consider the negotiations (of the independents) seriously." Leizaola, the /lendakari/ of the Basque government in exile, tried to add moderation but he was not heard by the ETA leaders. In an interview with the special correspondent of CAMBIO 16, Ander Landaburu, they insisted that "basically things have not changed (and) struggle will bring freedom for Euskadi." In spite of this, they indicated that "facing the armed struggle, the tasks are not the same under a situation of repression as they are at a time like the present." In short, they were willing to revise their tactics but not their "strategic options."

The subject of amnesty began to appear. Everyone spoke of the "amnesty" but there was no agreement on its extension or the time and context in which it should be granted. To the ETA, the subject was clear; only a total amnesty ("let the jails be emptied forever") could be acceptable to them. Their petitions included another long series of political conditions like selfdetermination for Euskadi including Navarra. These statements meant any agreement was impossible and, therefore, implied the continuation of terrorism.

Proof of the determination of ETA to continue "the armed struggle" came in the same month. On Tuesday, 13 January, ETA (p-m) [ETA (political-military] kid-napped industrialist Jose Luis Arrasate in Berriz (Vizcaya), breaking into

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his home at about 9:30 pm. Apparently they were looking for his 72-year-old father who had the same name and was owner of Forjas de Berriz but they accepted the substitution of the 26-year-old son. The kidnappers left a letter demanding a ransom of 100 million pesetas "in exchange for his life."

It had been exactly 3 years since ETA had kidnapped anyone, the last being in Huarte in January 1973. This action against Arrasate who did not have any political affiliations caused great tension in ETA (p-m) between the leadership who had not decided on this type of action and the base commands, the /bereziak/, who apparently did the kidnapping spontaneously. The Basque refugee circles called the kidnapping a "serious political mistake." The kidnapping lasted until 19 February with complex negotiations hindered by the internal dissension in the ETA (p-m).

A few days later, on 18 February, a civil guard (Manuel Vergara Jimenez) died in Villafranca de Ordicia (Guipuzcoa) when he tried to remove a Basque flag or /ikurrina/ that had a bomb behind it. ETA (m) [ETA (military)] claimed responsibility for the attack. It was necessary to yield to the evidence that the truce, whether voluntary or forced, had ended and that a new terrorist escalation had begun. The timid measures taken by the government to confront the Basque problem were not going to convince anyone, especially the ETA. At the end of January, a committee to study a special government for the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa was formed. A Carlist member of the Francoist Cortes, Gabriel Zubiaga, even resigned as spokesman of that committee to which he had just been appointed in protest of what he felt was an inadequate proposal.

On 9 February, ETA (m) assassinated the mayor of Galdacano, Victor Legorburu, gunning him down in the street in Cizurquil (Guipuzcoa). The next day a youth, Julian Galarza, was also murdered, apparently by mistake. The terrorist actions spread, expanding the range of possible victims. The young Galarza, murdered by mistake, had been confused with the mayor, according to some people. That led to the belief that ETA (m) was undertaking a murder campaign against civilians in local administrations. It was learned that several months before many mayors, deputation presidents and provincial deputies had received letters signed by the ETA, threatening them with reprisal if they did not resign from their political positions.

Meanwhile, the government had repealed several articles of the Decree-Law on Prevention of Terrorism of 26 August 1975. According to penologist Marino Barbero Santos, the repealed articles were "real legal aberrations." This amendment that meant the primacy of ordinary courts over military courts was considered "the green light for the first political reform" by INFORMACIONES. To MUNDO DIARIO, "the attempted effects of the Law (on Prevention of Terrorism) were not achieved and terrorism left an even longer trail of blood after promulgating the harsh repressive measures."²

Would freedom and less harshness decrease terrorism? At least broad sectors of the people believed that. In a survey by the Consulting Institute in the Basque Country and Navarra, 39 percent felt that terrorism increased with the Law on Prevention of Terrorism. Only 8 percent believed that terrorism decreased while about 48 percent felt that it remained the same. Also 52 percent believed that more terrorist acts occur with limited political freedom.

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The great hope of almost all the Spaniards beat on. When freedom and democracy were achieved, terrorism would disappear. Unfortunately, almost daily the news revealed the terrorist epidemic. Although greater freedom was breathed in the Spanish atmosphere and journalists, politicians of the still illegal opposition and citizens in general /felt/ freer, the laws had not changed. It was preferable to speak of tolerance rather than freedom. From time to time, the authorities gave reminders of this, making the harshness of the existing Francoist laws felt.

ETA (m) which had harshly criticized Arrasate's kidnapping continued to expand its terrorist targets. On 1 March, Emilio Guezara Aramburu, a bus inspector, was shot to death in Lezo while walking with a relative who was also wounded. The victim had been threatened before and was considered a police informer. It was no longer a matter of men in uniform or civilians in official positions. Any type of ideological proximity with the "incumbent" sufficed for the ETA (m) to find justification to act.

This March was going to be the bloodiest month since Franco's death. On 3 March, a general strike that had been smoldering for some time because of labor conflicts paralyzed the city of Vitoria. The police brutally forced their way into San Francisco de Asis Church where some 5,000 people were meeting. Teargas grenades were thrown and the terrified crowd ran out into the street. The police fired and killed four people and wounded a hundred. The impact of the news was indescribable. The reaction produced a general strike throughout the Basque Country. There were demonstrations and riots and, as a result of the incidents, a youth, Vicente Antonio Ferrero, was shot in the head and died in Basauri.

The Vitoria incidents were a sign of the failure of the pseudoreformist policy of the Arias government. Fraga, minister of government, was out of the country when these events occurred but los: his credibility. His reformist image that showed him as the only man who could bring democracy to Spain faded day after day. It was replaced by the image of a harsh politician, obsessed with order and incapable of starting the indispensable dialogue to lay the foundations for democracy in Spain.

Terrorism of the far right also continued with a series of attacks which were almost never claimed. The press and journalists were the preferred targets of these commands. On 2 March, Jose Antonio Martinez Soler, editor of the magazine DOBLON, was kidnapped by four hooded men who took him out in the country and treated him savagely. First he was subjected to an "indoctrination" interrogation. Finally, he was ordered to leave the country within 3 days under pain of death.

The weekly CAMBIO 16 received a package containing a bomb that fortunately did not explode. Victor Cardoso, Vitoria correspondent of the newspaper PUEBLO, also was the target of physical aggression. It was obvious that the continuist sectors perceived the function that the press fulfilled in the democratization process and proposed to cut it off at its roots.

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In that same month of March which we have already called very bloody, ETA (m) murdered a taxi driver from Guetaria (Guipuzcoa), Manuel Albiza, on 14 March. ETA (m) continued its policy to expand its selective terrorism.

The new political situation seemed to have changed the objectives of ETA (m). If we use Robert Moss' terminology distinguishing three types of terrorism-repressive, defensive and offensive-ETA (m) went from the last ("used against a political regime or system") to a variant of /repressive terrorism/, "doing away with 'traitors' and silencing critics." The murders of people who did not belong to the FOP [Public Order Forces] but were considered police "informers" or "Hispanists" no doubt came under this objective.

The murders of mayors and other local administrators obeyed the idea of viewing them as "denationalization agents" and representatives of "Hispanism." Also let us not forget that Krutwig, in his VASCONIA, suggested the creation of "parallel hierarchies" considered "the spinal column on which the entire subversive organization rests." Possibly ETA also had in mind another experience in the destruction of a local government structure. In Cyprus during the struggle for /enosis/ or union with Greece in the second half of the 1950's, local authorities were one of the favorite targets of the terrorist organization EOKA [National Organization of Cypriot Fighters]. On 28 October 1955, Archbishop Makarios, one of the leaders of the fight against the British occupation, asked all the /mukhtars/ or mayors of the Greek-Cypriot towns to resign. Since only one-fifth had resigned by the end of the year, EOKA assassinated three who stook out for their pro-British tendencies. Within a month, 80 percent resigned and there were no more problems with the /mukhtars/. Then the EOKA launched a campaign against the police. As can be seen, the ETA followed the reverse order.

On 18 March, ETA (p-m) kidnapped Angel Berazadi, managing director of Sigma, the most important enterprise in Elgoibar (Guipuzcoa). The terrorist organization did not claim responsibility for the kidnapping until 22 March; some days later, it was learned that ETA (p-m) was asking 200 million in ransom. The purely Basque family which abounded in nationalists carried out negotiations with great discretion.

On the day before this kidnapping, ETA (m) had attacked Eloy Ruiz Cortadi in Portugalete (Vizcaya). He was wounded and died a few days later. Apparently he was close to the far right. These organizations, concretely the one called ATE, did not relent in violent replies, answering the ETA terrorism with their own terrorist acts. On 21 March, in the French town of San Juan de Luz, a member of the ETA, Tomas Perez Revilla, was shot as he drove home. His wife was seriously wounded and he was slightly wounded in the head. On 23 March, a chalet near Guernica owned by Jesus Erezuma was destroyed by a bomb. Apparently it was a mistake but a few days later another nearby chalet owned by Domingo Anzalu, a member of the Guernica municipal government who was indicted for alleged aid to ETA, was destroyed. Other establishments of persons considered close to ETA were damaged. Incre were also many threats like those received by Bandres who complained that, in spite of having reported them, there was no investigation. ATE took responsibility in all these cases and, on occasion, left its "signature" painted on the debris of the damaged or

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destroyed buildings. On at least one occasion—threats received by a Vitoria psychiatrist, Jose Miguel Aguirre—a new, unknown organization appeared: MAS [expansion unknown]. In Madrid several of the threatening letters that book—stores received were signed by a Committee for National Salvation. Throughout the month of March, the threats to the press or to people known for their liberal tendencies did not stop. EL CORREO DE ANDALUCIA and its editor were intimidated, reminding them of the treatment received by Martinez Soler, editor of DOBLON. In Valencia the journalists were threatened ("You will not give yourselves up as victims") by GADVI [Antipolitical Group for the Defense of True Information]. Doctor Carreras of Barcelona who moved in professional circles was beaten and playwright Buero Vallejo, author of "En la ardiente oscuridad," an allegory of life in jail, was threatened: "Your eyes are in danger."

Meanwhile, the first Pro-Amnesty Groups that aspired to become associations under the law appeared. Thus, on 15 March, the Guipuzcoa group delivered its statutes to the civil government and introduced itself to the public. Such well-known people as Bandres, Castells and the sculptor Chillida belonged to them.

Also reports of torture or "bad treatment" began. One example was Perurena Lizalazu arrested on 27 August 1975. The next day she had to be hospitalized and the doctor attributed her condition to "bad treatment received at the Commissariat." Some months earlier, the press had reported on the case of Jose Matute Fernandez, the chief inspector assigned to Tenerife, who was tried for the homicide of a student, Antonio Gonzalez Ramos. The indictment acknowledged torture. A few weeks later, many newspapers reproduced the photograph of a Navarra worker, Amparo Arangoa. According to a medical certificate, she had many contusions on her buttocks, legs and the soles of her feet and kidney and bowel failure with a poor prognosis.

All these things demonstrated that something was beginning to change, albeit very slowly. Freedoms were won inch by inch by the uncontainable pressure of the political forces still not legalized, the press and the demands of a society that aspired to complete emancipation. It was still thought that to some ism would diminish as freedom expanded. This was precisely one of the aguments that was brandished to ask that the political reform, which was practically paralyzed, be started up at once.

At the beginning of April, the subject of ETA terrorism became big news, occupying the largest headlines in the newspapers since the events started piling up. On Monday, 5 April, the most spectacular group prison break in the memory of Spain occurred: 29 political prisoners escaped from the Segovia will through the water pipes. Of these, 24 belonged to the different branches of ETA; the other 5 belonged to FRAP [People's Action Revolutionary Front] and MIL [Iberian Liberation Movement]. The escape was perfectly planned although apparently it was moved up since a transfer of prisoners to Soria was expected. With vehicles waiting for them outside, the fugitives managed to practically reach the French border near Valcarlos. The FOP organized an equally spectacular dragnet and managed to arrest almost all the fugitives as

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well as members of the outside command who had collaborated in the escape. One Catalan fugitive, Oriol Sole, died in the confrontations between the Civil Guard and the fugitives. Only four of the prisoners and one of the members of the outside command managed to escape. It was said that they went to France but some days later, on 15 April, they were found in a chalet in Espinal by its owner, Jose Maria Rodriguez Azcarate. The fugitives gagged Mr Rodriguez Azcarate and his companion, took his automobile and fled to France. Later they were banished to the island of Yeu.

On 8 April when the dragnet for the Segovia fugitives still continued, a new incident confused the situation even more. Angel Berazadi, the industrialist kidnapped on 18 March, was found dead on a secondary highway near Elgoibar from a shot in the back of his head. The news was received with disbelief since no one thought it would reach such a fatal outcome. The negotiations between the family and the kidnappers had continued in spite of the fact that the government revealed that it was opposed to the payment of ransom and would not permit the 200 million pesetas demanded by the ETA to go to France. It was impressive to learn that one of the sons-in-law of the victim had an appointment in France that same morning to finalize details of the agreement.

The reaction was unanimous. No other terrorist attack had aroused such a wide-spread movement of condemnation. The Basque government in exile condemned the deed as did all the Basque opposition parties. Even the Communist Movement of Euskadi called it an "act lacking political meaning."

The government through Fraga, its vice president and minister of government, stated: "The government fully assumes the responsibility of its decisions... but the terrorists should know that since they want war, they will have it with all its consequences." There was also a definition-description of ETA as seen by the government: "The true nature of ETA, fanatic minority of weaklings that —in a declared war with the Basque people and Spain—shows its contempt for the most elementary sense of humanity and its determination to resort to the cruelest means in its desire to subdue a community through terror."

The press generally and categorically condemned the murder. INFORMACIONES thought that "the cold-blooded murder by ETA must spur on the rate of implementation of the democratic formulas and atmosphere in Spain desired by the majority of the Spaniards. Irrational violence will be overcome by the desire for peaceful coexistence. The reaction against those who murder cold-bloodedly must also be in cold blood."

CAMBIO 16 headlined an editorial "Against ETA, Freedom" and began by stating: "If ETA loses the tacit support of a large part of the Basque people—expressed by the clandestine political parties in the region, among others—its prompt disintegration is inevitable. The implacable murder of Angel Berazadi, a cruelty and stupidity beyond all limits, might constitute that point of no return....The main factor leading to the disintegration of ETA is General Franco's death and the promises—only promises—that the dictatorship will be replaced by democracy." In line with what was considered obvious by very broad sectors of the public, it indicated further: "The problem of ETA is not a police problem but a political problem." It ended saying that, once there was

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"an institutional democratic framework...then, and only then, the problem of terrorism will be a leftover affair that the police can solve."

Never since the attack on the street of Correo 1-1/2 years before had there been such an intense reaction. Possibly the emotional surprise was due to the fact that Berazadi, the fifth person kidnapped by ETA, was the first to be killed. No one understood how a man like him-defender of the Basque culture and, according to some circles, a "dues payer" to the ETA for more than 8 years--who was even considered a sympathizer of the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] could have been selected as a victim. This was especially true since it was known that the family was willing to pay the ransom that, according to some reports, had been reduced to 18 million.

LE MONDE published an editorial entitled "Spain, Obsessed by Violence" in which it stated: "Never has an act of terrorism committed in cold blood aroused such unanimous reproval....All the sectors of the public have solemnly denounced an act that, in their eyes, is not only a crime but also a political aberration."

The government had deployed massive forces to find the kidnappers and watch the border to prevent passage of the ransom money to France. It increased the number of its members operating in the north, first to keep the fugitives from going across the border and also to hunt down Berazadi's kidnappers-murderers. "The Great Roundup" was the headline on the cover of CAMBIO 16. The magazine felt that it was "the first great battle (of the government of the monarchy) against the ETA Basque separatists." The magazine reported that official secrecy about the police work had been established for some hours and, in addition to those arrested for the escape from Segovia, the capture of three members of the command allegedly connected to Berazadi's kidnapping and murder (Agustin Echenaga, Jose Ignacio Egarra and Jose Maria Aldaluz) was reported. At the same time, almost a dozen apartments and many weapons were discovered. A total of 87 people were arrested including ETA sympathizers, members and collaborators in different parts of Basque Country.

Berazadi's murder caused a crisis in the heart of ETA (p-m) which led to the resignation of some leaders of the organization including /Pertur/. Informed sources claimed the inspirer of Berazadi's and Arrasate's kidnapping was Miguel Angel Apalategui alias /Apala/, one of the key men of ETA (p-m).

The government had obtained cooperation from the French police after a meeting between Fraga and his French colleague, Michel Poniatowski. Consequently, on 6 April, six Basque refugees were banished to the island of Yeu. Two Spanish policemen (Jesus Maria Gonzalez and Jose Luis Martinez) disappeared in Hendaya 2 days earlier as they left a movie theater. The Spanish consul in Bayona, Mariano Baselga, presented the appropriate report to the local court in that French city. There was widespread deployment of the French police and, apparently, ETA (m) files, armaments and money were discovered. However, the policemen were not found.

The atmosphere of tension and the sensitivity of the Spaniards toward the terrorism received a new blow on 11 April when civil guard Miguel Gordo Garcia was electrocuted in Baracaldo trying to take down an /ikurrina/. The day

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before a Basque activist (Imanel Garmendia) had died in a confrontation with the Civil Guard. In this situation, it was not strange that political prospects dimmed and a new hardening was evident in the government. In statements to the NEW YORK TIMES on 1 January, Fraga had admitted the possibility of an amnesty, once the Penal Code and the Antiterrorist Law were amended. On 30 March, he told GIORNALE D'ITALIA: "There is no possibility of an amnesty because there is no reason for it or any legal basis." The clamor for amnesty, however, did not stop. From the most diverse sectors of the country, voices were raised, feeling that the amnesty was indispensable to construct a future of peace. It was also believed that when the amnesty returned all the political prisoners to their homes, terrorism would lose another of its "reasons" to be.

Berazadi's murder resulted in the parties other than the /abertzale/ left announcing that they would not attend the commemorations of /Aberri Eguna/ which had to be held in Pamplona because of "the serious tension created by all the different incidents in the past several weeks."

The atmosphere of violence did not change and again reached a dramatic level as a result of the incidents in Montejurra due to the traditional celebration that the Carlist Party organized there. When the followers of Carlos Hugo de Borbon-Parma were about to reach the peak of the historic mountain, they met a group of far rightists under the command of Carlos Hugo's brother, Sixto, well known for his fascist positions. The far rightists who included the GCR and apparently former Portuguese "Pides" and Argentine members of the AAA [Anti-Communist Apostolic Alliance] kept Carlos Hugo's followers from reaching the peak by firing at them. One person stood out in the shoot-out, "the man in the gaberdine" who turned out to be Army Commander Marin Verde. One youth, Ricardo Garcia Pellejero, was killed in the shoot-out. Three people were seriously wounded and many were slightly wounded. One of those seriously wounded, Aniano Gimenez Santos, died 4 days later. The Carlist Party presented a report accusing the government of not having prevented what indications several days earlier showed would be a pitched battle. The mobilization of the far right had been apparent in Madrid and in the Montejurra area. There were arrests but the government never explained the obscure points of those incidents nor cleared up its responsibility. As in the tragedy in Vitoria at the beginning of March, Fraga, the vice president for domestic affairs and minister of the government, was not in Spain. As he repeated many times in the following months concerning Vitoria as well as Montejurra, in his absence the secretary general of the Movement, Adolfo Suarez, was in charge of his department.

Although there were still attacks, ETA terrorist activity did not become intense again until October 1976. During the search for Berazadi and the same day as the escape from Segovia (5 April), ETA murdered Dr Jose Maria Garrido Lazaro in Santurce. On 3 May, a corporal in the Civil Guard, Antonio de Frutos Sualdea, died in Legazpia when a bomb exploded. The bomb, activated from a distance, exploded when the civil guard's car went down a road near Legazpia (Guipuzcoa).

On the following day, 4 May, the newspaper EL PAIS appeared for the first time. Reporting the above attack, it used it to "make an express condemnation of

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this criminal act and an unequivocal expression of its rejection of violence as a way to resolve political and ideological differences." It continued: "We hold the conviction that a democratic state with complete guarantees of individual rights and freedoms will be an effective curb to terrorism. Also we believe that, along with the action of the forces of order to combat the armed groups that operate in the Basque Country, only a political solution can end the situation there."

As is seen, with the exception of the far right and Francoist sectors, the news media almost unanimously felt that the best remedy for terrorism was democratic freedoms. Political solutions rather than police measures would be able to end terrorism. Some years later when the "political solutions" became reality in the form of freedoms, a constitution, autonomy and statutes, these hopes would dry up. The problem of terrorism did not obey such simple and optimistic plans. They would insist then on the need for appropriate legal instruments, greater police effectiveness, strictness in the Judicial Branch and even exceptional measures. They would understand, then, the international dimension of terrorism and even declare "dirty war" in order to eradicate it.

In June, ETA carried out one fatal attack. The victim was Luis Carlos Albo Llamosa, local leader of the Basauri Movement (Vizcaya) who was machine-gunned while waiting at a stop sign. A few days later, ETA distributed a communique in which it threatened: "Albo has been executed. We will do the same to all who are opposed to our people freely deciding their national and social destiny."

The scant ETA terrorist activity was due to the fact that during this period the political-military branch especially was reorganizing. It must not be forgotten that already, at the end of 1975, an internal report described "the bad organizational situation of ETA (p-m)": "Some 500 members were imprisoned, refugees packed the few houses available in northern Euskadi and were persecuted by the French state, the internal infrastructure was seriously hurt and only at the military level was there a complete command in operating condition." Later we will concern ourselves with this reorganizational stage of ETA (p-m).

If the ETA terrorism went through a period of dormancy, the same did not occur with the attacks of the far right which became epidemic in several parts of national territory.

On 24 June, the newspaper EL PAIS published an account of the acts of "white terrorism" in the Basque Country so far that year, listing almost 50 attacks from attempted kidnapping to explosions and threats. The newspaper pointed out that such acts endangered lives and "have sown terror in broad areas." It also emphasized that "until now, it is not known if any of the alleged perpetrators of these deeds has been arrested." According to the Madrid newspaper, the far rightist groups appeared "under the most diverse initials." It cited the already known ones of ATE and GCR and the recent OVA [Organization of Antiterrorist Volunteers] and CUD [expansion unknown].

A special target of the far right was the Antiguo district in San Sebastian. The Neighborhood Association in that district wrote a report that it presented to the mayor, asking for more protection and requesting that "as many inquiries

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and investigations as needed be carried out to help curb these clearly terroristic criminal actions that a group of enemies of society is perpetrating under the name of Christ the King."

However, the far right did not make its presence felt just in the Basque Country. At 2:10 am on 16 June, two men destroyed the Club Juvenil Beato in the Madrid district of Usera. Parish groups, neighborhood associations and relatives published notes alluding to the "chain of attacks and threats" suffered in the district.

Around the same time a group called CAS [Santander Antipornographic Campaign] appeared in Santander. It threatened the kiosks that sold certain magazines. There was also a wave of letter-bombs in Madrid, many of them addressed to theater critics like Amoros, Garcia Rico and Gassent and signed by the GCR. EL PAIS stated: "The explosive letters are the most recent method that the uncontrolled groups of the far right have used against news professionals to limit their work."

On 1 July, the president of the government, Arias Navarro, was summoned to the Palacio de Oriente by the king. The meeting ended with the resignation of the veteran Francoist politician. This ended a political situation that had become indefensible in recent months. Arias had shown himself to be absolutely incapable of piloting the necessary and desired political reform. In statements to Arnaud de Borchgrave for NEWSWEEK, the king himself had called Arias an "unmitigated disaster." Under these circumstances, it was obvious that the days of the Arias government were numbered.

Once the president of the government resigned, the mechanics planned by the Francoist laws still in effect began. Accordingly, the Council of the Kingdom —where some of the most intransigent Francoists like Giron had sought refuge —had to give the king a slate of names from which the chief of state would select the president of the government. With all these steps carried out, the name picked by King Juan Carlos I was announced on the afternoon of Saturday, 3 July. From the slate containing the names of Gregorio Lopez Bravo, Federico Silva Munoz and Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez, the king chose the last. Adolfo Suarez was the youngest and most obscure of those named. A typical Movement man, he had spent his entire political career in its ranks, following the strictest Francoist orthodoxy. In the Arias government, he had been secretary general of the Movement, last stronghold of classic Falangism. Therefore, it was not surprising that his appointment fell like a cold shower on many sectors. An article in EL PAIS by Ricardo de la Cierva became famous. It had the significant title: "What a Mistake, What an Enormous Mistake!"

However, others valued his youth and recent political deeds like his speech to the Cortes at the end of June, presenting the Political Associations Law. That speech contained phrases like: "If we contemplate the national reality with any sincerity, we must agree that there is not only a theoretical pluralism but also organized political forces. These forces, whether or not called parties, exist as a public fact."

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Hope was encouraged by the publication of the list of the new government on 7 July. There were no men of the democratic opposition on it but a certain reformist tinge was perceived. Francoism had finally ended and the transition began.

Then came months of intensive political activity when terrorism again revealed its presence, disproving those who trusted that any step toward democracy would make the beasts of terror retreat.

Rebirth and Baptism of GRAPO

Suarez began his mandate as president of the government in the midst of national clamor for amnesty. The traditional fiestas in so many places in Spain in July were used to ask for amnesty. It was a magic word which seemed to hold the key to the future of Spain. For the new government it was the test that, in the opinion of all the democratic parties, would show the sincerity of its proposals and promises. From Gerona to Badajoz, from Sevilla to La Coruna, from Eibar to Las Palmas in the Canary Islands, thousands of Spaniards went out into the streets asking for amnesty. Sometimes authorized, usually banned, these demonstrations expressed a single desire for total amnesty. There were many confrontations with the FOP. On 9 June, Maria Norma Menchaca, a 45-year-old woman, died from a shot in the head during an unauthorized demonstration in Santurce.

"The subject of amnesty monopolizes the attention of the country" headlined INFORMACIONES on the front page of its 12 July issue. It was expected that the subject of amnesty would be in the forefront in the next meeting of the Council of Ministers when the program of the new government would be drawn up. In its 16 July editorial entitled "Expecting Amnesty," EL PAIS saw amnesty as a "basic condition for national reconciliation and the construction of democracy." It repeated its well-known point of view: "Pacification of the Basque Country will not be achieved with weapons. The escalation of violence feeds on itself and someone has to take the first step to end that nightmare." To CAMBIO 16, the government "has the historic responsibility to initiate the construction of peace with a prompt amnesty....If this government that was born with stumbling feet makes amnesty its first step, it will be immediately strengthened and the difficult task of implementing a system based on the peace of souls and the peace of ideas will be facilitated." 11

As was expected, after its meeting on Friday, 16 July, the government issued a programmatic statement that was received favorably but with reserve. The opposition recognized that it was a step forward but felt that it did not go beyond good intentions and would wait to see it fulfilled. One of the points in the statement was that the cabinet would ask the king "in exercise of his right, to grant an amnesty applicable to crimes and offenses of political or philosophical motivation...which, in no case, applies to those who have wounded or endangered the life or physical integrity of people."

About 24 hours after the programmatic statement of the government was read, a bomb exploded in the Vigo Union House, a tragic reveille to the first 18 July since Franco's death. The powerful explosion wounded five, two seriously.

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Hours later, new explosions occurred at the monument to the dead in El Ferrol, at another union building in Barcelona, at the Falange delegation, in the Sants district of Barcelona, at the regional union delegation of Baracaldo, at another union site on the Gran Via in Bilbao, at the Ministry of Justice and the Palacio de Justicia in Madrid and at the monument to Onesimo Redondo in Labajos (Segovia). About 30 bombs exploded in all in what evidently was a well organized plan. In Madrid near the Segovia bridge, a youth, Carlos Hernandez Exposito, was shot and killed by the Civil Guard who suspected a group that fled after being told to stop. "Who placed the bombs?" asked the cover of CAMBIO 16. In its editorial with the same title, the weekly stated: "Each time we are about to advance with great difficulty along the path to normalcy and democracy, dark forces want to shatter national agreement with shots or bombings." It also pointed out that "the bombs were against amnesty" and noted the "'beneficiaries' were all those driving forces that want nothing to change here or, rather, want every change here to go backwards." 12

EL PAIS also discussed the source and, after questioning that it was far leftist groups, said in reference to the far right: "We are not saying anything new if we say that the man in the street blames the groups under this sign, so active with impunity in the Basque Country in recent months, for these deeds." It ended in complete doubt, stating: "Rather, it is one of two choices: either we are facing a new far leftist group of such dimensions that it must be asked how it was not detected to some degree before the bombs exploded or we are facing the same far rightist groups as always, a case in which any comment is superfluous." 13

Certain communiques attributed the attacks to a heretofore totally unknown organization: GRAPO [1st October Armed Revolutionary Groups]. Since no one knew anything about this organization, the questions spread. Couldn't it be a mask for the perpetual powerful sectors of the far right? To the police, the deeds smacked of OMLE [Marxist-Leninist Organization of Spain] or "far leftist groups related to FRAP." But GARI [International Revolutionary Action Group] and FRAP denied participation.

In this atmosphere of confusion, the police made about 25 arrests. On 23 July, in the regular press conference that followed the Council of Ministers meeting, Minister of Information Reguera gave the first official information. He insisted that the far right had nothing to do with the explosions and repeated that the blame fell on GRAPO "which murdered four armed police precisely on 1 October 1975." It was the first time that the responsibility for those attacks more than 9 months earlier had been attributed to a particular group. The minister of information also said that GRAPO was related to the PCE (r) [Spanish Communist Party (reformed)], itself a breakaway from OMLE. In a note published by the general director of security, this statement was repeated, imputing the attacks to one of the many Marxist-Leninist groups that directly or indirectly proceeded from the schisms in the orthodox PCE since 1964.

When the Council of Ministers met in La Coruna on 30 July, the concession of ammesty became a reality. According to journalistic calculations, the ammesty would benefit 500 people and exclude about 94 condemned for crimes of blood.

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The next day the reborn GRAPO which had already been considered "disarticulated" by the police after 20 arrests in previous days reappeared. Similar to the bombings on 18 July, new bombs exploded in Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, Sevilla and Pontevedra. Two terrorists were killed in Sevilla when the bombs they were preparing to place exploded.

GRAPO became one of the strangest enigmas in democratic Spain. As we will see, its attacks always coincided with times of progress in democratization. Its phraseology was leftist but its actions only seemed to benefit advocates of involution. Its men seemed crude but its well edited publications were incomparably more elaborate than those of other clandestine groups. Several times the police announced the complete disarticulation of GRAPO but, time and again, it was reborn from its ashes like a sinister phoenix. Later we will analyze GRAPO's significance in the Spanish democratic transition.

ETA: Between Truce and Internal Problems; "Pertur" Case

The atmosphere by the end of July 1976 was euphoric because of the amnesty but concerned about the appearance of the GRAPO phenomenon. One thing attracted attention, especially among those who followed the evolution of terrorism: the situation of ETA. On Friday, 23 July, one of the top leaders of ETA (p-m), Eduardo Moreno Bergareche alias /Pertur/, disappeared without leaving a trace. Accompanied by two other Basque refugees, /Pertur/ went to Behovia near the Spanish border. He said goodbye to his companions and nothing more was seen of him.

The first suspicion naturally fell on some of the far rightist groups that were acting in the French Basque Country. The fact that the "Spanish Basque Batallion, Emilio Guezala Command" sent a communique to the Bilbao newspaper EL CORREO ESPANOL-EL PUEBLO VASCO a few days later stating that /Pertur/ "has been executed and buried in a town in Navarra" contributed to this idea. Also the AAA, of Argentine origin but unknown until then in Spain, claimed responsibility for the deed in a note sent to EFE. It identified itself as a "guerrilla group trained militarily for guerrilla warfare with the objective of containing Marxist international terrorism supported by the KGB."

Blaming far rightist sectors for the kidnapping continued in the joint communique signed by six Basque political organizations ranging from ETA (p-m) to the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] and the PCE. EL PAIS emphasized: "Putting aside the content of the document, this is possibly the first time in recent months that Basque national groups of the left have signed a joint communique with organizations which they call /Hispanist/." The note stated that the kidnapping of the "Basque socialist patriot /Pertur/ is part of a systematic campaign of fascist repression being carried out with absolute impunity." 14

Another version appeared in the press 40 days after /Pertur's/ disappearance that attributed the deed to the ETA (p-m) itself, concretely to Miguel Angel Apalategui, /Apala/. According to the San Sebastian newspaper LA VOZ DE ESPANA of the Movement Press chain, the two friends who accompanied /Pertur/ to his mysterious appointment near the Spanish border saw him get into a car

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driven by /Apala/. There were three other people in the back seat. The newspaper continued: "Apparently they covered /Pertur's/ head with a sack and /Apala/ himself fired two shots at the back of his head, killing Moreno Bergareche instantly." 15

According to this version, /Pertur's/ murder was to settle accounts within ETA between advocates of all-out "armed struggle" like /Apala/ and others like /Pertur/ who proclaimed a more political solution on the level of mass mobilization that assumed the abandonment or relegation of the "armed struggle." ETA reacted indignantly to this version, pointing out that the ETA internal situation was much more complex and dynamic than suggested by the simplistic scheme of "political" and "military."

However, the idea of settling accounts persisted. As Letamendia wrote: "About 1-1/2 years later, a letter from distant relatives of /Pertur/ asked that investigations be opened in all directions, including refugees who were companions at that time." The only information the family gave the press was a letter /Pertur/ wrote to a friend 12 days before his disappearance in which he said: "These beasts have created such a climate within the organization that they have transformed ETA in northern Euskadi into a police state instead of a collective of revolutionaries where each one suspects his neighbor and vice versa." Also he said: "I do not escape from this infernal dynamics of conspiracies, slander, lies, etc., dynamics that tend to eliminate political rivals not through political debate but using dirty maneuvers in the name of 'discipline,' 'security,'."16

In spite of the above, Letamendia believes that there is no basis to accuse /Pertur's/ old comrades for his disappearance and accuses "the press of Madrid (Which) avidly latches onto revelations like these...of bad faith." He continued: "In any case, at least in the /abertzale/ left, the mere thought that these disagreements could turn into the intention to physically eliminate a political adversary would have caused laughter." Letamendia said later: "To the author, verification that the men of the /abertzale/ left have never killed each other would suffice but this (/Pertur's/ efforts toward the reunification of ETA) confirms even more his absolute conviction that /Pertur/ died at the hands of the far right." 17

Letamendia's angelical view of ETA would contrast with the facts that we have on the internal fights of an organization very similar to ETA in so many ways—the Irish IRA. Robert Moss wrote: "The IRA, like the majority of clandes—tine organizations, had a complicated history of internal disagreements, be—trayals and changes in political line behind it. The leadership continually wavered between a military orientation and a political orientation, between nationalist and socialist doctrines." 18 As can be seen, this is very similar to the history of ETA itself outlined in the previous chapter. Moss continued, recalling how the IRA "formally divided into the Official wing and the Provisional wing. The latter, considered rebels,...are very traditional in two senses: they want a united but nonsocialist (or communist) Ireland and they firmly believe in the use of force to achieve their objectives....The Official wing and its political arm, Sinn Fein, proclaim a revolutionary socialist ideology and feel as little sympathy for the Dublin government as for

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the Belfast unionists." ¹⁹ It would not take much work to establish parallels between the branches of the IRA and the branches of the ETA and even the existence of "political arms." We made this reference because Moss himself wrote that "although both bands joined forces to carry out some isolated operations in Ulster, beginning in 1970 they would fight each other in a bloody battle to obtain leadership of the province. This cost them as many deaths as skirmishes with the security forces." ²⁰ Moss then related in detail some of these punitive raids between the two branches of the organization.

Walter Laqueur stated: "In view of the historical evidence, it would be false to contrast the 'humanitarian' characteristics of leftist terrorism with the 'sadistic' terror of the nationalist and rightist groups. Criminals have frequently shown more humanity than terrorists....Terrorists are fanatics and fanaticism frequently leads to cruelty and sadism." Then he indicated: "In February 1972, a Red Army hideout was discovered in Karuizawa, a mountain resort some 80 miles from Tokyo. There they found 14 mutilated and tortured bodies; half the group had eliminated the others for antirevolutionary weaknesses and apparently some had been buried alive."²¹

In the history of terrorist movements, "settling accounts" is, as we can see, practically a constant. To simply state, as Letamendia does, that those things do not happen in the /abertzale/ left is the same type of simplification that Leizaola presented when he published a communique after Carrero Blanco's murder. At that time he stated: "The act of extreme violence, the premeditated and perfectly planned murder, is unsuited to the Basque man so ETA could not have participated in the execution of the president of the Francoist government."22

There is no evidence showing that /Pertur/ was eliminated by other ETA members but to exclude this with arguments like the one above would be a totally unacceptable type of racism, especially since there are sources that said that /Pertur/ had been kidnapped in April 1976 by the /bereziak/to keep him from attending the preparatory meeting for the seventh assembly.²³

What seems clear is that /Pertur/ was playing a very important role in the internal crisis of the divided ETA which had not been able to adapt to the new conditions of the Spanish political situation.

/Pertur/ had been fighting since the schism between ETA (m) and ETA (p-m) to increase the political ability of ETA. He felt it was necessary to create the "mass organizations that benefit from its armed struggle...(because) a purely military organization cannot be the vanguard of the proletariat." Within this dynamics there was a growing tension between the political leadership of ETA (m) and the "special commands" (/bereziak/). According to Letamendia, "these confrontations do not seem to constitute serious ideological differences until a year after /Pertur's/ death. However, it seems very obvious that the Berazadi case caused a crisis in ETA (p-m) which led to /Pertur's/ withdrawal. At the end of a long discussion, the decision to kill him (Berazadi) was adopted by three votes in favor, two against--/Pertur/ and /Eneka/--and one abstention. /Pertur/ resigned from all his executive responsibilities and prepared to fight the battle which he himself called 'the organizational conversion of our political struggle."

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From his withdrawal from the leadership organs of ETA (p-m) until his disappearance, /Pertur/ led a group which called itself /Otsagabia/. It basically produced two works. This effort in doctrinal expansion was made within the framework of preparations for the seventh assembly which would be held in the fall of 1976.

The first work was entitled "Notes on a debate on the party." In it, /Pertur/insisted on the formula of /splitting up/. "All those who until now have supported and identified with the action of ETA without participating in it, without going from the level of pure sympathy to the fight of the revolutionary patriots, today want to participate directly in it, join in an organized way. Naturally, they ask ETA to offer them new channels for that participation. Our proposal is as follows: the only viable solution to the present situation is organizational separation between the political struggle and the armed struggle. Concretely, we propose the creation of a party, the revolutionary vanguard of the working class and all the Basque people, and its incorporation in all the mass activities that ETA has done until now."

To /Pertur/, that party absolutely could not be the KAS [Patriotic Socialist Coordination] since "due to its heterogeneity, it is an organism lacking political initiative." It must be remembered that the so-called "KAS alternative" was not yet consolidated when /Pertur/ disappeared. From the beginning of 1976, there were negotiations between the forces of the /abertzale/ left. The reluctance of LAIA [Basque Workers Revolutionary Party] prevented the creation of KAS until September-October.

The party that /Pertur/ proclaimed--which would be the future EIA [Basque Revolutionary Party] which started at the beginning of 1977--would have to be characterized by the following features: 1) be independentist with Basque strategy; 2) be a class party, exclusive defender of the interests of the working class; 3) promote the mass organisms and popular power, giving them priority over the electoralist system; and 4) be functionally based on democratic centralism and internal unity.

The second work by /Pertur/ in /Otsagabia/ was entitled "ETA and the armed struggle." In it, he repeated the primacy of the "mass struggle" that does not have a limit over "armed struggle" that does. As a result of passage from the dictatorship to the transitional phase of the bourgeois democracy, "the leading role must correspond to mass struggle." The armed struggle must lose its offensive nature to take on a defensive nature. Its role is to constitute a dynamic force that guarantees popular conquests and to serve as support and cover to the mass struggle.

To /Pertur/, once these proposals—concretely, the /split/ into two organizations, one political and the other military—had been put into practice, no obstacle to the reunification of ETA (m) and ETA (p-m) would remain. As is seen by the tone of his theses, Marxist-Leninist tones predominate over nationalist ones. As at so many other times in the history of ETA, a conflict arises between the two poles. We already know that this type of conflict in the Basque organization has always ended with the expulsion of the laborites or Marxist-Leninists, with control of the organization remaining in the hands

of the nationalists. Based on these same dynamics, was /Pertur/ "eliminated" by the "national militarists"? Nothing can be confidently stated. If he had lived, would /Pertur/ have continued within the organization or, like in other times in the history of ETA, would he have been expelled or been forced to leave? There can only be conjecture.

What is obvious is the victory of /Pertur's/ theses at the seventh assembly where they were approved by 60 votes to 20. The main leaders of ETA (m) including /Argala/ were even guests at that assembly. "They attended, pleased with its development and with the resolutions adopted in it." / /Pertur's/ plans were carried out after his death except possibly his most cherished dream: the reunification of ETA.

At the seventh assembly, ETA (p-m) discussed the topic of armed struggle to which it assigned three functions: education subordinated to the general level and development of the mass struggle; weakening the power of the oligarchy. acting as a dissuasive and guaranteeing force for popular conquests; and, finally, remaining in coordination with the struggle of the masses, consolidating ideological agreement in both organizations (the political and the military).

ETA (m), in a November ZUTIK, transcribed the complete text of the resolutions of the Seventh ETA (p-m) Assembly alon; with the points of the KAS alternative, stating that it accepted them all. Nevertheless, Letamendia indicated that "although the interested parties are not aware of it—nor any of the persons in the /abertzale/ left at that time—the rest of its context notes political lines that greatly differ from the concepts that inspire the works of /Otsagabia/."²⁰

ETA (m) must be on guard against the penetration of reformism whose first symptom is that the unarmed organization begins to pressure the armed one to disappear when it is still needed. Under these circumstances, the armed organization becomes the last stronghold of revolutionary strategy.

ETA (m) felt, different from ETA (p-m), that only when the principles of the KAS alternative have been applied must armed action end its offensive nature to pass to a defensive nature, "keeping the oligarchy from violating its own legality." As we know, ETA (p-m) felt that, starting with the establishment of the bourgeois democracy, armed action would already have a defensive nature.

Letamendia recognized that "these differences, still not clearly seen by their own leaders, were going to abruptly explode in the preelectoral stage before 15 June. They explain the totally different future evolutions of ETA (p-m) and ETA (m) and explain even later events, still remembered by all."²⁹

These differences explain why, against the hope and even the conviction of all the democratic forces and all the news media that terrorism would recede as there was progress on the road to democratization, ETA terrorism not only did not diminish but dramatically increased. The figures are impressive: ETA had killed 2 people in 1968, 1 in 1969, none in 1970 and 1971, 2 in 1972, 7 in 1973, 23 in 1974 (including the 13 dead in the street of Correo never

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claimed by ETA), 19 in 1975 and 19 in 1976. In subsequent years, ETA would kill 21 in 1977, 107 in 1978 and 76 in 1979.

Since the death of the mayor of Basauri, Luis Albo Lamosas, on 9 June, the two branches of ETA observed a de facto truce, leaving summer terrorism to GRAPO. In spite of everything in the Basque Country, the summer was stormy and the traditional fiestas held in many places were often motives for violence. The PNV publicized a manifesto in which it protested the "attitude of uncertainty and terror created by the far right—which still acts with absolute impunity—or the repeated refusal of the administration to permit the use of the /ikur—rina/ when the Basques use it everywhere as the emblem of a people, independent of its origin or its first political connotation." The manifesto ended alluding to "institutional violence."

These protests intensified when, on 8 September, a youth, Jesus Maria Zabala, was shot to death in Fuenterrabia by the Civil Guard. According to Alonso, former Real Madrid player and eyewitness, Zabala was running, pursued by the Civil Guard. When he tried to hide in an alley, he was machine-gunned at close range. Alonso himself was pistol-whipped when he protested to the agents. The serious incident saddened the /Alarde/ fiestas that were held that day in the Guipuzcoa town. As a result of this, the full Fuenterrabia municipal government presented its resignation and 18 other local governments in the province denounced "the brutality of official repression." Bishop Setien and Bishop Argalla made a call to "those who have more power to open other roads for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the people and society." The general strike spread throughout the Basque Country and Martin Villa, minister of government, went to Bilbao to direct the police operation and study the situation in the field. 31

In a harsh editorial, EL PAIS accused the government of "insisting on repression as the only measure" and asked for political solutions. All of Spain breathed a critical atmosphere due to the action of the FOP. In August a youth, Francisco Javier Verdejo Lucas, member of the Young Red Guard, was also shot to death by the Civil Guard in Almeria. This led to the idea of "institutional violence" that seemed to parallel terrorist violence. CAMBIO 16 devoted a report shortly before Zabala's death to "The Thirty Killed by the Reform." An editorial entitled "Freedom and Order" stated: "Police topics are basic in a democratic society and those responsible for the forces of order have to be up to the challenge of freedom. The policy of the stick is no longer sufficient. It is necessary to scrupulously respect civil rights but law and order must also be maintained. Without this new public order strategy, the /unborn/ Spanish democracy might never be born."33

The first sign that the ETA truce had come to an end appeared on 18 September when the mayor of Andoain (Guipuzcoa) was the target of an unsuccessful attack. A few days later, on the night of 29 September, a taxi driver, Angel Andres Lorenzo, was kidnapped in Las Arenas (Vizcaya). He was forced to drive to Erandio where he was handcuffed and gagged. A little later, a bomb with 4 kilograms of dynamite exploded at the monument to the legionnaire Maderal Oleaga in Erandio.

However, on 4 October one of the most sensational attacks by ETA occurred in San Sebastian. The president of the Provincial Deputation of Guipuzcoa, Juan Maria Araluce Villar, was assassinated as he got out of his car to go into his home at 2:15 pm. Jose Elicegui Diez, his driver, Luis Francisco Sanz Flores and Antonio Palomo Perez, police inspectors, and Alfredo Garcia Gonzalez, an armed policeman, also died. To CAMBIO 16, it was the "most spectacular attack since the murder of Adm Luis Carrero Blanco." There was also the circumstance that Araluce was an adviser to the king. Minister Martin Villa explained the attack to the public on TVE and assured that "the government will not fall into the trap. Apparently, a state of exception "was very close" to being declared. The same magazine published an editorial on a black background on the same cover: "Freedom Without Anger." It said: "Today when the streets of this country are stained with the blood of brothers and the far right and the far left try to aggravate the situation, the only alternative is elections. But real elections. Clean elections, without exclusions and without tricks, that will take this country out of its dead end which it has to get out of, calmly, undramatically."34 Once more the idea that the establishment of democratic mechanisms would end the bloody escalation of political violence surfaced.

It must be remembered that there had also been a death for political reasons in Madrid. At a demonstration held there, as in many other places, in commemoration of the executions of September 1975, a student, Carlos Gonzalez Martinez, was killed. Apparently, the shots came from a member of an "antidemonstration command." This led to new incidents and a "day of struggle" on 1 October with more violence and many strikes in different enterprises.

With Araluce's death, many feared the beginning of a new terrorist phase although actually ETA became inactive again at this level of the "armed struggle" until 1977. This was in spite of the fact that leaders of ETA (m), in a press conference in Bayona, repeated their determination to continue the "armed struggle." They argued that Zabala's death in Fuenterrabia "used up our patience." The note ended by saying that "ETA will continue in the fight as long as constitutional and minimal channels for the expression of popular Basque freedom are not created, minimal democratic channels shaped by the programmatic points of the announced alternative" (referring to the KAS alternative).

However, there were attacks of a different type—burned cars, destroyed establishments, etc.—that clearly seemed to come from the far right. Attacks on people subsided while, in the three provinces of the Basque Country and Navarra, the clamor for total amnesty intensified. Pro-Amnesty Groups were created in many areas. Soon a slogan appeared: "Everyone home for Christmas." Total amnesty became the number one problem in the Basque Country which did not seem willing to rest until the prisoners that still remained in jail were released. According to some calculations, there were about 120.35

GRAPO and the Far Right Against the Reform: Winter of 1977-78

A few weeks after Adolfo Suarez was appointed president of the government, he managed to convert the hostile atmosphere of the first days in his favor.

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With a new language that was nothing like the typical oratory of the old Francoist regime, Suarez proposed "to make normal what is normal in the streets." Where the Arias government had failed, he proposed to succeed. The most surprising thing is that he managed to convince sectors of the public that, until then, had not hidden their skepticism. The complex alchemy of the reform--to go from the authoritarian system to the democratic system without breakingbecame somewhat credible. The Suarez plan was simple: the Francoist Cortes would approve a new basic law, after discussion, that would change the bases of the system, establishing new Cortes elected by universal suffrage. That political reform law would then be subjected to a referendum. The construction of the new democratic regime would begin there. Its primary goal would be general elections with the participation of all the previously legalized political parties. This was the philosophical basis of Suarez' reform which aroused many questions in the less optimistic. Would the Francoist Cortes be willing to commit hara-kiri, voting for a law that would mean their elimination? Would the "de facto powers" of the state--that is, the military--consent to the legalization of the Communist Party? Otherwise, it was impossible to think of democratic normalization.

The amazement was unanimous when Suarez, ably using his good knowledge of Francoism, got the Cortes to approve the political reform bill which, in paragraph 1 of Article 1, stated: "Democracy in the Spanish state is based on the supremacy of the law, expression of the sovereign will of the people." The music of these lyrics had not been heard in the political ears of the Spaniards for more than 40 years.

With the exception of the murder of Araluce and his companions, ETA--as we have already said--went through a stage of inactivity. After the bombs in July, the same thing could be said of GRAPO. However, it was very different with the far right. A report of CAMBIO 16 in November said in reference to the Basque Country: "It is already impossible to list the attacks against people and property and the death threats from those who identify themselves by letter, telephone or at the very moment of aggression as the GCR, members of the New Order organization and the Adolf Hitler Command." It pointed out the appearance of women in the commands. It was reported that "the death threats have reached: Nicolas Redondo, secretary general of the UGT [General Union of Workers]; Jose Antonio Saracibar, also of the UGT; sculptor Eduardo Chillida; San Sebastian lawyer Juan Maria Bandres; Julian Viejo, leader of the Communist Party of Euskadi; Eduardo Magallon, editor of the weekly BERRIAK; Jacinto Perez Iriarte, assistant editor; all its staff; etc." CAMBIO 16 in Bilbao was also threatened.

This action of the far right was not limited to the Basque Country. There were continual attacks in Madrid. On 6 November, the Rafael Alberti bookstore was burned by a command identified as "New Order-Sixth Adolf Hitler Command." This was a reminder that that command had sent threats to publications like CUADERNOS PARA EL DIALOGO, LA CODORNIZ, TRIUNFO, POSIBLE and EL PAIS. It was pointed out that the insurance companies themselves refused to insure the bookstore which became a priority target of far right terrorism. 37

Commenting on the activities of the Nazi group mentioned above, EL PAIS editorialized that "the authorities must consider that they are facing a process

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of deterioration of public safety that, festering, can produce an /Argentinization/ phenomenon not desired by anyone." It insisted: "ETA terrorism does not justify terrorism from the opposite side and the state--if it wants to survive--must not accept the dialectic of guns in the streets." 38

The black violence was also felt in Andalucia. In December, Blas Pinar inaugurated the social headquarters of the New Force in Sevilla and stated, with the provocative style that characterized him: "It was necessary to use the means required to go against the corruption that the present government in Spain has introduced." In Sevilla, Huelva, Cordoba and Malaga, bookstores and press kiosks were burned or damaged and some people were attacked or threatened "as Reds." Responsibility fell on the Nazis of the Adolf Hitler Command, the GCR and, in Malaga, the FAE [Spanish Anticommunist Front] formed by old legionnaires and soldiers of the Blue Division. Complaints about this varidalism which also remained unpunished were continual. 39

The "dirty war" in the French Basque Country began to acquire alarming dimensions for Basque refugees. Two men and a woman were tried in November by the Bayona Court. Although condemned only for illegal possession of arms, they seemed to be involved in a network of people close to the Spanish police whose objective might be kidnapping ETA members for subsequent return to Spain. Another Spaniard, Salvador Grau, was also arrested on 5 October in Bayona. He was allegedly involved in the same type of operation. 40 Journalist Jose Maria Portell, himself a future victim of the ETA, studied the organization of the "anti-ETA" commands in a report, discarding the thesis that "they could be persons...who act personally and empirically." He continued: "There is a national and international structure behind it." In the same report, it was assumed that /Pertur/ had been the victim of these commands which he considered "parapolice groups." Portell stated that, in the last 19 months, the number of attacks committed by the uncontrolled anti-ETA commands "reaches about 200 in Spain, 2 of them with fatal consequences and the majority, some serious and some not, but without blood. In the case of France, in spite of the fact that the number of attacks has evidently been lower -- 44 -- the police has already managed, by watching the highways or merely by chance, to arrest at least nine anti-ETA activists." To demonstrate the difficulty of statistics in this area, let us point out that CAMBIO 16 said there were 26 anti-Basque attacks in French Basque Country during the last 1-1/2 years. That includes /Pertur's/disappearance.41

Portell stated: "In some cases, it was the Spanish police who penetrated into French territory without revealing their position." He even named some people, arrested or not, implicated in this type of activity. Finally he concerned himself with the money received for this "work": "One action consisted in 80,000 pesetas for a completed job--50,000 in advance and 30,000 upon completion." Finally he alluded to the fact that all these groups operate at the international level through a confederation called /Harkis/.42

The Basques living in France also felt repressed by the French authorities. The Basque refugees who had been banished to the island of Yeu in April had managed to escape in July. However, in October, because of the official visit of the Spanish royalty to France, 11 other refugees including /Argala/ were

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banished. Aya Zulaica had been sentenced by the Bayona Court to 3 years in jail. Apparently good winds were not blowing for ETA members.

On 15 December a referendum was planned in which the political reform law which Suarez had gotten past the obligatory step of the Francoist Cortes would be submitted to the approval of the Spaniards. On 11 December when there were only 4 days until the referendum, a terrorist incident upset the country. Antonio Maria de Oriol and Urquijo, president of the Council of State, adviser to the king and former minister of justice under Franco, from a family well known for its ties to the past regime, was kidnapped from an office located right in the center of Madrid. The Basque roots of the victim and the fact that he had apparently been threatened on several occasions by the ETA made it appear at first that the Basque organization was responsible for the event. Almost immediately, however, sources close to ETA denied its participation in the kidnapping. Shortly before 8:30 pm of the same day as the kidnapping, EL PAIS received a telephone call in which GRAPO claimed responsibility, stating that the communique could be picked up in a certain telephone booth. In the note, GRAPO indicated: "Through this action, our organization reveals its rejection of the farce of the fascist referendum." The condition for the victim's release was that 15 prisoners belonging to GRAPO, the PCE (r), ETA, FRAP and UPG [Galician People's Union] be released and sent to Algeria.

From the very first moment of this long kidnapping came questions about the real objectives of an attack in which destabilizing features could be clearly perceived. Who was GRAPO really and what did it want? Was it logical and possible that a far leftist organization would so openly play the cards of involution? EL PAIS wrote: "The far left has never collaborated better with the far right than it did yesterday, as it did when ETA assassinated a Basque mayor on the day the Cortes voted on amending the Penal Code or the murder of Mr Araluce in San Sebastian. The same could be said of the wave of bombings early in the morning last 18 July. It all seems to be a plot to demonstrate-among other things--that democracy is worse than what there was, that there is more public disturbance and more violence." After stating that there was still no democracy but "a prior state of tolerance," it repeated the idea that "the only way to put an end to terrorism is to eliminate the causes and the environment that can be its hotbed. These are political measures and we have repeated for days that those adopted in the Basque Country are not sufficient nor good enough." Finally it echoed the doubts that many Spaniards harbored about GRAPO. "It is not appropriate to weave stories but it is too much of a coincidence that each time a liberalizing political measure is prepared, the far right finds good pretexts to incite rebellion against the state. We do not question that the executing arm of these deeds is an organization of the extreme left. But it is appropriate to ask who gives it the arms and the money and who plans things so that they always benefit the 'extremists' of the other side."43

DIARIO 16 also expressed its suspicions about GRAPO from the beginning. "The operation carried out assumes an organizational setup too complicated to be attributed to a small group of leftist madmen. To set up a few men is one thing. It is very different to kidnap a political celebrity with such incredible perfection and without leaving the slightest trace behind. The command

that kidnapped the president of the Council of State is supported by a complete organization and needs a closely woven network of accomplices to do things like it has. For a group like GRAPO which no one knew anything about a year ago to achieve such a high degree of operativeness in a few months surprises everyone and makes many skeptical. How can all that be achieved without the police finding enough clues to dismantle or, at least, control the group? What covers have been used to create such a developed organization without raising suspicion or leaving any traces other than its consummated crimes? Many questions lead to suspicions that there is a cat in the bag."

In subsequent days the police arrested many including 36 alleged members of the PCE (r). Suspicions about ETA did not completely disappear since Oriol's son, present at the kidnapping, identified a photograph of an ETA member, Jose Luis Echegaray alias /Mark/, as one of the kidnappers.

The political parties condemned the kidnapping but showed interest. The PCE of Euskadi compared "deeds of this nature" to "the persistence of official repression." The PNV, through one of its leaders, stated that "some responsibility in an action of this type which is condemnable fell to the government for not protecting political celebrities on the eve of the referendum."

GRAPO constantly issued communiques using EL PAIS and INFORMACIONES as couriers. The first devoted a long editorial to the topic, "EL PAIS and Its Responsibilities." It called its "situation unwanted and uncomfortable" and stated that "EL PAIS's acceptance of this uncomfortable role as intermediary has no other motive than moral duty and civic obligation to help save Mr Oriol's life." It further assured that "everyone knows that EL PAIS has not told all that it knows" and emphasized the risks taken by its editors in the operation. 40

The tension aroused by Oriol's kidnapping led the far rightists to expand their acts of violence. At the same time, they pressured the government for a broad amnesty, a measure that was being prepared before Oriol's kidnapping.

One of the official propaganda posters for the referendum had the slogan:
"People, speak out so that violence will be quiet." However, violence was a
daily fact. In its latest issue, CAMBIO 16 published one of its already regular reports on the violence of the far right in which it revealed that possibly more than 500 million pesetas from the holdup of a bank in Nice in the
previous summer—called "the robbery of the century"—could have gone to Spain
to finance "a Spanish rightist group based in Madrid." The weekly again
listed the establishments, especially bookstores, that had been the targets
of terrorist attacks and people threatened or attacked. It also referred to
the main groups involved. "In spite of the proliferation of initials painted
on street signs in Euskadi, only three groups of the far right have real
membership. They are MAN [National Action Movement], the GCR and the ATE.
It is believed that some members of those factions have double membership."
It also studied the bombing systems used by these groups and emphasized that
"the detonating system is very complex and apparently can only be acquired
from arms traffickers who operate in Brussels. Then it explained the mechanism. It also insisted that the psychosis of terror forced the people in the
Antiguo district of San Sebastian to form self-defense squads. It stated:

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"When anonymous threats were sent, they were signed with initials like OVA [Organization of Antiseparatist Volunteers], FAS [Antiseparatist Front] and other less known ones."47

GRAPO made its presence felt during those last weeks of 1976 and the beginning of 1977, not only through the continual avalanche of communiques that filled the front pages of the newspapers but through other actions like the attempt to organize a general strike. There was even an armed confrontation at the CASA enterprise in Getafe on 10 January between a GRAPO command that was inciting a strike and guards of the enterprise who were wounded.

Also on 30 December the Council of Ministers abolished the TOP [Court of Public Order] by decree. It had been one of the key instruments of political and union repression during the Franco regime and was, therefore, hated by all the democrats. Its abolition, received with relief, meant the crimes of terrorism would go to ordinary courts. The abolition of the TOP was also considered a sign of the real democratizing decision of the government in spite of the fact that the reform process was so threatened by the situation of violence that we have been commenting on.

The Tragic Week: the Atocha Massacre

The political situation reached an extremely high degree of tension in the last week of January 1977. Oriol, who had been kidnapped, continued to send letters to his family and GRAPO continued to issue communiques repeating "that the delay in solving this problem depends only on the government." No one explained the inability of the police to effectively pursue the kidnappers. CAMBIO 16 wrote: "The government must declare its intention to grant amnesty, asking in exchange simply that the Basque opposition lay down its arms until final peace is reached in that global political agreement that will put the Spanish democracy on its feet.... The argument that the government cannot give in to the blackmail of GRAPO is certainly not valid. If ridicule killed, GRAPO would have died of shame. This shocked country has not yet dared laugh at that sordid tragicomedy of the stupidest kidnappers in history....And this is another subject. How is it possible that the Spanish police have not found Oriol's kidnappers? A month has already passed and GRAPO walks around here like Pedro in his own house, talks with journalists without having any fear, runs its errands as if Madrid were its backyard, machine-guns people, papers the Metro with leaflets and no one is found. Earlier it piled bombs up and they were not found."48

In this situation of confusion, on Sunday, 23 January, a week of related violent events began that, without exaggeration, can be called a really tragic week. That Sunday an unauthorized demonstration convoked by all the leftist parties and sponsored by the Pro-Amnesty Commission of Madrid started at the Plaza de Espana at noon. It was demanding total amnesty. From the very beginning, there were armed groups of the far right determined to "break up" the demonstration. One of the many incidents that occurred claimed the life of young Arturo Ruiz, a student and member of the Workers Commissions, the communist union organization. AAA claimed responsibility for the murder. Later it was learned that the group that fired at Arturo Ruiz included Argentine

Jorge Cesarsky who was arrested, Spaniards Jose Fernandez Guaza and Angel Sierra, Italian Stefano delle Chiae and a fifth person who was not identified. All were known for their violent activities. Cesarsky was considered tied to the Information Services of the Presidency, one of whose headquarters was on Calle Rey Francisco where he was seen. Fernandez Guaza had acted within the framework of ATE in the Basque Country and in the French southwest. Angel Sierra had led far rightist commands, especially those that destroyed about 20 Picassos on exhibit at the Theo Gallery in Madrid in November 1971. Delle Chiae belonged to the Italian fascist group Avanguardia Nazionale and had been seen at the Montejurra events in 1976.

The next afternoon a new name was added to the already very long list of victims of political violence. During a student demonstration organized to protest Arturo Ruiz' death, a smoke bomb killed young Maria Luz Najera.

That Monday, 24 January, the 45th day of Oriol's kidnapping, would go down in the chronicles of terrorism as one of the ominous dates in the terrorist escalation against the Spanish democracy. In the morning, Lieutenant General Villaescusa Quilis, president of the Supreme Council of Military Justice, was kidnapped as he left his home on Calle O'Donnell. The kidnappers wearing army uniforms were identified as members of GRAPO. This organization claimed responsibility for the kidnapping "in response to the murder of Arturo Ruiz during the demonstration for amnesty." It was, without doubt, an opportunistic statement since it was impossible to organize a kidnapping without much longer and more careful preparation.

That black Monday was witness in the late hours to the most serious terrorist act carried out by the far right: the Atocha massacre. At about 11 pm, a far rightist command broke into a laborite office of Workers Commissions located at Atocha 55 where a meeting related to a transportation conflict had just been held. The attackers fired their weapons at close range at the few people who remained in the building, killing five of them and seriously wounding four others. Enrique Valdelvira, Luis Javier Benavides, Francisco Javier Sauquillo, Serafin Holgado and Angel Rodriguez were killed; the first four were lawyers and the last was an administrator. Apparently the killers were looking for Joaquin Navarro, leader of the Transportation Workers Commissions, who had already left the building. In the middle of March, the perpetrators of the brutal killing were arrested: Jose Fernandez Cerra, Carlos Garcia Julia, Fernando Lerdo de Tejeda, Francisco Albadalejo, Leccadio Jimenez Caravaca, Fernandez Palacios and Gloria Herguedas. They were well known people connected to far right circles. Lerdo de Tejeda was the son of Blas Pinar's former secretary. Fernandez Cerra and Fernandez Guaza, implicated in Arturo Ruiz' murder, had acted with ATE in the Basque Country. Garcia Julia was a New Force dissident. Albadalejo held a position in the Vertical Transportation Thion and Jimenez Caravaca, an old member of the Blue Division where he was wounded in the head, was an expert on arms.

It was hard not to see a perfectly planned operation behind these incidents aimed at destroying the attempted democratic reformism that Suarez piloted. CAMBIO 16 alluded to the IF [Fascist International] and wrote: "According to a note in the BOLETIN DE INFORMACION published in Geneva by CITE CATHOLIQUE,

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the IF met in Rome last 3 October to coordinate efforts in the fight against the Marxist trends in Spain." The names of some of those attending were given. It added that "the Spanish organizations in LEA [Spanish Anti-Marxist Struggle], ATE, GCR and Trade Union Action Groups, attended the meeting where the plan of action for the commemoration of the first anniversary of Franco's death was basically discussed....In the middle of the summer (1976), the presence of two recognized members of the IF, Atalians Stefano delle Chiae and Salvatore Francia, was detected in Spain."

However, the tragic week would not end with the Atocha massacre. On Friday, 28 January, the teletypes again rang out to announce two other attacks that left two armed police and a civil guard dead. Three other agents were seriously wounded. The events had occurred during two holdups of branches of the Madrid Savings Bank in two different districts of the Spanish capital. GRAPO claimed responsibility.

No one any longer questioned that an operation of provocation was in progress as part of what the Italians called the strategy of tension. It was a matter of creating the conditions to destabilize the democratic system or, in Spain's case, to prevent its establishment. For the first time in their history, most of the Spanish newspapers published a joint editorial on Saturday, 29 January, entitled "For the Unity of All." Due to its historical interest and its relationship to the subject of terrorism, we reprint it below:

"In these times of national crisis when powerful forces threaten the very essence of the state and try to violently usurp the popular mandate for democracy and peace, the press feels an obligation to make a call for the unity of all, without exclusion.

"The right of a people to freely decide their collective destiny cannot be impeded by violence and organized crime. Only public confrontation of the different positions, the clarification and transparency of social realities and, in the end, the expression of the will of the citizens through voting can legitimately shape the new Spanish society.

"Terror has no ideology. The exposure of those who try to benefit from this strategy is the unanimous demand of the Spaniards and their government. The servants of order and other citizens are victims today of the same violence that tries to submerge our country in civil discord.

"Those who have used this machination are the enemies of all, the enemies of the Spanish people. Their plan is obvious: they are trying to keep the civil formulas of free and orderly coexistence to which the Spaniards have a right from being established. Facing this challenge, all the political and social forces must form a common front and, setting aside their differences, proclaim their determination to stay on the road to democracy through free elections until the end.

"The government and the rest of the political forces must quickly come to an agreement and adopt energetic measures to safeguard the peace without hurting public freedoms. The existence or nonexistence of democracy in Spain and the future of our country as a pluralistic and free society are in play.

"ABC, ARRIBA, DIARIO 16, EL ALCAZAR, EL PAIS, INFORMACIONES, PUEBLO and YA

"This joint editorial has been published by all the Barcelona press and most of the other Spanish newspapers."

The week ended with a television speech by Suarez that Saturday night in which he calmly analyzed the situation and explained the need for the measures taken by the Council of Ministers the day before, concretely the decree-law suspending Articles 15 and 18 of the Fuero de los Espanoles for a month for persons about whom there were well-founded suspicions of collaborating in the realization or preparation of terrorist acts. Those articles concerned arrests for more than 72 hours and the possibility of searching homes without warrants.

In the middle of this serious situation, the only positive aspect was the rapprochement between the government and the opposition which felt solidarity facing the terrorist onslaught. The opposition parties, except those of the far left--PTE [Spanish Labor Party], ORT [Revolutionary Organization of Workers] and MC [Communist Movement]--which were marginal, drew up a joint communique. They referred to the "unavoidable need to reach a complete pluralistic democracy through free elections in the shortest time possible" and asked the government to maintain public order, "disarming the terrorist groups that circulate with impunity today."

The PCE was in a more difficult situation than the other opposition groups. Its secretary general, Santiago Carrillo, had even been arrested in December for several days. It saw its democratic image reinforced by the fact that the lawvers machine-gunned in Atocha were its members. The funeral for the victims which left from the Palacio de Justicia was an impressive demonstration of grief. Paradoxically, in the midst of so much blood, there was progress on the road to reconciliation, indispensable for the establishment of a democratic regime. However, many suspicions and many bad habits remained. The deaths from terrorism were taken in different ways, according to the different political positions. Let us analyze the following published by INFORMACIONES, 29 January, page 7, under the title "Don Joaquin Satrustegui: the opposition should go to the funerals of the murdered police." "The idea that the democratic opposition can attend the burials or funerals of the guards murdered in Madrid yesterday was widespread in political and news circles. Liberal leader Joaquin Satrustegui told INFORMACIONES: 'I believe the opposition should attend the funerals. I myself will attend the ceremonies held for the murdered servants of order." As can be seen, the way was slowly opened to the idea that the state and its systems served and belonged to the entire national community, that all victims of political violence must be equally mourned, that there are no first or second-class deaths.

January ended and with it the most dramatic days lived by the Spaniards since Franco's death. Oriol and Villaescusa continued to be held and no one dared predict when or in what way the enigmatic kidnappings would be resolved or if what was behind GRAPO would ever be known. 50

In the ensuing days, the police made an undetermined but very large number of arrests that aroused the protest of some leftist parties. There was no police

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information and many of those arrested were quickly released. The arrests also affected members of the far right.

These arrests—especially those of members of the PCE (r), the illegal party of which GRAPO was the armed branch—apparently gave the police important clues. The statements of some police sources seemed to respond to that; they said that Oriol and Villaescusa had to be in Madrid "and in different places. In case the police found one of the hostages, the kidnappers could count on the cover provided by the other to continue playing their game." I

It was also obvious that GRAPO had changed tactics during the kidnapping. From the release of 15 prisoners, their first demand when they kidnapped Oriol, they went on to demand total amnesty and later resigned themselves to a public promise of that. They also went from threatening Oriol's "execution" to practically guaranteeing his life but threatening to hold him "as long as necessary."

All this led to continued speculation about the real nature of GRAPO. In many sectors, especially the left, it was stated that GRAPO was a far rightist group or, at least, "managed from international fascist positions." Statements of this type had been made in foreign journalistic circles like EL MOUDJAHID, official organ of the Algerian Government (in its 29 January issue). This was curious since there were known ties between GRAPO and the MPAIAC [Sovereignty and Independence Movement of the Canary Islands], the Canary Islands independence group led by Cubillo who, in turn, enjoyed open protection from Algerian leader Boumedienne.

In the speculations about GRAPO, a Spanish minister—apparently De la Mata Gorostizaga, minister of union relations—told the ASSOCIATED PRESS: "The government in Madrid was convinced that Oriol's kidnappers were from the far right." This idea seemed to be corroborated because expert graphological and semantic tests of the texts sent by GRAPO detected syntax often used in Italy and Argentina, two frequent sources of far right activists.

Some circles accept the hypothesis that some news services of the Francoist epoch remained detached from the new political situation and continued functioning in favor of involution and against the consolidation of a democratic system in Spain. The Documentation Service of the Presidency created by Carrero Blanco was frequently cited with its functions of coordination and liaison with all the remaining intelligence services. This service had been strengthened in the last years of Francoism and had extensive information on all the groups and people of the democratic opposition.

A book published a little earlier in Paris contributed to all these suspicions. Its author was Luis Gonzalez-Mata, a former secret agent in the Spanish services. This strange and disturbed person stated that the Spanish secret services had participated in the creation and maintenance of some leftist organizations with terrorist activities like DRIL [Iberian Revolutionary Directorate for Liberation], MIL and FRAP itself. According to /Cisne/-Gonzalez-Mata's operative name--he himself had given Alvarez del Vayo, president of FRAP, 800,000 pesetas and 20 passports from certain Spanish

authorities. The American CIA and the French DST had also manipulated FRAP, according to /Cisne/, behind the back of the Spanish secret services.

It seems obvious that FRAP was infiltrated by Spanish secret agents. One Spanish journalist sent to European cities like London came to know a "member" of FRAP who later was introduced to him in Madrid as a policeman.

The revelation of these facts about FRAP which had just renounced armed struggle led to the idea that GRAPO could be merely a red figurehead concealing fascist elements. Judicial and police investigations in Italy demonstrated the close connections between "red plots" and "black plots." Why couldn't the same thing happen in Spain? CAMBIO 16 asked: "RAP, RAP. What do these initials that form the root of FRAP as well as GRAPO refer to? They create such a complicated verbal balance as to call a militant far leftist group 'patriotic.'" It said: "If FRAP and GRAPO have been infiltrated—or invented?—by foreign secret services that exceeded their functions, if an infinity of followers of fascism who found their final refuge against triumphant Masonic democracies after the war in our holy dictatorship wander around loose, the plot here can have very complicated threads. It is necessary to follow the threads; the government is obliged to disassemble this machine of terror that operates here with surprising impunity."53

Following a completely different line, journalist Alfredo Semprun, closely tied to police circles, stated in ARRIBA and in the magazine DIA 32 that Francisco Romero Marin, the PCE leader who became a general in the Soviet Army, was the "governing head" of GRAPO. The next day ARRIBA published a correction at the insistence of the PCE to whom "such slander is intolerable...(and) we want to denounce the coarse maneuver of trying to connect our party to the criminal acts."

The kidnappings of Oriol and Villaescusa ended happily after a spectacular "Rescue Operation" that began on Wednesday, 9 February, after the fortuitous arrest of a person carrying one of the pistols of the police murdered on 28 January. Through his confession, it was learned that he had an appointment with another member of the command on Friday, 11 February. This person was arrested and turned out to be Enrique Cerdan Calixto, one of the most prominent leaders of GRAPO. A key ring was found on him with the name of a development "Ondarreta 2." General Villaescusa was found in one of its houses and a woman, Encarnacion Martinez de Santiago, and a man, Abelardo Collazo, another important leader of GRAPO, were arrested.

That same day, 11 February—the feast of Our Lady of Lourdes as Oriol re-called—the president of the Council of State was also released. His kidnappers kept him in an apartment of the "Sardinero" development in the Madrid district of Vallecas. GRAPO members Manuel Gil Araujo and Celsa Garcia Vallejo were arrested there.

That same day a police inspector, Antonio Lopez Salcedo, was murdered in Barcelona and an armed policeman, Juan Romano, wounded. The command responsible for the attack, also belonging to GRAPO, was arrested at 11 pm that same 11 February.

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These brilliant police actions had been directed by a commissary, Roberto Conesa, who had become famous and would be one of the most controversial members of the Spanish police. Conesa had been the last chief of the Political-Social Brigade when it was dissolved by the Suarez Government in November 1976. Transferred to Valencia as senior police chief, he was called to Madrid at the end of January 1977 to lead the team of specialists used in the fight against GRAPO. Conesa was an expert in the fight against the far leftist organizations and had dismantled GARI [Iberian Revolutionary Anarchist Group] after this group kidnapped the office manager of the Bank of Bilbao in Paris, Mr Suarez.

On 11 February, the minister of government, Rodolfo Martin Villa, and several police chiefs including Conesa held a press conference to explain the details of the rescue operation of the kidnapped men. Conesa insisted that there was no one behind GRAPO.

However, the doubts did not disappear. To CAMBIO 16, "the conflicting versions of the two kidnapped victims, the gaps in the information given by the authorities and the logical deductions from the official note on the case lead to the fear--hidden under a statement of "reserved material" still in existence which muzzled the press--that GRAPO, finally imprisoned, was not only the threat of a group of far leftist youths determined to provoke a prerevolutionary state in this country but perhaps a puppet moved by obscure and confused forces that would be much more difficult to control at the key moment of the reform program of the new monarchy."

EL PAIS also insisted that "the release of Mr Oriol and General Villaescusa does not put an end to the questions that Spaniards have been asking about the origin of the terrorist campaign unleashed in our country." It added: "Many doubts remain to be explained in this affair." Further it insisted: "It is necessary to explain to the Spanish people each and every one of the steps in this process: if there was a conspiracy, who organized it and why." It ended alluding to the "garbage that remains which some are determined not to see. The possibility of an effective democracy in Spain depends on finding and revealing the perpetrators and accomplices in this incredible plan." A few days later, the same newspaper again referred to the "atmosphere of skepticism (that) spreads in the street. Many people ask the questions that we ask in this editorial today." It again listed the contradictions and inconsistencies perceived in the official version of the events. Jose Oneto wrote: "Perhaps GRAPO does not know who it works for but the state should know. If the government of that state knows the conspirators but does not denounce them, it is betraying the interests of the country."

From Provocation to Amnesty

The tragic week, the week of fear as it was also called, left a bitter taste in everyone's mouth. Laying aside the enigmas, it must be remembered that although GRAPO appeared practically dismantled for the second time in 6 months, the barbaric Atocha massacre and the murder of Arturo Ruiz were still not solved. The Spanish democrats saw indications everywhere that led them to think that a formidable conspiracy was in progress to keep democracy from succeeding in Spain.

Before the month of February ended, the General Directorate of the Civil Guard publicized a note on Tuesday, 22 February. It reported that, in the course of "the investigations by the FOP about possible terrorist activities," the presence in Madrid of several individuals suspected of belonging to an extremist group devoted to criminal activities, even arms traffic, had been detected. Investigations had led to the discovery of a building at Calle Pelayo 39 in Madrid where arms were manufactured. That building had been rented several months earlier by Sanchez Covisa, leader of the far rightist group, GCR. As a result, several people were arrested in addition to Sanchez Covisa himself. This included several Italians well known for their ties to far rightist organizations and international fascist circles. The group included celebrities like Salvatore Francia--who had a lot to say in the coming years--Elio Massagrande and Mario Tedeschi. The national and foreign press really concerned itself with Mariano Sanchez Covisa then. For example, the German magazine DER SPIEGEL published some of his statements. In reference to the king, he stated: "I cannot show loyalty toward someone who wants to transform Spain into a European-style democracy." He justified violence: "I believe that...it is not bad....Violence at the service of a just cause, when the other ways have been exhausted, is good in my opinion." He ended stating: "If the situation occurred,... I would be willing to kill for the fatherland without too many scruples."

It was obvious that the far right was developing a perfect plan of political destabilization and that the death of Arturo Ruiz, Atocha and the manufacture of arms on Calle Pelayo were only the most visible tips of an unusually large iceberg. The government had declared the first two cases reserved material against the protest of the press which saw the measure more as censorship than an attempt to achieve greater efficiency in the investigations. EL PAIS wrote: "There are obvious indications that someone wants to throw a blanket of silence on the escalation of violence suffered by this country recently. A year after Vitoria, almost a year after Montejurra, 2 months after Oriol and more than 30 days after Atocha, there are only confusing explanations." A long series of questions followed stating the doubts that overwhelmed the citizens as well as the news media and the different political sectors. 59

Meanwhile, even though the center of gravity of political interest had been in Madrid for many weeks, the Basque problems, so closely tied to ETA terrorism, continued without any progress toward a solution. Ammesty—total ammesty—continued to be the popular demand. Legalization of the use of the /ikurrina/—the two—cross Basque flag initially the ensign of the PNV—had been achieved after the meeting of a group of Guipuzcoa mayors with Minister Martin Villa on 18 January. "The traditional 'tamborrada' of San Sebastian...was the real example of /ikurrinas/ but, with this symbol recently rescued after almost 40 years of illegality, the cries of other concrete and urgent demands continued even louder if possible: ammesty, Euskera bilingualism, reintegration of the Fuero, autonomy."

On the first day of the year, ETA had murdered employee Gonzalo Santos Turrientes in Las Arenas (Vizcaya). Then it maintained a long truce of more than 2 months, leaving terrorism to GRAPO and the far right.

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At the beginning of March, a Pro-Amnesty Week was held in the Basque Country without incident. It was known that the government was studying a new amnesty measure, delayed only by the kidnappings and serious incidents of the last week of January. "In the street, in churches, with placards and by word of mouth, thousands of persons continued to ask the government for amnesty before the elections." At the same time, "on the morning of the 4th (March), Telex telegrams and radio dispatches began to arrive from different provinces stating that amnesty for those found guilty of the murder of FOP members would automatically produce visible discontent in the garrisons of the Civil Guard and armed police."

After the meeting of the Council of Ministers on 4 March, a note was published —considered a sounding board—in which the government announced there had been approval "finally of the bases on which the provisions and decisions to complete the set of amnesty measures would be adapted." A week later, at the next council meeting, the new decree—law through which only a few members of ETA and FRAP would remain in jail—estimated at no more than 20—was finally approved. However, the Basque demands were for total amnesty and did not accept any limitation. Juan Maria Bandres wrote at that time: "The government must know that the people will not cede one iota of their just demands. The people will continue fighting with all their energy, with all their enthusiasm, until achieving their legitimate demand of seeing all, absolutely all, the prisoners come home."62

The government was reaching the limit of its possibilities but ETA, as it had already done on other occasions, exploited the concession of the amnesty to again make its bloodthirsty presence felt. Early in the morning Sunday, 13 March, an attack in Mondragon killed a civil guard, Constantino Gomez Barcia, and seriously wounded two other civil guards who died later, Miguel Santaella Carretero and Jose Castano Vazquez. ETA (m) claimed responsibility for the attack which was interpreted as reprisal for the death of alleged ETA members Nicolas Mendizabal and Sebastian Goicoechea in a confrontation with the Civil Guard on 8 March in Ichaso (Guipuzcoa). A third member, Francisco Aldanondo, was wounded. Basque sources said that, at the time of the shooting, the car of the ETA members was stopped at a checkpoint. On Monday, 14 March, a demonstration in San Sebastian degenerated into a pitched battle; a youth, Jose Luis Aristizabal, died from a rubber bullet. That same day the decree expanding the amnesty was published in the BOLETIN OFICIAL DEL ESTADO; however, it did not include crimes of blood expressly. 63

When all Spain breathed relief for the arrest of those allegedly responsible for the Atocha massacre, the Basque theme became inflamed again in spite of the ammesty. The incredulity of those who had believed that the progressive establishment of freedoms, especially the ammesty, would disarm terrorism began to spread. EL PAIS asked: "How can the endorsement, sympathy or mere neutrality toward the ETA members by large sectors of the Basque people be explained? How can you account for the solidarity of the Basques with the political prisoners condemned for crimes of blood and their mobilizations to protest the deaths of two ETA activists?" Incomprehension grew and was going to make the solution of the Basque problem even more difficult in the future.

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General elections for the new democratic Cortes became the political point of reference. With the electoral laws established and the political parties (including the PCE which created a new moment of crisis) legalized, everyone prepared for the first electoral battle in 41 years. EIA, the party promoted by ETA (p-m) which we have already mentioned, prepared to run in the elections, already set for 15 June. From the underground, ETA demanded the creation of "minimal democratic channels through which their (the people's) aspirations can materialize without resorting to violence." To the ETA, those channels were contained "in the KAS alternative program." Concretely, ETA announced at the end of March that if total amnesty and the democratic freedoms were not achieved, "ETA convokes the Basque people to abstain and proclaims its determination to return to armed struggle until the achievement of the KAS alternative program." Complete acceptance of the KAS alternative was, in fact, a letter of marque that let ETA continue the armed struggle.

Meanwhile, the prisoners began to leave the jails although the campaign for total ammesty did not stop. ETA seemed to keep its truce momentarily with the exception of a Civil Guard sergeant killed in Tolosa (Guipuzcoa) on 29 April. At the beginning of that month, 18 April, the bodies of the two police inspectors, Jose Luis Martinez and Jesus Maria Gonzalez Huero, who had disappeared in Hendaya in April 1976 appeared on the French beach of Anglet.

In its desire to reach the elections without Basque prisoners in jail, the government offered the best known ETA members, many of them sentenced to death, exile which meant their departure from Spain. Exile was a measure that the government had conceived to approximate total amnesty as much as possible without clashing with the broad sectors of the public who did not accept simple and immediate release of those guilty of very recent bloody deeds. That release assumed an acceptance of armed violence that many Spaniards opposed. It was not clear whether the government could impose exile which, according to the Penal Code, was a penalty established by court sentence for a period ranging from 12 years and 1 day to 10 years. Also the ETA members only accepted exile as a preliminary measure: they wanted to return to their homes after the elections, feeling that any other solution was not real total amnesty.

On 10 May, Suarez received the Basque negotiating commission and told them that complete freedom of all the prisoners was not possible "because of his alleged weakness toward the far rightist sectors, especially the military," according to Letamendia. Meanwhile, a new Pro-Amnesty Week was held in the Basque Country from 8 to 11 May with many mobilizations. On 12 May, a "day of struggle" convoked by the parties including the PSOE, there were serious incidents. In Renteria a bullet killed an old man, Rafael Gomez Jauregui, and many other people were wounded. One, Gregorio Marichalar, died 10 days later. In Pamplona there were two deaths: one youth died from a bullet in the head and an old man watching the riots from a balcony died from a heart attack when a rubber bullet came near. On Saturday, 14 May, another person, Manuel Fuertes, died in Gallarta (Vizcaya) as he fled from the Civil Guard.

Discouragement began to spread because even if all Spain, through a gigantic effort, advanced toward democratic normalcy, the Basque Country seemed about

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to break away from that collective effort. EL PAIS wrote: "Beyond the demand for total amnesty, the political objective of ETA and its allies is to achieve a climate that makes electoral absenteeism of the people as well as the withdrawal of the central and leftist candidates possible. The reason is that the elections, and only the elections, can open the way to the third strategy, the only one capable of ending the vicious circle of 'assimilationism-independence.'"

On 22 May, the first five ETA members exiled left by air for Brussels. They were five of the ones tried in Burgos: Gorostidi, Larena, Uriarte, Onaindia and Dorronsoro. They had just reached Belgium when they gave statements to the press. Their intransigence was dazzlingly clear. They did not seem willing to cede one iota of their demands to balance the concessions of the government which, therefore, looked more like symptoms of weakness than gestures of goodwill to many political sectors.

Javier Larena said: "Either give us the amnesty that the Basque people want or everyone here is going to arm himself....If Suarez continues with delays as he has until now, he will have to accept the consequences that the people impose." Larena also stated: "Whoever wins the elections, no one will stop the mobilizations of the Basque people. They are going to increase with that campaign for the total democracy not granted and socialism." CAMBIO 16, which printed these statements, commented: "Those who have waited in jail for 8 years do not want to waste a minute more."

The released ETA members did not reject introduction of the topic of armed struggle. Although Uriarte expressed the primacy of "mass mobilizations," Mario Onaindia--who later would experience a very marked evolution--feared the formalism of the bourgeois democracy. He stated: "Under these conditions, there can be democracy and nothing will change essentially...(so) there must be demonstrations and new deaths in the streets. Under these circumstances, the armed struggle must be spontaneously reproduced through a self-defense mechanism of the people." He continued that idea: "When the people ask for armed struggle, there is no reason to deny them it." Onaindia felt: "ETA does not have anything to hide, any past to regret." To him and the other ETA members, their violence was different and was justified as opposed to the "black terrorism" that he condemned. Commenting on the Atocha massacre, he indicated: "It was then that the country discovered that we lived surrounded by murdering bands." Watching a film on the events in the Basque Country, a journalist asked them "if they would return to take up arms." The five "exiles" smiled with a gesture that could be interpreted as an affirmative. One of them said: "After having seen the film, you can imagine...."

Meanwhile, there was one of the frequent periods of crisis in the heart of ETA (p-m). Especially after the kidnapping of Javier de Ibarra on 20 May--to which we will refer later--the disagreement between the leadership of ETA (p-m) and the /talde bereziak/ or autonomous commands who decided to continue the armed struggle was clearly revealed. In a communique published on 11 May, these commands accused the leadership of ETA (p-m) of not really strengthening the military organisms and of having accepted a truce without previously obtaining a satisfactory response to the demands of the /abertzale/left. At the bottom of all this lay the secret talks with the Suarez government

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initiated apparently at the end of 1976 in which the two branches of the ETA participated. The March incidents interrupted the negotiations but they were resumed with only ETA (p-m) participating. In an internal publication of ETA (p-m), KEMEN No. 11, the leadership proposed a public statement of truce to its members which the commands interpreted as weakness. That led to the break and the /bereziak/ commands "expelled" the leadership, considering themselves the only ETA (p-m). This position did not thrive and the /bereziak/ ended by joining the ETA (m). 68

The catalyst in this crisis which affected not only ETA but all the /abertzale/left was participation in the elections. As we indicated before, the position favoring abstention seemed to predominate although the ETA (p-m)--or, more exactly, the leadership of ETA (p-m) to which the /bereziak/ commands were opposed as we have seen--was forming a favorable attitude toward the elections. Their arguments are contained in their publication, HAUTSI No. 15, which came out after the elections. In short, it was a matter of not leaving the field free for the PNV and the PSOE and being present at the discussion and elaboration of the statute which would be the major future topic.

ETA (m) opposed participation with arguments contained in ZUTIK, No. 68, which also came out after the elections. The ETA "milis" opposed what they saw as the intrinsic limitations of the regime (intangibility of the monarchy, national unity, hegemony of the army). There were other reasons that, in short, meant a disadvantage for the Basques if they accepted the imposed rules of the game. This was especially due to the lack of two basic requirements: total amnesty and respect for minimal democratic freedoms.

These differences between the two armed Basque organizations were reproduced in the political organizations. The parties in the KAS and another small group like the MC formed a united candidacy under the label Euskadiko Eskerra (Euskadi Left). After the events in the middle of May which we have already mentioned, the KAS candidates withdrew from Euskadiko Eskerra on 18 May. The trip to Belgium by the first five "exiles" inspired the main component of Euskadiko Eskerra, the EIA, to reexamine the subject of participation in the elections so it convoked an extraordinary assembly in Beasain on 28 May. A position to participate won by a majority of two to one. As Letamendia, one of the advocates of this position, said: "They start from the conviction that there is no democracy but it is necessary to use Parliament as a tribunal to denounce that lack of democracy and to defend a Basque democratic alternative against the Spanish parties so that the KAS alternative is credible to the masses." The conclusion was that "the /abertzale/ left reached 15 June divided, weakened and enmeshed in its worst crisis."

These disagreements among the different groups of the Basque left were not understood or accepted in Madrid. There were still many who did not believe the distinction between the two ETA's was significant. The differences among the host of small parties of the Basque left identified by their Euskeric initials were even less understood. To EL PAIS, the KAS candidates who withdrew on 18 May "might be motivated by the probable small implementation of their options in the electorate. Secondly, an eventual withdrawal from the elections by the other parties as well as the voters would at least

momentarily prevent the final replacement of the violent paramilitary space in which assimilationists and independentistas fight by the peaceful political space which the Basque democratic parties and presumably the people themselves of Euskadi advocate." Referring to the last attack of the ETA which took the life of armed policeman Manuel Ordera de la Cruz in San Sebasti n on 18 May before the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Javier Ibarra, the Madrid newspaper continued: "It is more than likely that at least some of the branches of ETA will unleash a new armed offensive whose ultimate objective would be the same: to keep the elections from opening a new area of constructive dialogue where all, absolutely all, the problems of the Basque people can be discussed and resolved by democratic and peaceful means." To

The kidnapping of Javier Ibarra y Berge which we have already mentioned was claimed by people considered to be part of ETA (p-m) although, as we have already said, it was the /Zabarra/ command of the /bereziak/. Its long communique referred to the "days of struggle in all of Euskadi for amnesty and the democratic freedoms (which) have been a clear sign that the working class and the Basque people in general demand a radical national alternative, refusing to accept the reformist hoax. In response, the government through its so-called Forces of Order has unleashed a wave of repression and murder in Euskadi whose balance tragically lives up to the best epochs of the Franco dictatorship." It continued: "We have brought battle to the enemy where it can most affect him: his repressive and oligarchical machine, upholder of the dominant system... With the arrest of Javier de Ibarra, we have struck one of the substantial pillars on which the present oppressive state rests: the oligarchy." They considered their hostage "a typical example of economic and political power, closely tied to the highest circles of the still intransigent Francoist bunker."

In this communique, it is not known whether the elementary nature of the ideas or the apparently spontaneous naturalness with which they justify their violence at the same time that they condemn the violence of the "dominant system" is more surprising. It is light-years away from a democratic concept and a cursory understanding of human rights. It is impressive to see that such crude and undeveloped concepts are at the root of the Basque drama and, by extension, to see the fragile nature of the Spanish democracy.

The elections approached but violence continued to affect political life. On Saturday, 4 June, two civil guards were murdered in Barcelona. At the same time, electrical installations in Madrid were attacked, leaving part of Madrid without electricity. GRAPO, the sinister phoenix that seemed to rise from its ashes, returned to make its presence known.

The government continued its exile policy and three other ETA members--Inaki Sarasketa, Jose Antonio Garmendia, pardoned in 1975 due to his loss of the ability to reason because of a head wound, and the well-known Francisco Javier Izco de la Iglesia, the most famous in the Burgos trial--arrived in Norway at the beginning of June. On 2 June, /Apala/, one of the most famous ETA leaders, was arrested by the French police and some naively thought that he could be used as a hostage to guarantee Ibarra's life since he was considered responsible for the kidnapping command that demanded 1 billion pesetas for the

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release of its victim. /Apala/, who denied his participation in the kidnapping, was held in Porquerolle where, at the end of May, 10 of the most dangerous members of the ETA (m) had ended up by decision of the French minister of interior.

The elections held on 15 June made the death of Ibarra who had already been kidnapped a month fade into the background. The great dream of millions of Spaniards consisted in the hope that democracy would end the violence and terrorism would disappear. EL PAIS expressed this naively: "Violence is not the patrimony of any regime but statistics show that there is less terrorism today than in the last years of the dictatorship and there is, in exchange, more freedom. The violence that at times breaks out in our land is not the result of bad government but the inheritance of a past that it will take us years to erase from our lives." 71

When Ibarra's murder was not yet confirmed, CAMBIO 16 wrote: "If it is true that Ibarra has been murdered, the groups that condemn and do things like this leave the political arena and fall exclusively in the arena of common crime. To commit a cowardly murder a few days after the freeest elections in the history of Spain would be an act of provocation or crime without any extenuating circumstances." 72

What was first a fear unfortunately became evidence when, on 22 June, a week after the bright electoral 15 June, Javier de Ibarra's body was found in the spurs of Berazar. If the kidnapping was unanimously condemned, the murder reached even greater heights of rejection and condemnation. DEIA, a newspaper close to the PNV, condemned the murder energetically as it also condemned "any attempt to manipulate this act slowing down the democratization of the country." It also wrote: "However, every violent deed has roots that explain but do not justify this psychopathology that our country is suffering." EL PAIS stated: "Ibarra's murder does not even fall under 'terrorism.' It is a kidnapping followed by attempted extortion and premeditated murder....The Basque People for Liberty do not deserve this insult." What did the Madrid newspaper mean? Perhaps everything that had been done before under those initials--ETA--was honorable? This demonstrates the complex understanding of terrorism by the Spanish people, the news media and political leaders. For a long time, they more or less tacitly accepted "certain" terrorism and "certain" violence. It was contradictory, for example, that a man like Jose Maria Benegas, a PSOE leader in the Basque Country, spoke simply of a "tremendous political mistake." Juan Maria Bandres, recently elected senator for Euskadiko Eskerra in Guipuzcoa was cleverer when he commented: "I have always been against the death penalty. I believe that human life is inviolate." The ETA (p-m) itself condemned the crime in its press organ HAUTSI: "That is not the style of the ETA. That is not the way which has given us unquestionable popular support and sympathy during these years."75

The summer of 1977 which began with the general elections meant the end of one political stage and the beginning of a very different stage in terrorism. As we have already seen, terrorism of every color was present at this time. GRAPO still had time to place two bombs in the headquarters of DIARIO 16

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causing damage valued at 20 million pesetas. However, this did not keep the newspaper from printing. Earlier, at the beginning of May, the president of Empresa Cros, Jose Maria Bulto, was murdered in Barcelona by the inhumane procedure of placing a bomb on his chest. Several organizations including FRAP claimed responsibility in communiques that could not be authenticated.

Case of Marginal Terrorism: the MPAIAC

In the panorama of Spanish terrorism during the stage of transition to democracy, everything was not reduced to the "big" three in terrorism: ETA, GRAPO and the far right. There were other marginal phenomena, the most important being the MPAIAC whose leader was attorney Antonio Cubillo.

Cubillo was a man close to the PCE who chose the road to exile in 1961. He went to Paris and 3 years later went to Algeria where he lived under the protection of the Algerian authorities who gave him a position teaching Spanish. At that time, Cubillo was completely disillusioned by the PCE. The same year he arrived in Algeria, 1964, he founded the MPAIAC which, for a long time, was a "one-man group."

Meanwhile Cubillo was elaborating his very basic and unoriginal theory in which it is not hard to find elements of the theory of the Algerian revolution. Cubillo defined the MPAIAC as a "patriotic national liberation movement...that tries to include all the social strata that are for independence, popular freedoms and, in the future, socialism."76

Cubillo extolled his organization which he said had four fronts: the political-diplomatic, worker, cultural and military. However, it must be recognized that Cubillo did have some diplomatic triumphs to his credit. The first was in 1968 when he got the OAU to recognize the "Africanness" of the Canary Islands. Another far-reaching victory was the permission granted by the Algerian authorities in 1975—when Spain signed the tripartite agreement on the Sahara with Morocco and Mauritania—to broadcast a daily 30—minute program called "The Voice of the Free Canary Islands." Starting then, Cubillo and the MPAIAC became well known and won some followers in the archipelago. Cubillo's mottos were stated in his "theory of the war of the fleas" summarized as follows: "It is necessary to pester from all sides, each one acting on his own."

On 1 November 1976—the same day when the armed struggle of the Algerian FLN began 22 years before—the "military front" of the MPAIAC went into action. The objectives of this offensive were the Canary Island branches of the large Madrid stores, travel agencies or government buildings. It was never necessary to mourn deaths or serious wounds since, as Cubillo announced from his Algerian microphones, they used small explosives "in order not to cause serious harm." However, the broadcasts of "The Voice of the Free Canary Islands" gave instructions for manufacturing homemade bombs and urged the cells of the MPAIAC to become "shock groups," the basis for the future "Guanches Armed Forces." Passage to the "armed struggle" caused a crisis in the heart of the MPAIAC and some left the organization. Cubillo "dissolved" these rebel

groups which he accused of having been "bureaucratized by the infiltration of Carrillo revisionist intellectuals." These dissident groups stated that they were not against the "armed struggle" but they declined the opportunity because "the objective conditions are not right."77 Cubillo continued with what he called the "phase of armed propaganda" that caused an acknowledged psychosis of terror in the archipelago.

At the beginning of 1977, concretely on 16 February, a bomb was thrown at an armed police van. It was the first time that the FOP were attacked. This seemed to mean that the MPAIAC was beginning a new stage in its terrorist offensive. This attack could also be seen as a response to the arrests of alleged members of the MPAIAC a few days earlier by the intelligence services of the Civil Guard. They included the man considered to be the military leader of MPAIAC, Guillermo Santana Garcia. Another important leader, Domingo Acosta, secretly went to Algeria in March. In February and March 1977, Cubillo's broadcasts served to publicize several GRAPO communiques which, as we already know, had kidnapped Antonio Maria de Oriol and General Villaescusa. This made the Algerian authorities unhappy and they demanded prior approval of Cubillo's broadcasts. With the pretext that the picturesque Canary Island leader had the "flu," the broadcasts were suspended for several weeks. Spanish diplomatic pressure, the commercial interests of Algeria itself and the stand of some Algerian political circles were the reasons for these restrictions in Cubillo's radio privateering privilege.

The independence leader energetically rejected the idea that GRAPO was managed by the far right, stating: "All this is the invention of Madrid." In statements to CAMBIO 16, Qubillo accused Carrillo of denouncing the members of MPAIAC who were arrested. The magazine pointed out: "Most of the Algerian circles cannot ignore the idea that Cubillo has been manipulated without knowing it." 78

As the date of the first general elections approached, Cubillo announced to the press his intention to "extend our armed propaganda to the Spanish Pyrenees." He also announced that, in the next stage, "we will attack Spanish interests abroad." The Algerian atmosphere changed and became more favorable toward Cubillo who resumed his broadcasts on 12 May. A day later a bomb claimed by MPAIAC exploded in the Galerias Preciados store on Calle Arapiles in Madrid. 79

Cubillo prepared a new diplomatic offensive for the meetings that the OAU held in May and June 1977. A subcommittee of the organization met in Dar-es-Salaam in May and agreed to include the Canary Islands on its working agenda. The Liberation Committee of the OAU met in Luanda (Angola) in June and permitted Cubillo to present a report in which he pointed out the "Canary Islands colonial status." According to Cubillo, there was a Spanish-U.S. plan to make the Canary Islands a major strategic base for NATO to control Mahgreb and western Africa, keeping all the national liberation movements and the new African nations in check. He stated prophetically: "If you do not support the Canary Islands and the MPAIAC now, the responsibility for the future of Africa and the islands will haunt you until the end of your days." Agostinho Neto, the Angolan leader, promised to help Cubillo "until complete liberation of the Canary Islands."

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On 23 June, the 29th OAU Conference began in Libreville (Gabon). With the above precedents, it seemed that Cubillo could achieve success but Spanish diplomatic action supported by France had the committee sent by Cubillo expelled. However, the conference did agree to send a mission consisting of Libya, Algeria, Senegal, Guinea and Nigeria to draw up a report. If favorable, it would lead the OAU Liberation Committee to give arms and money to Cubillo through secret agreements. Spain refused to be included in the OAU mission since, in the opinion of Spanish diplomacy, that would be equivalent to recognizing the theses of the MPAIAC. The OAU Conference of Chiefs of State that was held immediately following did not add anything to the topic of the Canary Islands although it was understood that the archipelago was included when "the anticolonialist struggles" were mentioned.80

The subsequent activities of the MPAIAC correspond to another period in the evolution of Spanish terrorism. We will return to it then.

FOOTNOTES

- 1. See CAMBIO 16, No 215, 1 January 1976, pp 14, 15.
- 2. See MUNDO DIARIO, 8 February 1976, Editorial "We Have Attained Something."
- 3. See Robert Moss, "La guerrilla urbana," Ed. Nacional, Madrid, 1972, pp 55 ff.
- 4. Ibid., p 67.
- 5. INFORMACIONES, 8 April 1976, p 1, Editorial "In Cold Blood."
- 6. CAMBIO 16, No 228, 19 April 1976, p 3, Editorial "Against ETA, Freedom."
- 7. Ibid.
- 8. See Letamendia, op. cit., p 349.
- 9. See EL PAIS, 16 June 1976, p 13.
- 10. See EL PAIS, 27 June 1976, back page.
- 11. CAMBIO 16, No 241, 19 July 1976, Editorial "Amnesty," p 3.
- 12. CAMBIO 16. No 242, 26 July 1976, Editorial "Who Placed the Bombs?", p 3.
- 13. EL PAIS, 20 July 1976, Editorial "The Dynamiters," p 6.
- 14. EL PAIS, 3 August 1976, p 9.
- 15. LA VOZ DE ESPANA, 4 September 1976.

- 16. Letamendia, op. cit., p 348. When publication of the quoted letter brought the /Pertur/ case to the forefront again in January 1978, a bitter argument arose. /Pertur's/ brother, also an /abertzale/ militant, accused the /bereziak/, justifying his position with the well-known phrase: "Truth is revolutionary." EL PAIS indicated that the revelations "seriously tarnish the image that the ETA members have tried to perpetuate recently." It alluded to "the infernal dialectics that motivates the armed vanguards." (EL PAIS, 25 January 1978, Editorial "/Pertur's/ Death," p 6. See also p 15, "ETA Member Was First to Suspect /Bereziak/ in /Pertur/ Case" and "New Data on Last Days of /Pertur/.") Also see CAMBIO 16, No 323, 12 February 1978, "/Pertur/ Case: ETA Against ETA," pp 22 ff.
- 17. Ibid., p 349.
- 18. Robert Moss, op. cit., pp 128, 129.
- 19. Ibid., p 129.
- 20. Ibid., p 130.
- 21. See Walter Laqueur, "Terrorismo," p 179, Ed. Espasa-Calpe, Madrid, 1980.
- 22. See Julen Aguirre, "Operation Ogre," op. cit., p 149.
- 23. See DIARIO 16, 2 March 1981, p 6, "/Pertur/ Would Have Liked Him."
- 24. Letamendia, op. cit., p 349.
- 25. DIARIO 16, article cited in footnote 22.
- 26. The points of the KAS alternative are as follows: 1) establishment of full democratic freedoms; 2) total amnesty with freedom for all political prisoners and return of the exiles; 3) dissolution of the repressive corps and those of special jurisdiction and acknowledged responsibility; 4) measures to improve the living and working conditions of the popular masses, especially the working class; 5) recognition of national sovereignty in Euskadi and its right to freely determine its national future; 6) provisional establishment of a statute of autonomy for southern Euskadi which covers all its territory including Navarra; 7) within the framework of that statute, constitution of a provisional government that will participate in the organs of the central government and will respect its constitution if both recognize the principles expressed here; 8) KAS understands that these demands cannot be achieved through negotiations with the reformist governments of the monarchy but through a process of popular struggle to end the continuation of fascism and the oligarchical government.
- 27. See Letamendia, op. cit., p 351.

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- 28. Ibid., p 353.
- 29. Ibid., p 354.
- 30. EL PAIS, 1 September 1976.
- 31. CAMBIO 16, No 250, 20 September 1976, pp 16 ff.
- 32. EL PAIS, 15 September 1976, Editorial "After Fuenterrabia," p 8.
- 33. CAMBIO 16, No 247, 30 August 1976, pp 3, 18-20.
- 34. CAMBIO 16, No 253, 11 October 1976, cover and pp 8 ff.
- 35. CAMBIO 16, No 254, 18 October 1976, p 11, "The Basques Not Granted Amnesty."
- 36. CAMBIO 16, No 260, 29 November 1976, p 55.
- 37. EL PAIS, 7 November 1976, back page.
- 38. EL PAIS, 16 October 1976, Editorial "Terrorism Has No Ideology," p 8.
- 39. CAMBIO 16, No 262, 19 December 1976, "Far Right; There Is No One Who Can," p 39.
- 40. CAMBIO 16, No 260, 29 November 1976, "Mercenaries Against ETA," pp 52, 53.
- 41. Ibid.
- 42. MUNDO DIARIO, 2 December 1976, "Anti-ETA Commands Revealed; Names; Connections and Remuneration," p 4.
- 43. EL PAIS, 12 December 1976, Editorial "Kidnapping of Oriol," p 8.
- 44. DIARIO 16, 13 December 1976, Editorial "Strange GRAPO," p 4.
- 45. EL PAIS, 12 December 1976, pp 11, 12.
- 46. EL PAIS, 17 December 1976, Editorial "EL PAIS and Its Responsibilities," p 6.
- 47. CAMBIO 16, 26 December 1976, "Blows to the Left," p 41.
- 48. CAMBIO 16, 23 January 1977, Editorial "With GRAPO's Permission," p 3.
- 49. CAMBIO 16, 6 February 1977, "The Fascist International," p 13.
- 50. Serial on "Week of Conspiracy" was published by Gregorio Moran in ten installments in DIARIO 16 from 19 to 30 May 1977.

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- 51. CAMBIO 16, No 271, 20 February 1977, "GRAPO and the CIA," p 12.
- 52. Luis Gonzalez-Mata, "Cygne," Ed. Grasset, Paris, 1976.
- 53. CAMBIO 16. No 271, 20 February 1977, Editorial "RAP, RAP," p 13.
- 54. CAMBIO 16, No 272, 27 February 1977, "GRAPO's Puppets," pp 8 ff.
- 55. EL PAIS, 12 February 1977, Editorial "Everything Is Not Over," p 6.
- 56. EL PAIS, 16 February 1977, Editorial "Profound Skepticism," p 8.
- 57. HISTORIA 16, No 11, March 1977, "Chronicle of La Villa y Corte," p 8.
- 58. More information on these Italian neofascists can be found in CAMBIO 16, No 273, 6 March 1977, p 20; CAMBIO 16, No 274, 13 March 1977, pp 16 ff.; and EL PAIS, 23 February 1977, p 11.
- 59. EL PAIS, 24 February 1977, Editorial "Terror and the Secret," p 6.
- 60. CAMBIO 16, No 269, 6 February 1977, "Ikurrinas Unfurled," pp 14, 15.
- 61. CAMBIO 16, No 275, 20 March 1977, "Never Ending Amnesty," pp 8 ff.
- 62. Juan Maria Bandres, "The Decree and the Amnesty," in CAMBIO 16, No 276, 27 March 1977, p 21. On the page before is a chart with a list of the prisoners who would not immediately benefit from the new amnesty although their cases could be the subject of individual study and resolution, according to the new law.
- 63. Letamendia, in his cited work, wrote: "Of the 110 Basque political prisoners, about 80 leave by the end of a month but very slowly, one by one. Their departure makes the situation of the approximately 30 prisoners left even more pathetic. It is another government smoke screen presented as total amnesty and again there are ambiguous phrases and limp statements by the forces in the negotiating commission" (op. cit., p 366).
- 64. EL PAIS, 25 March 1977, Editorial "Violence in Euskadi," p 8.
- 65. Op. cit., p 369.
- 66. EL PAIS, 17 May 1977, Editorial "Euskadi: Three Strategies," p 3.
- 67. CAMBIO 16. No 287, 12 June 1977, "ETA, Farewell to Arms," pp 39 ff.
- 68. We have followed Letamendia's narration and his analysis of the crisis of the /abertzale/ left, op. cit., pp 365 ff.
- 69. Ibid., pp 373, 374.

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- 70. EL PAIS, 19 May 1977, Editorial "Euskadi: Blackmail by the Abstentionists," p 8.
- 71. EL PAIS, 5 June 1977, Editorial "The Threat Becomes Concrete," p 6.
- 72. CAMBIO 16, No 290, 3 July 1977, Editorial "Settled, Country," p 3.
- 73. DEIA, 23 June 1977, Editorial "A Murder," back page.
- 74. EL PAIS, 23 June 1977, Editorial "Euskadi Is Not Guilty," p 8.
- 75. Quoted in MUNDO DIARIO, 2 August 1977, "Ibarra's Death; ETA Member Condemns," p 1.
- 76. Statements to CAMBIO 16, No 262, 19 December 1976, "Canary Islands; Independence Elevated to Cubillo," pp 23 ff. Concerning Cubillo, the origins of the MPAIAC and the doctrinary bases of Canary Island independence, see also MUNDO, 20 November 1976, "Canary Archipelago; Armed Struggle," p 25; GUADIANA, 3 February 1977, "Canary Islands, MPAIAC, Independentist Experiment," pp 20 ff.; and INTERVIU, 24 February 2 March 1977, "MPAIAC, the ETA of the Canary Islands," pp 14, 15.
- 77. MUNDO, 20 November 1976, "Canary Islands: Armed Struggle," p 25.
- 78. CAMBIO 16, No 270, 13 February 1977, "Cubillo: 'GRAPO Is My Friend,'" p 23.
- 79. LE MONDE, 12 June 1977, "The Separatists Proclaim a Boycott of the 15 June Elections"; CAMBIO 16, No 286, 5 June 1977, "Cubillo, the GRAPO and Others," p 12.
- 80. CAMBIO 16, No 292, 17 July 1977, "Canary Islands: Volcano in the Atlantic," and "Cubillo to His Own," pp 18 ff., and No 293, 24 July 1977. "OAU, the Black Babel, pp 48 ff.

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SWITZERLAND

TERRORISM AS MISSION, RESPONSIBILITY: REFLECTIONS OF A PSYCHOANALYST

Basel ANALYTISCHE PSYCHOLOGIE in German 1979 pp 190-215

[Article by Wolfgang Giegerich, written in Stuttgart, May 1977]

[Text] To preclude a misunderstanding from the very beginning: The formulation "terrorism as mission" is not to be an intimidation that the following remarks are to bring about a glorification of terrorism or even a call to terrorist acts. I am by no means writing as a sympathizer of the anarchist scene, but I find terrorism just as despicable as everybody else does. I am also familiar with the indignation that arouses desires for revenge and which could produce a more or less hidden demand for "court-martial and execution," for the "eradication" of this "criminal gang."

Psychoanalysis, however, takes a peculiar approach to those things that are despicable. It goes back to the early beginnings of psychoanalysis. At that time, between 70 and 80 years ago, Freud touched on something with his interpretation of neurosis which produced an abhorrence among the public which at that time was as strong as today's disgust for terrorism: sexuality. It is true, today we can hardly imagine how much sexuality was detested at one time and the immediate, affective indignation that followed violations of the sexual taboo, because today the whole world knows and even little children are permitted to learn in school that sexuality is something "natural and beautiful." Nevertheless, we can still more or less imagine what it was like at that time when we think of the passionate persecution and the moral defamation that Freud was exposed to. Although he himself was a man with a distinct moral conscience, being a psychoanalyst, he delved especially into the forbidden areas. After all, it is the task of psychoanalysis to reveal the "other side" and to bring back the memory of those things that have been suppressed by the ruling consciousness. Psychoanalysis must deal with the objectionable and despicable things.

The reason why the attitude of the psychotherapist seems really peculiar, however, is the fact that he does not simply adopt an opposing position and propagate the reversal of all values. The meaning of psychoanalysis was never, for instance, to condone sexual excesses and to take the things that are an abomination and change them into "something good" just like that. Rather, moral scruples, disgust, resistance are taken just as seriously as the object against which the resistance is directed. As a consequence,

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a fundamentally new level of consideration has been achieved. Instead of being partial to one side or fighting on the same level for the opposite position, psychoanalysis leaves this moralistic level entirely and is considering the life of the soul under the viewpoint of its actuality (i.e., its phenomenology). Both, the things we despise (for instance, the sexual drive) and the moral principle (for instance, the condemnation of sexuality or something dirty or evil) are concerns of the soul, are psychic facts. Therefore, the psychoanalyst will certainly not deny the moral or unconscious-affective values and present all manner of conduct as good ("healthy," "beautiful," "natural"), or neutral; there is no cheap way to get around the pathological, the perverse, the obscene and the evil values. But he will no more take these values as he does, for instance, the taboo sexual impulses and make them into a principle and viewpoint of his own attitudes, but he will consider both as objects for his research and experience, because they are at any given time individual psychic substances, and it is not possible to take one arbitrarily and use it as a criterion for the others.

According to Jung's presentation, alchemists--spiritual ancestors of psychoanalysts--had a deep aversion to the idea of incest; it did not deter them, however, from describing incestuous alliances (conjunctio) in their works if they were the result of spontaneous ideas, just as much as Freud later investigated oedipal incest phantasies without taking a position "for" or "against" incest. The psychoanalyst must employ a similar attitude to approach such phenomena as murder or terrorism, which today are absolutely considered the most barbarous and depraved ways of behavior. He does not condemn, but he also does not condone; he does not at all pronounce a verdict of "good" and "evil," "right" or "wrong," but in murder and terrorism he sees facts which he can first only establish, just like a natural scientist who in the beginning only registers and describes an earthquake or a volcanic eruption. The general consciousness, which appropriated for itself moral judgment (or in other cases, a subjective, human feeling of disgust) and has become identical with it, essentially means that murder, because it is "inhuman," "evil," and "forbidden" and therefore should not be, yes, to a certain extent it is an impossibility (because "something cannot be that must not be"). But just as much as our disgust is not an absolutely valid objection to the (biological) right to existence of spiders and rats but the reaction and sensitivity of one kind of living being to certain other kinds, the moral revulsion is also not an ultimately valid objection against the psychic "legitimacy" of murder, destruction and aggression. It is the essence of the message of the moral axiom that murdering is evil, but the moral message is only one "message" in the human soul in addition to others, for instance, impulses and emotions. It is itself only a psychic and not a metaphysical truth and for that reason it has the same degree of reality as does the murder impulse (although it is part of its phenomenology to claim the metaphysical absoluteness for its truth). One truth, the one of morality, which says that murder is inhuman does not exclude the other truth that murder is very much a genuine human possibility and originates in the soul as does the moral judgment on it. It sounds like a contradiction, but in reality it is only a conflict, and anybody can experience it in some form of a conflict. To begin with, facts or phenomena exist and they are entitled to

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the legitimacy that befits all things that are; their effect on our feelings and our judgment on them, however, are always secondary without being any less real and, within the framework of a psychological attitude, any less legitimate; as characteristics they are part of the total picture of the psychic phenomenon.

Psychic facts, as it were, have an appealing character. They are tasks: They want to be recognized, "integrated," "understood" as reality. If we become victims of moral outrage--on one hand it is certainly justified--become slaves to it and consider a terrorist act as nothing but an act of insanity, a terrorist as a criminal who has disqualified himself morally: a barbarian, and if we are satisfied with this opinion, we are taking it too lightly. The mere rejection does not do justice to something that is real. When we use the word "criminal," we only put aside the phenomenon, and we want to rid ourselves of the "responsibility" which has been placed upon us by reality--to find an answer to the task--rather than accept it. Terrorist acts are putting a "question" to us. Why is it that something so terrible is possible at all? What is it all about? There is something in this blind violence that is crying out, something that wants to be heard. The incomprehensible acts of terror demand that we make a serious attempt to come to terms with this phenomenon mentally--not only outwardly by using police force. What I am saying is that the victims of terrorism but also the unutterable misery which the terrorists brought upon themselves (I am thinking of the Baader-Meinhof gang) must not be totally in vain, an absurdity without meaning. If this were so, another piece of incomprehensible reality would carelessly be swept on the garbage pile of history, a letter placed in the files unopened, an indigestible lump swallowed. We would have "taken care" of the matter, and yet, deep down, it would remain unsettled. There is something here that is waiting for deliverance.

Whatever happens to us, binds us, it involves us and becomes an obligation in itself whether we want it or not. It will not leave us alone. We cannot simply get rid of it by pushing it away, making light of it or ignoring it. No matter how paradox and "unfair" it may sound: Because of the crime which the terrorists committed against our society, because of their attack on us we owe them (and us) something: We must accept the question which has been raised; we must mentally recognize the phenomenon of terrorism; eventually we even must find some way to reconcile ourselves with it.

Of course, when I say reconciliation, I do not mean a legal amnesty. The attempt to make some sense out of terrorism is not to end up as a cheap harmonization to be used to deny the negative, barbarous and absurd acts or subsequently glorify them. The terrorist act is a crime. The law enforcement organs have the right and duty to fight anarchists and to protect the citizens from them. But in addition to this exclusively negative reaction, the no!, the battle against them, annihilation and placing them behind walls or in fortresses (Stammheim!) there is also a positive reaction to that which we abhor. It consists of interpreting the event as an appeal to us, a challenge to take stock of the situation. What does terrorism have to say to us; what does it have to do with us, where do we have to make changes? As long as we are not policemen, we do not have to look at the situation from the standpoint of the police, without, however, ungratefully forgetting the

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protection which it grants us and without losing sight of the law which it defends. In addition to (not instead of) the standpoint of the law enforcement organs, other viewpoints concerning the facts must exist and be permitted, for instance, a "purely human" or a psychological attitude.

What can prompt people (particularly those from "bourgeois families") to become terrorists? From where do they derive the strength to place themselves outside the community, to give up all forms of security in life, taking upon themselves the enormity of bomb attacks that also destroy "innocent people" and holding out until the bitter end, including hunger strike and without any kind of personal gain? It is not appropriate to take refuge in expressions such as "evil desire," "criminal disposition," "perverse adventuresome mentality." They are insufficient. In this context it would also be absurd to use concepts like "sick," "psychologically disturbed," "full of complexes," "politicization of personal conflicts." The phenomenon is too powerful, too huge to be contained in such concepts, they would explode. Terrorism cannot simply be derived from the family situation, personal life experiences and the upbringing of its supporters, something that must be emphasized in defense of the parents. Consequently, it would be nothing but a bad joke--an idea that is utopian anyway--to "cure" terrorists by using the methods of conventional psychotherapy. Other approaches must be considered. The phenomenon simply goes beyond personal psychology.

Even the terrorists themselves would not very readily agree with a personal psychological interpretation of their intentions. Rather, the way they see themselves is in total reference to the collective social and political situation, and they consider their behavior as a strategy or tactic with the purpose of achieving a certain political goal expressed in manifestos. As much as we have to affirm the emphasis on the collective-objective dimension of terrorism in contrast to the personalistic view, on the other hand, we cannot and do not want to follow this unique, in other words, political self-explanation either. Although there is undeniably a strong rational and conscious trait when planning and implementing terrorist actions, it must not cover up the totally irrational character of terrorism, because essentially it came into being through something irrational. The interpretation, according to which terrorism (in the liberal welfare societies of the industrial countries--among the Palestinians, for instance, things are certainly quite different) goes back to personal political opinions and that terrorism is nothing but a conscious, rational, purposeful act, is still not getting at the cause of it and also reflects a superficial, completely inadequate, personalistic view. The viewpoint of personal desire and opinion cannot answer our question satisfactorily; it cannot explain where individuals get the strength to oppose an entire society, a human community in which and from the native soil of which they derive their very opportunities of existence. No personal will would be strong enough to carry out such a radical, almost incomprehensible operation, because every instinct of the individual runs counter to this behavior; and no individual would have enough strength on his own to bear the almost cosmic loneliness that results from such a separation -- unless there is another force which carries and supports him and compensates for the security of the community, which makes all our lives possible. Just thinking about such loneliness can make one shudder.

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In the lives of the terrorists, anything personal is almost entirely in the background. It is a life without personal consideration, giving up happiness, comfort and most of the other private interests in life that an ordinary person enjoys, a life of renunciation, asceticism and sacrifice. Terrorists are almost no longer persons who act according to their own thoughts, feelings and aspirations, but they are almost total servants, in other words, impersonal tools and organs executing an idea. When we visualize the lifestyle of terrorists, their devotion, an almost absolute obedience to their mission and call and when we then look for the closest parallels or analogies, what comes to our minds--as long as we are not blinded by our affective rejection of terrorism--is the picture of such objective forms of life as the life of an official, for instance, a Prussian civil servant who knows nothing but his duty, or even better, a monk or a priest. It may sound like blasphemy to compare a terrorist with a priest, but a phenomenological way of looking at things cannot but confirm a certain analogy. To be sure, goal and contents of the respective mission are entirely different. The terrorist serves destruction and violence, the priest, on the other hand, serves love. Nevertheless, it does not change the fact that according to its phenomenology, the life of the terrorist appears to have been selected from the ranks of ordinary people, just like the priest, the prophet or the Maid of Orleans, I almost want to say: chosen, and he is living out of devotion, consecrated to a superpersonal "idea." (To land in prison, on the stake or the cross, naturally, is very much part of the life of a chosen person.)

Of course, it is difficult to reference to our Christian-enlightened harmlessness, which can only envision the priesthood as something good. But morality is not always and not necessarily a part of the religious way of life. The history of religion has seen forms of the priesthood, the office of which originally practiced a great deal of cruelty. Here is only one example: During the period of antiquity, the sacred grove and the shrine of Diana Nemorensis were located at the Italian lake of Nemi. In this grove there grew a certain tree, and one could see a dark figure walking around it at any time of day until late at night. The man carried a sword in his hand, and he was constantly looking around as if he expected to be attacked by an enemy at any moment. He was a priest and a murderer; and the man for whom he was looking would murder him sooner or later and become priest in his stead. It was the rule of the shrine. A candidate for the priesthood could only attain the office by killing the priest, and after he had killed him he stayed in office until he was killed by a stronger or more skillful person (according to Frazer, 1922). -- Thus a dimension of religious reality becomes visible which shatters all bourgeois-harmonic-moral thinking, a reality which makes the comparison between the way of life of the priest and the one of the terrorist appear not quite so irrelevant in spite of the fact that the example has no direct relationship to terrorism, although on the basis of our conventional moralistic concepts of religious offices one might have assumed otherwise.

The issue is not to upgrade the anarchist into something like a priest but to do justice to the power and extent of the phenomenon, to its enormity by adjusting the framework, the dimension and the categories of our thinking on the phenomenon to meet its requirements. The real motivating force behind

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the way of life of the terrorist and the principle that shapes it cannot be found within the terrorist himself, neither can the lifestyle of the priest be derived from the conditions of the personality of the individual clergyman. Rather, the lifestyle of the individual priest is determined by a superimposed, prescribed principle, he is the fulfillment of a preordained design, and whoever wants to understand his lifestyle must take into consideration the objective psychology of the office of the priest, including its "metaphysics" and symbolism and its independence--independent, of course, of any personal motives that the individual officials might have. Because inherent in inis lifestyle is the fact that the private life is more or less sacrificed to the superpersonal office. The terrorist also sacrifices his private life, in part even his physical existence--just like a martyr--to a superimposed independent "office"; nevertheless, there is an important difference, which is that his "office" is not given to him by the outside, by society. It is not rooted in the collective consciousness. It has no social legitimacy but an individual legitimacy which is based on the spontaneous "natural force" of the soul. Therefore it would be more appropriate in this instance to use the term of prophetic mission or work rather than office. Accordingly the anarchist would be more like an artist (of recent times) whose work is also quite individualistic and creatively new. One cannot know what it will look like until it is finished, because it is not a simple repetition of a familiar picture, passed on by tradition. But in spite of the inherent individualistic character of creativity, the artist is not only personally motivated and destined. Jung (1971) says: "It is apparently quite evident that the artist must be explained from his art and not from the inadequacies of his nature and his personal conflicts..." (Article 158). "In the end, whatever wants to be within him, it is not the person but it is the piece of art" (Article 157). Goethe saw it the same way: "The songs made me, I did not make them," and Nietzsche formulated the following words: "Am I searching for my happiness? I am searching for my work." The work, however, like the office is something objective and impersonal; the artist does not create it but it forces itself upon him and it has its own autonomous, objective psychology, which is the reason why the artist does not have to be by any means the best authority for the interpretation of his works: As an interpreter he is just as much a human being and a person like everybody else, and possibly he is as much a stranger to his own work and its real creator as is the public.

Terrorist acts are not acts of madness by individuals, although we would like to see them that way to make them more harmless. It is not enough to use a purely negative attitude and point to the flaws: inhumanity, unreasonableness, abnormality. There is also something positive to terrorist acts (in this respect, however, "positive" is not intended to attach a value): No matter how destructive and negative they are, they are still an expression of a creative force; no matter how immoral, they spring from an extraordinary degree of a moral life, and inexorable victory of a spiritual principle over mere natural aspirations (one need only remember the hunger strike!); no matter how sinister and dark the works of the terrorists are, they are still the religious fulfillment of a fateful life. Already the general outrage and the horror show that we are faced with a "monstrous" power that goes way beyond the ordinary, with a reality and a (albeit evil) truth that cannot be eliminated from the face of the earth by turning away from it or belittling it,

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using as an explanation that the causes are personal conflicts, a misguided formation of opinions or deprivation. On the contrary, terrorism reveals an objective-psychic content, a reality.

Therefore the true subject of terrorist acts is not the terrorist, taken as a person, which is the reason why he is no more or no less personally responsible for his act than the artist is responsible for his work. Just as much as the artist's interpretation of his own work is not reliable, information by terrorists on the reason and purpose of their actions must not be taken literally, because they would only report as persons and interpret their terrorist activities subjectively, seeing themselves as victims of these terrorist acts that have been thrust upon them objectively.

Because they confuse themselves just as much as we do with the real subject of their actions, the mighty, real idea which is the driving force behind them. Their information could only have profound validity to the extent to which they might have become aware of the power which has manifested itself within them as a psychic background which themselves distinguished.

Of course, we are especially interested in the reason why: why did particularly these people become a part of the terrorist scene? Considering what has been discussed above, it is clear that there can be no explanation for the decision to adopt this style of protest—because it is not at all a matter of decision. I believe that in this particular case we can only confirm an event after it has taken place; we cannot explain it any more than we can explain the reason that made Mozart into Mozart and Saul into Paul. One cannot choose the kind of terrorism that has appeared on our scene. Rather, we should perhaps say it the other way around, terrorists were "selected" and seized by terrorism and in it they discovered themselves and their own fateful way of life. Is it not possible that our longing for "explanations" expresses the desire to remove the power from the objective psychic reality, to take away the potency of the "Gods," because for logical reasons every explanation of the "decision" would confirm the ego in its self-glory?

Everything would be so much simpler and more agreeable if terrorism could be explained from the personal inadequacies of the few individuals who support it. Because then it would simply be nonsense, a perversion or a sickness-in short, it would be nothing and as such it would not really have to be taken seriously. We could "thank God that we are not like this one"; we could find peace in the thought that whatever happened was the private work of a few who have gone astray and it only concerns them. We ourselves would not be involved at all, we would be outsiders and observers who could only be affected by the consequences of the acts. At that moment, however, when we must realize that behind the terrorist acts is an actual subject, an objective psychic reality, the picture changes. Suddenly they are of great concern to us; we have been involved in it from the very beginning: It becomes my business. I am not referring to such platitudes, for instance, that everybody, as a human being, is perhaps a potential murderer and nobody knows what he may be compelled to do when driven by fate. It remains noncommittal and distracts from the real thing. On the other hand, however, I do no want to obliterate the differences between us and the actual terrorists: We are

not terrorists and presumably never will be terrorists. We have not committed any violent crimes and therefore we do not need to have a bad conscience. The issue is really something quite different. We have to recognize our connection and solidarity with the things we detest and identify with that which we are not.

If terrorism is not to be considered from the personalistic point of view but from its psychological autonomy and objectivity and if the terrorist is not considered any more responsible for violent acts than the artist is for his work, the reverse would have to be considered, meaning that they cannot only be attributed to the terrorist but just as much to the community as a whole. An objective reality is not the private property of individuals, it belongs to everybody, it has a collective dimension. Just like a work of art originates in a single invidual without, however, being his own personal affair, terrorism is also evident in individuals and still possesses universal significance, yes, validity. What differentiates a piece of art from the painting of a hobbyist is the fact that it is not of a purely private nature but that it is born of an entire period and it has something important to say to this time and maybe for all times. The piece of art concerns everybody, a whole people and sometimes even all mankind. Although the artist's personality becomes a part of the piece of art, whatever makes a work a piece of art, the style, is only incidentally inherent in the personality of the artist, it is not substantive. Just as much the persons who are terrorists might only be related by accident to the objective phenomenon of terrorism, and in the final analysis it may have no more to do with them than it does with us, in this respect I am not referring to our characteristic as private persons with our own idiosyncracies and opinions but to the objective-factual level, the collective-superpersonal side in us. In other words, the same distinction between personal characteristics and objective factors which we emphasized when we mentioned priests, artists and terrorists, also applies to us. After all, we are not only Mr or Mrs X, but we are also people of the 20th century, members of a people, carriers of a collective consciousness, and psychically we are just as real and substantive in this capacity as we are as private people. Whatever it is in us that responds to and comprehends the objective content of a piece of art, it is not our subjective ego but an objective dimension within us which corresponds to the true subject of the piece of art, a dimension which connects us with the present time and its spirit. To be sure, we are not our time or our society, but we belong to it, just as much as, the other way around, it belongs to us. Whatever happens to it affects us: Whether it is the success in soccer by the national team or the economic crisis, the piece of art or terrorism; it makes no difference whether we participate personally or not, because the personal level is particularly nonessential. The superpersonal collective is not simply the collection of innumerable private persons, but it possesses an independent psychic reality.

In this manner we become conscious of our responsibility, because the question is pressing in on us: What does terrorism have to say to us (and about us), what does it have to do with us? What kind of a world is it, what kind of a community which practices such signs of the time? I do not want to answer the question in this essay—we all must answer it—but I want

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to restrict myself consciously provisionally to a few aspects. Terrorism can be interpreted as a collective shadow of our time. It reflects and explains the destructive seamy side of our public life and thinking and it tries simultaneously to protest against it, to fight it. It is only apparent at a few places of the entire community, in a few individuals who, however, represent all of us.

There are two specific characteristics that distinguish terrorism: brutal force and anonymity in its application. When I say anonymity I mean the fact that the violent act is committed blindly without any inner connection with the respective victim, that bombs are placed and the perpetrators themselves do not know whom they may tear apart. Terrorism does not fight against specific persons, just as much as it is not fighting for personal goals, but it is directed against anonymous organizations or structures. It is the case even when a gun is aimed at a specific person: The bullets were not intended for the man in Buback but for the Federal Chief Prosecutor and the authority for which he stands. What makes the violence so brutal is the fact that it strikes anonymously and blindly at any victim, that is remains impersonal and abstract.

The twofold characteristic of brutality and abstract anonymity is not only a mark of terrorism but also of the style and mentality of our state of affairs. Initially it may seem incredible, because today, in our society, everything seems to proceed generally quite civilized, constitutional and sometimes even almost philanthropic, certainly to a much greater degree than at any other time. I am not going to dispute that. Nevertheless, I still feel that there is a steadily increasing brutalization, especially on the collective-public level, and it makes only sense if a distinction is made and accepted, a distinction between the outer person and the person as a soul. This distinction is very important because the psychic development of the contemporary man itself made it indispensable and it led to a wide rift between the two aspects and almost total displacement of the aspect of the soul. The displacement was and is so strong that the soul could only return on the basis of some otherwise inexplicable symptoms, disguised as the so-called "unconscious" (which is something totally unknown, hypothetical and something that has never before been anticipated), but in such a state of unconsciousness it can naturally lead only a miserable, wretched existence. With respect to the level of the outer person, today things are as a rule not brutal but pleasantly civilized, i.e., the level that refers to the human being as a legal person and a citizen, as an employee and a person seeking recreation, his basic rights, his social security and his living standard, in short, all those things that today make up the concept: quality of life. From the philosophical point of view, the outer person is the sensual-objective person and psychologically it is the eqo personality, i.e., the personality which comprises the consciousness, my physical experiences and "my" unconsciousness, in other words: "I myself," including everything that is part of me. On the other hand, we cannot consciously perceive the quasi-official terrorism which proceeds from our community, until we cease to stop at the outer person when looking at people and view things from the standpoint of the soul (which is more or less an autonomous person in contrast to the ego personality) and until we stop feeding on and

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being diverted by the "bait" of "improved quality of life" and visualize the treatment of the soul--including the treatment by us!

I would like to show the brutality and anonymity in three areas or aspects of our modern life: in the bureaucratization of life, in the political area and in the trend toward scientism. I will restrict myself to a few examples and pertinent remarks, because I do not want to make my presentation and proof exhaustive but inspire continuing consideration. More and more areas of our lives are becoming victims of the bureaucratization, an administered world is coming into being. In the process, the civil servants' apparatus (or its analogous body in the free economy) is increasingly being supported and replaced by a real apparatus, the computer, which can be called the perfect bureaucrat because it lacks what makes the human functionary an imperfect bureaucrat, human feelings and weaknesses. With the computer humanity succeeded in realizing even the ideal of the bureaucrat in a pure culture, because even its weaknesses are exclusively of a technical or organizational nature. Today all economic planning and economic policies depend on the computer; it takes care of modern police investigations, our letters are delivered with the aid of a computer, a large share of our mail, printed advertising and bills are written and mailed to us exclusively by computers; our bank transactions are carried out by a computer and it goes on and on through all areas of life, including vacation scheduling or even marriage arrangements. But even where the computer is not yet in use, the thinking is more and more adapted to the computer mentality: The police, for instance, is "rationalizing," in cases of speeding or parking controls the main concern is so longer the law but statistics, purely rational, practical aspects, for instance, replenishing the budget; tickets are issued routinely-bureaucratically, totally disregarding any kind of perception of justice, simply following a bureaucratic "fine catalog."

When I use the expression "disregarding the perception of justice," I do not at all want to imply that illegal practices are being applied; on the contrary, because of the rational approach by the police the chances are greater of getting away without a ticket when one would actually have deserved one. In addition, the computer is by no means a total equalizer, it does not necessarily pose a danger to the individual, because the increasing computer technology also makes it possible to consider and coordinate individual wishes or peculiarities within the organization to a much higher degree than human workers would be able to do. Converting to a computer also does not mean that somebody will lose his head in the process or suffer violence; on the contrary, it provides for people relief and an improvement in the "quality of life." At least that is the way it looks when we consider the situation from the viewpoint of the outer person. But what does it look like from the standpoint of the soul? What must be the effect on it when a computer addresses a letter to me, when I receive a ticket based on mere police routine, when I have to stop at a number of traffic lights although the streets are empty? The computer cannot "address" me as a person, as a man with a soul, but only as a statistic, and consequently it can only address and awaken that side of me. Every time I receive such a letter, I am shut out as a person, the soul is liquidated. Every time I have to stop at a traffic-free intersection because of a red light and wait until it turns

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green, I am eliminated as a competent, responsibly acting being and am assuming the nature of the apparatus which directs me. Every routinely-bureaucratically issued traffic ticket—a purely administrative measure—disregards me as a person equipped with a perception of justice, not because it would be unfair—injustice would actually strengthen the perception of justice—but because it is outside of right and wrong and involves the replacement of the idea of justice by an administrative measure.

When one looks at these examples separately, they appear unimportant. It seems that they are insignificant details, and that "nothing else will happen" because of them. But in a similar context Heidegger (1975) made the following statement: "When a doctor treats a number of patients incorrectly, there is an impossible interpretation of a poem, 'nothing else will happen.' But perhaps it is good if we say things more carefully: ...in a case of an inadequate interpretation of a poem it looks as if nothing else is happening. Some day—perhaps 50 or 100 years later—however, something happened." Perhaps we only think that nothing else will happen, because we only look at the foreground, the physical, political, economic and legal events, at visible and tangible damages to our bodies and lives and external comfort, while in reality—although it is not directly visible—an enormous amount of things have happened which will gradually affect even the physical—social sphere. Is it not possible that something serious has already happened: Is it possible that terrorism may already be an initial answer?

It is not immaterial whether I experience and imagine mayself as a noninterchangeable person and whether the manner in which I am approached also indicates that the person within me is meant or whether I am seen as a disposable number in an "integrated personal-data-recording system" and whether I agree to be "recorded" accordingly. It is not immaterial whether a bureaucratic agency uses an automatic radar-control inscallation and a computer printout to send me an "anonymous" notice of a fine as is done to thousands of others or whether I am stopped in person by a policeman and I have to appear before a judge to defend myself. In view of the "administered justice," is it still possible at all to call our state a constitutional state, i.e., if we look at the real meaning of the word? It is not immaterial whether something is undertaken from the viewpoint of a purely practical purpose and a technical-organizational advantage or whether my sensual experiences, my perception of justice, my power of judgment, my feeling of responsibility are addressed (and whether the intentions are sincere). The computer, even if it addresses me by my name and with "Dear Sir..., whether it says "cordially" instead of "respectfully" and prints "private" on the envelope, even if it knows extremely personal information about me and does justice to my individual situation, it has no idea whatsoever what an individual, what a person is; a computer does not mean individual peculiarities as such, but it sees them as abstract characteristics expressed in figures and numbers, which is the reason why the consideration of the individual in computer work is an abomination: It undermines our concept of life of the individual person, because it substitutes imperceptibly an anonymous-abstract, technical-statistical meaning, and as a consequence we will no longer notice how ruthlessly the real personal factors are being eradicated.

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What we have here, in this mentality and the internal style of public attitudes, is the same anonymous brutality toward the soul, which the terrorists employed in their external actions toward society. Terrorism reflects in an obvious manner the psychic terror of our time, which is behind the legal-social civilized atmosphere and which is almost incomprehensible but ever-present, a terror which is not borne by the small circle in economics and politics who are responsible but by all of us. In this area there is no difference between the person who is responsible and the victim. We get what we deserve. To get more material things--more "quality of life," as leisure time, more labor-saving devices through technicalization, more consumer goods through more economic growth, more "education" (= information!)
--we all are selling the qualitative aspects, meaningfulness, justice, in short: our soul. We are not making any attempts to look at life from the viewpoint of the soul, but we have limited ourselves to the point of view of the outer person (body and life, possessions and property). When problems arise, they are exclusively approached by using practical-organizational (political, economic, sociological and technical) categories and methods, a psychic way of looking at things is absolutely nonexistent. (After all, even psychology liquidated "the soul.") There are attempts, for instance, to pass new legislation to guarantee the protection of data: as if the evil did not begin until the illegal misuse of data; it began a long time ago, when the practice was started to "record" and "store" human life in the form of computer data.

With respect to the topic of psychic brutality, the phenomenon of television-because of its enormous influence--is particularly important and so is "managed communication" in general. There are complaints about the violent scenes in the films that are being shown. But that is not the real problem, not the actual corruptive brutality. Rather, truly brutal is the fact that I can turn on and off a person who is speaking on television and the spoken word in general by pushing a button; the fact that I can be "taken care of" technically; that a female television announcer can present a beautiful smile to an apparatus, the camera, which, however, is allegedly intended for the public. But how can I smile at an audience which is not only unknown to me but is is also invisible, unnoticeable, without violating myself? Here we really have absolute anonymity, and the human smile is abused for this purpose; it is robbed of its humanity and objectified, just as much as the word that is turned off can no longer be an animated, living reality ("of divine origin," was was believed at one time), it can no longer be human language in the fullest sense of the word, but it has been degraded to a thing functioning as a means of communication. To be sure, it certainly is feasible that the announcer does not feel at all that she is smiling at the camera, but rather, she is imagining that she is looking at the audience. But if that is the reason why she is able to smile beautifully, it would mean that even subjectively she succumbed to the deception in which she is taking part herself, because objectively the relationship between her and the public is impersonal-anonymous and purely factual (information transmission); consequently the familiarity that was intimated with the smile is not exactly simulating an existing human emotional relationship.

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Somehow one will have to take a look at the disregard for psychic values, which is inherent in our technical approach to culture (culture as a noise backdrop, as consumer goods, disposable if one feels like it, independent of the rules of time and space and our inner disposition. What would people say if human beings were treated in the same manner as creations of the soul?). The distinction between worthless and valuable broadcasts is therefore totally irrelevant when it come to the actual question of value which is raised by television, because tacitly it already presupposes a positive basic decision on the value of television and defies an insight into the principal depreciation and degradation of the psychic culture and personal attributes through television, radio, cassette recorders (not to mention the level of programs or the manner and style of announcements).

I would like to cite only two examples of brutality toward the soul from the political arena. When community reforms are carried out, for instance, it is purely done out of "administrative-technical necessity"; traditions, geographic connections, established community and competitive feelings are ruthlessly disregarded. The abstract number is in command: The personality of a community or a landscape is ignored. When a politician or an industrial manager talk about the expansion of nuclear energy, all they see is that without it "the lights will go out" sometime, growth will stagnate and the number of unemployed people will rise. They point to the "force of circumstances," the perniciousness of the matter, however, is the belief that economic problems are forces of circumstances and not the problems themselves, although they certainly appear serious, temporarily almost insoluble. Such thinking is governed by the independent law of the economy, man himself abdicated and considers himself a mere object of the economy. Consequently, man is a priori reduced through our concept—not by the facts themselves—to "economics"; man as "freedom," as a moral subject, as a creative individual is excluded from the facts from the very beginning. One will certainly have to deal with the hard demands of the objective reality, and one must not suppose that man's freedom to act is unlimited. But the human subject is also a fact and is part of the total situation--unless it is systematically shut out through our attitudes and self-opinion; unless we prevent it from coming to the fore. Fundamentally no consideration is being given to the fact that in the worst cases there might also exist the possibility of a sorrowful renunciation, a voluntary sacrifice. Man is what he eats. An active clearance sale of man as a soul to the self-legitimism of abstract, objective occurrences.

With respect to brutality in the third area which I would like to mention, the trend toward scientism, I would only like to point to the introduction of tests and their statistical evaluation in psychology; here, however, we must also keep in mind that even if nothing else happens outwardly, psychically many things could have happened. Of course, nothing at all happens to the person taking the test; but is it possible to measure what the soul must experience when its living emotions, convictions or feelings are reduced to an abstract cross on a schematic questionaire and subsequently become a dead numerical value? Together will 100 others they will be thrown into one pot and possibly they will be dropped altogether if they should deviate too far from the mean value of the entire investigation. If the soul

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and its emotions are alive, yes, alive beyond the vegetative and animal state, showing human qualities, we can equate what happens to various psychic emotions during a psychological test with reactions by people if they were treated in the same manner. Thus we can experience the anonymous brutality which is no less horrible than the treatment of the physical person in concentration camps. Of course, the psychological test is only one example of a development that is advancing on a wide front and which is pursuing the goal of limiting reality to the calculable and simultaneously denying the status of reality to those areas that are accessible to vivid intuition and sensual experiences. A significant factor is the development of research trends in areas such as information theory and cybernetics, which also look at the entire human and spiritual reality, including art, as if it were a technical product: man in the image of a machine! The idea of man as a machine (Lamettrie) -- at one time, during the enlightenment, it was still a bold concept, hardly more than a presentiment--became reality a long time ago. I cannot go into further details in this connection. The following appropriate words by Heino Gehrt (1975) may serve as a brief summary of this entire topic. He writes: "The growing scientism of the intuitive side of life and the progressive mathematization of this side of science are resulting in a heretofore nonexistent brutality, violating original life impulses. Naturally it corresponds to the brutality to the life impulses which have been dismissed from the social and personal order by this attitude."

As I said before, the above statements contain only a few examples to serve as a hint. A comprehensive discussion would have to include many other things, last but not least the development in the area of language, the (apparently insignificant but still fundamental) importance of which cannot be overrated (deterioration of the language, something which, for instance, is evident in the latest lyrical products; replacing language with pictures—comics and television—combined with the so-called phenomenon of the "no longer readers"; the language in the hands of advertisers, information theorists and computer technicians, etc.). Furthermore, without any additional explanations it has to be pointed out that a discussion which would go beyond a mere illustration of brutality, bringing to light also the background, could not avoid getting into a presentation of the history of the metaphysical attitude of the soul in the occidental world. Everything else would remain a superficial

In addition to the three general aspects which I selected—bureaucratization, politics, scientism—another unique but still symtomatic example for brutalization must be mentioned, particularly in connection with terrorism: forced feeding of prisoners during the hunger strike. But also in this respect I can only make a few brief remarks. Independent of how the moral value must be judged of the respective motives for the hunger strike, a hunger strike is only possible when it eminates from a spiritual—moral power. The act of the forced maintenance of life of those who are conducting the hunger strike is simultaneously a destruction of man as a moral being: In this instance the abstract state machinery is using brutal force to crush an individual psychic emotion (decision); the technical (medical) superiority of the state, the coldest of all cold monsters, is running over a moral principle. The idea of vegetating biologically wins over the spiritual

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existence of man; the last freedom of an otherwise absolutely defenseless person is thwarted without hesitation. The decision of the individual is not respected as something untouchable; one knows better than the prisoners themselves what is good for their welfare. At one time heretics were burned for their own salvation, today hunger strikers are forced to live for so-called The terror is the same. All ideas about the dignity humanitarian reasons. of man have been lost. If the formulation should be retained, at best it might be the human physique, the living organism. The image of man which is manifested here is materialistic in principle, because in the final analysis it reduces man to his physical existence. What good is the basic right of freedom of expression if it does not include the freedom to err and freedom to the final no, to hunger strike? Forced feeding is not taking the superior spirit of our constitutional state and pitting it against the (evil) spirit of terrorism; the challenge on the part of terrorists born of freedom is not being met with a higher moral principle. The fight is not accepted at all at the moral level on which it is extended, but it is bypassed and double-crossed, because the physical substratum and man as a free subject ("and if he were born in chains") is simply taken by surprise and checkmated. No matter how immoral and unlawful the behavior of terrorists, at least on this point their moral superiority becomes apparent, whereas the state declared its own bankruptcy as a defender of human dignity and the freedom of the individual.

Can I defy the fateful disgrace that falls upon me because of a hunger strike until death which is directed against me or a harakiri suicide simply by using force to prevent the physical execution of the suicide? Even under the assumption that the disgrace is undeserved and morally unjustified, brutal force is not a weapon of defense against such an attack. Even if the hunger strike is used maliciously, as a means of blackmail, the striker is coming forward and risking his life, a conscious decision requiring continual will power. Considering such a high risk, abuse ceases to be nothing but abuse, it acquires an extraordinary degree of reality, yes, truth. Consequently the issue is no longer who is right according to legal-formal, written laws and who can subsequently checkmate the other person by using police force, but the issue is that the spiritual substance of the terrorists and the spiritual substance of the constitutional state are engaged in a final, inexorable duel and that during this struggle the truth and the right to existence in reality will have to be decided. Every countermeasure against the hunger strike which loes not require an equally high commitment and is not willing to stake the entire personality and its own moral value is disqualifying itself morally from the very beginning. Whoever cannot make this commitment, must accept the fact that he may be blackmailed. This way or that way we are involved; in something that we are not looking for and something that we do not want, yes, something that originally did not even have anything to do with us. A piece of psychic reality is moving toward us and is compelling us to come up with an answer, which we must provide not with words or deeds but with our being and entity. We must not "overcome" such a reality as a "problem," we must be willing to accept it and be changed by it, "remembering" instead of "acting."

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Although I do not want to deny the political and social aspects of terrorism, in the final analysis, however, it seems to me that this phenomenon is an expression and outburst of a soul that has been driven to the extreme by the sublime terror of our general mentality. The continually progressing violation of original life impulses on the whole spectrum of the spiritual and psychic life is producing an ominous pressure in all of us, an anger which increases in fury the more powerless it is. How is the soul to defend itself against the anonymous computer bureaucracy, who is to be held responsible for the entire development? There is nothing that one can get one's hands on. The pressure which is weighing on all of us--like a heavy climatic pressure-is finding a vent in some individuals and reaching the air as blind brutality; the incomprehensibility of the violation corresponds to the anonymity of terrorist attacks, which are actually not directed at certain responsible individuals but against an entire mentality--called "system," "imperialism," "establishment," etc. Is it really possible to reproach terrorists because they have placed themselves outside our constitutional state, after one accepts their goals as a given fact? After all, the struggle which they are engaged in and which has become their fate cannot be fought with the means of the constitutional state, by the courts and the political parties, because the struggle is actually taking place on a fundamentally new level of experience and understanding, as it were, a new level of reality which absolutely has not yet been anticipated, not to mention included, by the organs and statutes of the state.

To be sure, we experience and endure this reality but we still do not have a conscious concept of it. Our thinking and speaking are not yet aware of it. We are not yet really aware of the pent-up anger within us. It appears that humanity is only beginning to conquer gradually this totally new "world." To us this world is a very sublime world, the psychological level of consciousness, which seems to be in the process of replacing the present factual-real level of experiencing the world. To quote Jung (1972): "It is my firm conviction that beginning now and continuing into the indefinite future the true problem will be a psychological one." At this point I can only give a sketchy illustration on the subject in connection with our immediate topic and statements that have been made, although a detailed presentation would be appropriate because it is dealing with a form of experience of the future which we feel vaguely at best, but which in the final analysis is still something unknown that is difficult to formulate. According to existing concepts, for instance, the term brutality was used when people (or animals) were severely abused, no matter whether is was physical or psychic mistreatment. The psychological conscious less, however, also experiences psychic impulses, emotions, ideas, desires, 'eelings and values (which we ordinarily consider the characteristics of or the substance within man) in a manner as if they were independent persons. Therefore, there can also be a totally different kind of brutality, one that is directed against such emotions. In such a case nothing terrible needs to happen to \bar{a} person, no gestapo is necessary, no clubs and torture instruments, on the contrary, conditions can be "devilishly human" and as we have seen the most brutal violence can take place. It is something that we have to realize more and more until we see this brutality in the same distinct manner and react with the same immediate outrage as we already do

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when it comes to burning witches and to torturing or the way we react to "psychoterror" (in spite of the word component "psycho" it must not be confused with psychic terror to which we refer here). Although we may feel uncomfortable inside when we fill out a questionaire—for the time being we still believe that nothing will happen because of it: because our consciousness has still not accepted the psychic reality; we simply do not yet see it. But it is already there and only too real, something that has been made unmistakably clear by the terrorist answer to the psychic brutalization.

There were times when people were completely insensitive to brutality used against people (torture chambers, inquisition, and into the 19th century the exploitation of the working proletariat) -- something that we hardly imagine today--because their (medieval) consciousness had no idea of man and his natural reality; they only saw the metaphysical-mythical level of reality in our world. As far as they were concerned, man was still completely in the image of God, behind which the physical existence faded into immateriality and unreality or had not yet fully appeared. Only gradually the idea of the "concrete man" fought for and obtained its right against the demands that were placed on man my metaphysics and religion and subsequently captured a place for itself in the general consciousness. Only since then man has been able at all to experience himself as a sensual-objective being. Analogously we too are actually still quite insensitive when it comes to brutality against the person in the soul, because our consciousness is still dependent on the natural, factual, social level of reality, and the right of the soul and its emotions (even against the concerns of the "outer person") must still be conquered. But we have already entered the vast situation of revolutionary change. Today, man's really big problems are no longer the same as they were during the last century, on the level of political and social concerns; concepts a long time ago, they have been integrated into our consciousness and been promoted extensively. It has been a long time since the rights and the welfare of the individual have been a burning topic, because everything that can be said about it was said a long time ago (naturally it is a long way from being realized).

As people who see themselves as politically and socially functioning human beings, we are helpless when it comes to today's problems (mass and consumergoods society, information deluge, technicalization, computer, nuclear threat, breakdown or disintegration of traditional religions and philosophies); we have been surrendered to the "forces of circumstances," because we built structures and unleashed forces that have overwhelmed us. These far-reaching changes are calling for a new man, they require a human being with a psychological consciousness, which will be the only thing that can penetrate the depth of problems and search behind them. Furthermore, it will not have to be a mere object to be surrendered to the technical and social development-which can no longer be reversed--but, on the contrary, it might again consider technology, which overwhelmed us (as mere "outer people"), as a means. The dangers of technology, environmental and population problems cannot be overcome with technology. It would be a catastrophic mistake to think that it might be possible. The only hope of overcoming these problems lies in a change of man in the sense of a fundamental deepening of his consciousness of reality....(As a consequence it is also anachronistic if we are still

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thinking and acting on the political-social level (even in psychology), hoping that it will bring about fundamental changes, if we still do not recognize the so-called women's problem as a genuine psychological problem, which must be treated on the level of the inner attitudes and the style of consciousness and not on the social level "of women" and "of man.")

Just as much we are making a mistake when we fight against terrorists and anarchists with blind hatred and get rid of our disgust with criminal prosecution--the same mistake, the same literalistic misunderstanding to which the terrorists fell victim on their part; they envisaged their protest-which was actually justified -- as a political one and acted "on the outside" with armed force. As I said before, I am not pleading for immunity from criminal prosecution. On the other hand, we do not have to be proud after we manage to put the terrorists under lock and key. After all, the murderer and his executioner are on the same level, between them there exists a hidden identity. And the punishment, although it is necessary, essentially is as much an encroachment on the crime itself. At any rate, moral outrage is out of place. On one hand, it ought to be difficult enough for us to swallow and digest the psychic terror in which we also share, and on the other hand, instead of reacting with outrage, being shocked and challenged by terrorist acts, we should absorb the shock and let it affect us in such a way that something within us will be set in motion. That would be the true answer to terrorism. Something must be done not only with the terrorists but with all of us.

We should be grateful to the terrorists for startling us, because now we have been given an opportunity to pay attention to the general terror, which has been in existence for a long time although it has been barely visible, and by developing a new insight, we will simultaneously enter a new phase of psychological consciousness. In the final analysis, this is the task to which we are challenged by terrorism, the responsibility which it imposes on us. Is it not possible that the deep psychological but totally unconscious meaning of anarchist ideas, which of late have spontaneously sprung up again and again, is not that they are to destroy the state "outside" but the idea of the state: that they break the fixation of our mentality on political and social aspects, the spell under which we are held by the idol--the state-and the idea of society and subsequently overcome (in a psychological but not social sense) the "collective man"? Is it possible that anarchism and the mighty revolutionary impulses are only misunderstood politically and "acted" literalistically because of a psychological consciousness that is too narrow, while they are in reality a fundamental psychic change?

As long as thinking and acting remains politically oriented, the overthrow of a system can only be accomplished in the name of another system, which is the reason why all political revolutions fail. They carry within themselves what they want to overthrow because they operate on the same old level and avoid the true overthrow, which would also have to include their own thinking. It is the tragedy of the politically-oriented anarchism. Nevertheless, it is useless to dismiss as utopian and wrong the powerful longing of modern man for a "revolution," for something new. It is more important to take the inherent impulses and channel them in the direction of their true meaning and goal.

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Anarchism is questioning the state in such a fundamental manner that none of us knows where we stand and how it is to be classified. After all, even the judicial organs have been totally shaken and are at a loss what to do about it. To be sure, normal criminals are antagonists of judges and policemen, but because of it they are playing their role within the judicial system, if I may put it that way. The terrorist, however, does not play along, he is questioning the judicial system in general. What makes that kind of questioning possible at all? It is only possible because a standpoint is actually behind it and it is based on the foundation of that which is questioned. A consciousness which is based on the same foundation as the one which is being considered, cannot fundamentally question the item because it lacks the required dimension. The simple fact that an anarchist movement exists, that the thought of anarchy can even be thought, shows that the consciousness must have penetrated the foundation much more deeply, at a level where the "state" itself becomes altogether questionable (and also can only become at all).

In this respect we should not be disturbed by the fact that the terrorists and anarchists themselves have not yet become conscious of this consciousness: Nevertheless, it is already present although it takes on the form of more or less blind, "impulsive" political behavior (which, however, is supplemented with political theories, but their main value is rationalization and intellectualization). Furthermore, we should not be deceived by the fact that in the terrorist act the new consciousness expresses itself in a purely destructive form (apparently because of the extensive unconsciousness) and we must realize that it represents a truth. It is not unusual that initially a new attitude of consciousness appears only in the form of symptoms, in the behavior and on the affective and somatic level: interferences with customary attitudes, thus the latter also reacts easily with paranoid resistance to the new. Is it not possible that anarchism must be approached psychologically, which may be the only way that it can find fulfillment and that the ideological manner of thinking and the fixation on state and power can be overcome?

The idea of "anarchy" as an invitation to a (psychologically envisaged) individuation? The true revolution as a process of advancing toward the fundamentally new level of psychological form of life? The (modern) "state" as an embodiment of the literalistically solidified imagination—an immovable fact—and the enmity against the state as a negative road toward psychology?

Summary: Terrorism As Task and Responsibility, Reflections of a Depth-Psychologist

Terrorism cannot adequately be explained from the life-histories of the individual terrorists. The life-style of terrorists is one of devotion to powerful transpersonal ideas. Terrorists live and carry for all of us the destructive shadow aspect of our age. Thus they belong to us, and we are called to sincerely respond to the phenomenon of terrorism--not merely negatively through police action, but also in the sense of "responsibility." The crude and open brutality of the terrorists mirrors a subtle and covert brutality of public life. This latter brutality appears to be directed,

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not against people, but against the persons in the soul. This leads to the distinction of a fundamentally new level of experiencing (from the point of view of "soul") from the hitherto dominant one (from the point of view of "man"). The anarchists misunderstand the idea of anarchy as a political idea (on the level of "man") and do not see its actual, psychological meaning. The idea emerges that the "state" might be literalism-embodied and that the antagonism against the state might have to be seen as a via negativa towards psychology.

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